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ABSTRACT
This dissertation thesis deals with the cryptographic constructions for user authenti-
cation. Rather than classical authentication protocols which allow only the identity
verification, the attribute authentication systems are the main topic of this thesis. The
attribute authentication systems allow users to give proofs about the possession of per-
sonal attributes. These attributes can represent any personal information, for example
age, nationality or birthplace. The attribute ownership can be proven anonymously and
with the support of many features for digital identity protection. These features in-
clude, e.g., the unlinkability of verification sessions, untraceability, selective disclosure
of attributes or efficient revocation. Currently, the attribute authentication systems are
considered to be the successors of existing authentication systems by the official strate-
gies of USA (NSTIC) and EU (ENISA). The necessary features are partially provided by
existing cryptographic concepts like U-Prove and idemix. But at this moment, there is
no system providing all privacy-enhancing features which is implementable on computa-
tionally restricted devices like smart-cards. Among all weaknesses of existing systems,
the missing unlinkability of verification sessions and the absence of practical revocation
are the most critical ones. Without these features, it is currently impossible to invalidate
expired users, lost or stolen authentication cards and cards of malicious users. There-
fore, a new cryptographic scheme is proposed in this thesis to fix the weaknesses of
existing schemes. The resulting scheme, which is based on established primitives like Σ-
protocols for proofs of knowledge, cryptographic commitments and verifiable encryption,
supports all privacy-enhancing features. At the same time, the scheme is easily imple-
mentable on smart-cards. This thesis includes the full cryptographic specification, the
formal verification of key properties, the mathematical model for functional verification
in Mathematica software and the experimental implementation on .NET smart-cards. Al-
though the scheme supports all privacy-enhancing features which are missing in related
work, the computational complexity is the same or lower, thus the time of verification
is shorter than in existing systems. With all these features and properties, the resulting
scheme can significantly improve the privacy of users during their verification, especially
when used in electronic ID systems, access systems or Internet services.
KEYWORDS
Privacy, authentication, digital identity protection, cryptography, anonymity, smart-
cards.
ABSTRAKT
Tato dizertační práce se zabývá kryptografickými prostředky pro autentizaci. Hlavním té-
matem však nejsou klasické autentizační protokoly, které nabízejí pouze ověření identity,
ale tzv. atributové autentizační systémy, pomocí kterých mohou uživatelé prokazovat
svoje osobní atributy. Tyto atributy pak mohou představovat jakékoliv osobní informace,
např. věk, národnost či místo narození. Atributy mohou být prokazovány anonymně
a s podporou mnoha funkcí na ochranu digitální identity. Mezi takové funkce patří
např. nespojitelnost autentizačních relací, nesledovatelnost, možnost výběru prokazo-
vaných atributů či efektivní revokace. Atributové autentizační systémy jsou již nyní
považovány za nástupce současných systémů v oficiálních strategických plánech USA
(NSTIC) či EU (ENISA). Část požadovaných funkcí je již podporována existujícími
kryptografickými koncepty jako jsou U-Prove či idemix. V současné době však není
známý systém, který by poskytoval všechny potřebné funkce na ochranu digitální iden-
tity a zároveň byl prakticky implementovatelný na zařízeních, jako jsou čipové karty.
Mezi klíčové slabiny současných systémů patří především chybějící nespojitelnost relací
a absence revokace. Není tak možné efektivně zneplatnit zaniklé uživatele, ztracené či
ukradené autentizační karty či karty škodlivých uživatelů. Z těchto důvodů je v této
práci navrženo kryptografické schéma, které řeší slabiny nalezené při analýze existujících
řešení. Výsledné schéma, jehož návrh je založen na ověřených primitivech, jako jsou
Σ-protokoly pro důkazy znalostí, kryptografické závazky či ověřitelné šifrování, pak pod-
poruje všechny požadované vlastnosti pro ochranu soukromí a digitální identity. Zároveň
je však návrh snadno implementovatelný v prostředí smart-karet. Tato práce obsahuje
plný kryptografický návrh systému, formální ověření klíčových vlastností, matematický
model schématu v programu Mathematica pro ověření funkčnosti a výsledky experimen-
tální implementace v prostředí .NET smart-karet. I přesto, že navrhovaný systém ob-
sahuje podporu všech funkcí na ochranu soukromí, včetně těch, které chybí u existujících
systémů, jeho výpočetní složitost zůstává stejná či nižší, doba ověření uživatele je tedy
kratší než u existujících systémů. Výsledkem je schéma, které může velmi znatelně zvýšit
ochranu soukromí uživatelů při jejich ověřování, především při využití v elektronických
dokladech, přístupových systémech či Internetových službách.
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1 INTRODUCTION
User authentication is a service crucial for many electronic transactions. Without
a secure verification of users, it would be impossible to provide many services both
on the Internet and during everyday life. We need authentication services for the
verification of identities and persons’ authorizations. The most common examples
of systems, where authentication is a fundamental service, are the electronic bank-
ing systems, information systems or physical access systems. In addition to these
fundamental systems, there are many non-critical applications which are used on
daily basis like employee ID cards, library cards or discount cards. With the steep
increase of the number of services provided electronically, it is reasonable to expect a
strengthening demand for secure and reliable authentication systems. On the other
hand, it is not only the security of service providers what is needed to protect. The
security and privacy of users must be also protected. It is very important to keep in
mind the fact that users release a lot of personal information by using authentication
services. Every time we use an authentication system to get an access to a service,
we release our identity, which can be abused by the service providers for tracking
our behavior, profiling our usage of the service or even for impersonation. That is
the reason why modern authentication systems provide privacy enhancing features
protecting users’ identities and private data. In this thesis, the aspects of existing
privacy enhancing authentication systems are analyzed and a new authentication
scheme providing advanced features for privacy protection is developed.
The classical authentication systems, like RADIUS, Diameter or Kerberos, are
frequently used for the identity verification. Based on the identity of a user, the
system usually decides about the authorization. Therefore, the primal goal of these
systems is to provide a user with some secret information and then do the verification
of the possession of that secret. This approach is used in most present authentication
systems because it is simple and allows many variations based on many forms of
users’ secrets. The user passwords, secret keys, private asymmetric keys or even
biometric data can be used. The classical authentication systems, from which the
most successful ones are analyzed in Section 2.1, provide a relatively safe way to
verify the identity of a user. On the other hand, underlying cryptographic primitives
are usually simple and don’t allow building mathematical proofs of security. That is
the reason why more complex authentication protocols have been developed in the
end of 90’s.
The advanced authentication protocols allow a deeper mathematical analysis.
These protocols are usually based on assumptions about underlying cryptographic
primitives. In authentication systems, the use of so called Zero-Knowledge primi-
tives have become very popular for the design of new protocols. These primitives
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allow building mathematical proofs of security. It is possible to prove that an au-
thentication protocol based on Zero-Knowledge primitives releases exactly no more
information about a user than it is designed for. This is very useful because the user
can be then sure that no private information is released during the execution of the
protocol. The Zero-Knowledge protocols are used in many practical systems today.
Even advanced systems, which provide not only authentication but also more com-
plex features, use the Zero-Knowledge cryptographic primitives. We introduce some
of these advanced systems in Section 2.2.2, describe the cryptographic background
in Section 4 and build a new system from related primitives in Section 6.1 and 6.2.
Unfortunately, the verification of user identity brings some risks. Let us leave out
the risk of stolen passwords or keys and let us consider the authentication protocols
secure from this perspective. Even in that case, the service providers always learn
the identities of users who are trying to use their services. The identities can be
considered privacy-sensitive information, from the privacy-protecting perspective it
would be desirable that the service providers learn as little private information as
possible. With the information about users’ identities, it is possible to track users,
analyze their behavior and create user profiles. Based on this information, a more
focused advertisement, prediction of user behavior or even the revelation of other
personal information can be done. In this thesis, it is shown that more granularity
to user authentication is needed. There are many services, like libraries, video
archives or private Internet databases, where the identity disclosure is not necessary
for authorization. In many cases, only the verification of some personal attributes
(like age, license possession or citizenship) is sufficient for receiving a service. In
these cases, disclosing identity is unnecessary and creates security risks. That is
the reason why the attribute authentication systems have been introduced. In these
systems, only a user-selected subset of private attributes can be disclosed. As a
result, the users can stay anonymous during the use of services while their attributes
are securely verified. These systems provide the maximum level of privacy protection
- the users can reveal specifically only those private attributes which are needed by
the service providers.
There are more reasons why the above mentioned privacy preserving authenti-
cation systems are not yet used in commercial systems. The main reason is the
complexity of the cryptographic design. While the classic authentication systems
like RADIUS are simple from the cryptographic perspective, the new attribute au-
thentication systems are very complex and involving advanced mathematical con-
structions. That is the reason why many schemes remain theoretical and on a paper
only. The second reason is the unwillingness of service providers who don’t want
to provide their services to anonymous users. They want to protect their assets by
being able to revoke invalid users and identify malicious users. Unfortunately, it is
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very difficult to achieve privacy and anonymity for honest users together with the
ability to revoke and identify attackers. Currently, none of existing systems pro-
vides reliable and practical revocation of malicious users. Therefore, the goal of this
thesis is to provide a cryptographic attribute authentication scheme with working
revocation features.
In this thesis, the main focus is put on the privacy-preserving attribute au-
thentication systems. They represent the most recent step in the development of
authentication systems and use the most recent cryptographic techniques. Chapter
2 defines the scope of this thesis and analyses the major weaknesses of classical
authentication systems. The existing technologies for privacy protection are also
introduced in that section. Chapter 3 defines the objectives of the thesis. The re-
quirements on the new authentication systems are stated here. Chapter 5 describes
the main competitors of the newly proposed cryptographic scheme which are the U-
Prove of Microsoft and Idemix of IBM. The analysis of related schemes is provided
in 5.3. The main output of this thesis, the new attribute authentication scheme,
is described in Chapter 6 and analyzed in Chapter 7. The information about the
implementation on a smart-card platform and the performance results are provided
in Section 7.3. Finally, the comparison of the proposed scheme with related work is
given in Chapter 8. The conclusion and proposals for future development are given
in Chapter 9.
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2 FIELD OF INTEREST AND MOTIVATION
The field of interest of this thesis and the motivation for developing a new authenti-
cation system are presented in this chapter. The analysis of classical authentication
protocols forms the first part of the chapter. The most popular protocols, namely
RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) [86], Diameter [45] and
Kerberos [75], are described and their disadvantages are presented. Although these
protocols are frequently used in practical scenarios, serious disadvantages connected
to user privacy exist. In particular, none of these protocols provides the anonymity
of users and the unlinkability of verification sessions. Moreover, there is no built-in
support for proving the possession of private attributes in these protocols.
The second part of the chapter is focused on technologies which try to provide the
privacy-enhancing features missing in classical authentication protocols. First, the
anonymous routing protocols are described. These protocols allow anonymous com-
munication on the Internet using the existing IP infrastructure. By using anonymous
routing, the users can stay anonymous and without worries about the identification
from IP addresses. These technologies are already implemented in practical systems
and are ready for use. They can be used in existing attribute authentication sys-
tems as a communication subprotocol as well as in the scheme proposed later in this
thesis.
The last section of this chapter is devoted to the introduction of attribute au-
thentication systems. These systems are the successors of classical authentication
protocols described in the beginning. Attribute authentication systems allow users
to keep their data private and stay anonymous in situations where identity disclo-
sure is not necessary. The defining properties of attribute authentication systems
are stated and the motivation for building attribute authentication systems is de-
scribed in this section. Finally, a short overview of existing systems for attribute
authentication, namely anonymous authentication systems, group signatures, cre-
dential systems, and anonymous tokens, is provided.
2.1 Classical Authentication Protocols
The authentication protocols described in this section are denoted as classical pro-
tocols. They are usually used for the identity verification where the user gives a
proof about his identity. The most common authentication systems use usernames
and passwords for the verification of users. The assumption is that the user’s secret,
which is securely distributed before actual authentication takes place, is known only
by its owner. Therefore, the knowledge of the secret is equivalent to being able to
prove the identity. On the other hand, nothing more than identity is usually proven
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by these protocols and users’ real identities are almost always disclosed. Users don’t
have an option to act anonymously1 and cannot give verifiable statements about
their attributes.
RADIUS Protocol
The RADIUS protocol (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) [86] is cur-
rently one of the most popular protocols for remote authentication of users. The
reason for being so popular is its simplicity, effectiveness and easy extensibility. It
is supported by almost all network border devices used for access control. It is the
typical representative of centralized systems, therefore the user, controller and au-
thentication server entities can be found in the communication pattern. The usual
configuration of a network using RADIUS is depicted in Figure 2.1.
User Controller
Authentication Server
Protected
Network
Fig. 2.1: RADIUS communication pattern.
In RADIUS, the user verification can be done by direct password transfer,
challenge-response method or EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) [19] method.
The simplest method is the direct transfer of username and password. The password
is transferred in an encrypted form so eavesdroppers are unable to learn it from the
communication between the controller and authentication server. The method based
on the username-password transfer is depicted in Figure 2.2 and the protocol runs
accordingly to following steps.
• The user transfers his username and password to the controller. This can be
done using a webform or PPP (Point-to-Point Protocol) protocol. The transfer
method is not defined in the standard and can be decided by the manufacturer.
• The controller creates the Access-Request message from the received informa-
tion. The Access-Request message carries the username in plaintext and the
password encrypted using XOR and MD5 [82]. The Access-Request message
is depicted in Figure 2.3(a).
1With the exception of pseudonyms. In that case, users can generate and change their user-
names randomly which guarantees their anonymity and unlinkability of their verification sessions.
Unfortunately, in most practical systems, users cannot create or modify their usernames.
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User Controller Authentication Server
Username, Password
Access-Request
Access Accept/Reject
Accept/Reject
Fig. 2.2: RADIUS direct transfer method.
• The authentication server receives the Access-Request message, checks the
username and password with respect to its database and does the decision.
The decision whether the user is accepted or denied is put to the Access-
Response message depicted in Figure 2.3(b).
• The controller receives the Access-Response message and accepts/rejects the
user accordingly. Optionally, the controller can inform the user about the
result of authentication.
Code ID Length Nonce Username Pass
Username
PasswordNonceKey
MD5
XOR
Access Request
(a) Access Request
Code ID Length Nonce Username Password
MD5
Check
Access Request
Code ID Length Nonce Key
Code ID Length Hash
Access Response
(b) Access Response
Fig. 2.3: RADIUS Access-Request (a) and Access-Response (b) messages.
The above described method is protected against replay attacks by using a ran-
dom nonce (number used once) for each session. But there is also a more secure
version of RADIUS which uses a challenge-response method. In this method, the
password is not transferred in the first step. Instead of containing the password, the
reserved field is either empty or containing the “ch” character. The Access-Request
message is transferred to the authentication server like in the former method. The
server answers with a random string called challenge. The controller resends the
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challenge to the user who must answer with a right response (for example, gen-
erated by a hardware token or computed using a hash function). The response
is put to the password field in the Access-Request message and sent back to the
authentication server. The server then accepts or denies the access of the user.
The last available variant of RADIUS uses the EAP protocol. The EAP protocol
gathers more authentication methods to a single protocol with unified syntax. In
this case, the RADIUS protocol only transfers EAP frames in RADIUS messages
and allows the direct communication between the user and the authentication server.
The advantage of EAP is its scalability because it is possible to add new authenti-
cation methods and therefore extend the original set of supported methods. EAP
is usually used in local networks and can be encapsulated by both RADIUS and
Diameter [45]. The most common EAP authentication methods are enlisted.
• EAP-MD5: the classical challenge-response method using the MD5 function
as a hash.
• EAP-TLS: the method used in the TLS protocol [54] based on asymmetric
cryptography and certificates. The mechanism is similar to the challenge-
response technique. The identity verification is based on the ability to encrypt
random messages by a private key of user’s certificate.
• EAP-TTLS: the method is based on EAP-TLS but does not require the use
of certificates on users’ side. The users are verified using a password.
• EAP-PEAP: the method is similar to EAP-TTLS and does not require the
usage of certificates on user’s side. The server certificate is still needed. EAP-
PEAP is common in enterprise implementations.
EAP is becoming more and more popular not only in enterprise environments but
also in personal authentication systems. It is the variability of the system which
makes it useful for a large number of practical scenarios. Nevertheless, most methods
in EAP still use either a password or a private asymmetric key as the authentication
factor. Similarly to plain RADIUS, identity of users is disclosed and there is no
support for attribute authentication.
Diameter Protocol
Diameter protocol [45] has been developed as the successor of the RADIUS protocol.
Therefore, there are many characteristics common for these two protocols. The
improvement was done in the area of mobile network support and in extensibility.
Although Diameter is not directly compatible with RADIUS, there is a compatibility
patch available. The authentication methods used in Diameter protocol are very
similar to those used in RADIUS. The communication pattern of Diameter stays
the same as it is in RADIUS for most common authentication scenarios. Diameter
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is not designed to add new authentication methods, rather than that it adds syntax
and supporting mechanisms. The changes from RADIUS are following.
• TCP or STCP protocol is used instead of UDP protocol used in RADIUS.
• The protocol is protected by IPSec or TLS.
• The AVPs (Attribute Value Pairs) carrying extending information have been
enlarged from 8b to 32b.
• A better support of error control, accounting and roaming have been imple-
mented.
Kerberos Protocol
All above described protocols, RADIUS, EAP and Diameter, belong to the cen-
tralized authentication systems. They are usually used for controlling the access of
remote users to private networks. The typical example is the VPN (Virtual Private
Network) access where users are accessing a remote private network over an inse-
cure channel, typically the Internet. These protocols form the majority in practical
implementations of remote authentication systems. Nevertheless, there are also sys-
tems where local users have to be authenticated before accessing local assets. Let
us consider local company networks where users are accessing company servers over
LAN (Local Area Network). For these scenarios, Kerberos protocol [75] is very of-
ten used. The Kerberos protocol does not work on the edge of the network but
only controls the access of users to local resources. The communication pattern of
Kerberos is different from the pattern used in centralized systems. The Kerberos
entities are the user, KDC (Kerberos Distribution Center) and the protected server
the user is trying to access. Informally, it is possible to say that KDC gives users
the approval for using protected servers. The communication pattern is depicted in
Figure 2.4.
The Kerberos protocol is based on symmetric cryptography. Therefore, each user
of the system must have a unique secret key. Since the protocol uses a centralized
administration, each user key is distributed and stored by the central database of
KDC. If a user wants to access the assets of protected servers, he must ask KDC for
a permission. If the access is granted by KDC, the user is given a ticket. The ticket
is a construction later used for authentication with a protected server. The whole
process can be described by following steps.
Obtaining a TGT (Ticket Granting Ticket) usable for a service request.
1. A user creates a password which is shared between him and KDC. Using a
hash function, so called LTK (Long Term Key) is computed from the password
by the user. The user also creates a request for the initializing TGT (Ticket
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Fig. 2.4: Kerberos communication pattern.
Granting Ticket) encrypted by LTK. TGT allows receiving tickets for protected
services from KDC. The request is computed using identification data and the
time of construction.
2. KDC receives the request and verifies all data including user’s password, time
and personal data. If the check is correct, the TGT construction is created.
TGT is composed of two parts - the first one is encrypted by user’s LTK
and the second one is encrypted by KDC’s LTK. Both parts contain a newly
generated temporal key called TGT session key. TGT is sent to the user.
3. The user receives TGT and stores it. TGT will be later used for future requests
for services. It is not necessary to use LTK any more so the user password
and LTK stay secret from this point.
Obtaining a ticket for using a protected service. This process uses the previously
generated TGT.
1. The user composes a request for a service. It is composed of TGT, name of
the requested service and the identification data encrypted by the TGT session
key. The request is sent to KDC.
2. KDC receives the request, decrypts the TGT and recovers the TGT session
key. Using this TGT session key, KDC decrypts identification data and checks
them. If the check is correct, KDC creates an answer composed of two parts.
The first part is a newly generated session key encrypted by a TGT session
key and the second part is the service ticket. The ticket is the newly generated
session key with authentication data, all encrypted by the LTK of the protected
server.
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3. User receives the answer and recovers the session key. User contacts the pro-
tected server and sends the ticket.
4. The protected server receives the ticket and decrypts it using his LTK. The
authentication data are recovered and are trusted because the ticket has been
generated by trusted KDC. The protected server allows the user to use its
services.
It is clear from the above described procedure of authentication that Kerberos
uses symmetric cryptography and hash functions. The main problem of this protocol
is KDC which must be completely trusted. KDC is able to eavesdrop the communi-
cation of all users and forge invalid sessions. In local networks in companies, this is
not usually an issue because KDC is administered by the company. But KDC is also
a single point of failure because, if attacked by attackers, all secret user keys can be
disclosed from a single database. Kerberos is not usually used for authentication of
remote users like RADIUS or EAP.
Other Protocols
RADIUS, EAP, Diameter and Kerberos are the most common protocols used for
user authentication. Most devices providing access control are supporting at least
one of these protocols. Nevertheless, there are more authentication protocols avail-
able. They are less common and some of them are strongly bound to particu-
lar operating systems. The examples are TACACS+ [37], LANMAN, NTLM or
NTLMv2 [90]. TACACS+ is a protocol very similar to RADIUS. The username
and encrypted password are sent like in RADIUS. The difference is in the transport
mechanisms (TACACS+ uses TCP segments) and in the separation of supported
services. TACACS+ separates authentication from authorization and accounting.
However, also TACACS+ works with mechanisms similar to those used in RADIUS.
LANMAN, NTLM, NTLMv2 are protocols used in Microsoft’s operating systems.
These protocols are based on the challenge-response mechanism in combination with
a hash function. Again, the authentication methods are based on cryptography
known from above analyzed protocols. We provide a short overview of properties
provided by analyzed protocols in Table 2.1.
The first column of the table refers to services provided by the respective pro-
tocol. AAA means authentication, authorization and accounting. If some part is
substituted by the “-” mark, the respective service is not supported by the protocol.
The second column marks the authentication method used in the protocol. The
analyzed protocols support Direct Transfer of Secrets (Direct), Challenge-Response
method (Ch-R) or EAP methods. The third column states whether symmetric or
19
Tab. 2.1: Comparison of classical authentication protocols.
Services Authentication Cryptography Usage
RADIUS AAA Direct, Ch-R, EAP Symmetric Remote auth.
Diameter AAA Direct, Ch-R, EAP Symmetric Remote auth.
EAP AA- EAP A/Symmetric Remote auth.
Kerberos AA- Direct A/Symmetric Domain auth.
LANMAN AA- Ch-R Symmetric Local auth.
NTLM AA- Ch-R Symmetric Local auth.
NTLMv2 AA- Ch-R Symmetric Local auth.
Glossary:
Services: AAA (Authentication, Authorization, Accounting), “-” means unsupported
Authentication: Ch-R (Challenge-Response), Direct (Direct transfer of secrets)
Usage: Auth. (Authentication), Domain auth. (authentication within local network)
asymmetric cryptography is used. The last column states the most common envi-
ronment where the protocol is used.
The protocols briefly analyzed in this chapter represent those ones mostly sup-
ported by commercial implementations and devices. Many more protocols were
analyzed during the research preceding writing this thesis. Overall, more than 100
papers dealing with authentication were analyzed by the author and the research
team. Not only classical protocols, but also protocols based on biometrics and un-
conventional methods were included. The results and statistics were published in
[14, 15] but the outcomes correspond to protocols analyzed in this thesis. Three
major weaknesses were identified in classical authentication protocols: low security
stemming from outdated cryptographic primitives, no protection of user identity
and missing support for proving other attributes than user identity.
Weaknesses of Classical Authentication Protocols
The three most significant weaknesses of classical authentication protocols are stated
in the following section. Other weaknesses might be found when analyzing the
protocols from other perspectives but those related to security, cryptographic design
and privacy are considered most significant in this thesis due to its scope.
Weakness 1: Low Security
Vast majority of analyzed authentication protocols is based on outdated crypto-
graphic primitives. The most common methods are: sending encrypted passwords,
computing a response for a challenge and the use of personal certificates. Classical
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protocols heavily rely on hash functions, with many protocols’ security depending
on old and broken functions (for example, LM hash [90], MD4 [81] or MD5 [82]).
From the practical perspective, the classical protocols are working and providing
reasonable protection against attackers. On the other hand, it is very difficult to
provide proofs about their security using mathematical analysis. In many cases,
the security of protocols is only “trusted”, supported only by statistics. Fortunately,
with the use of modern cryptography, it is possible to use primitives which allow
mathematical proofs of security. There are constructions which allow to manage
the amount of information released during the authentication session. For exam-
ple, one can use Zero-Knowledge protocols to limit disclosed secret information. In
more advanced systems, it is possible to reduce the security of the whole system
to the security of some well-known assumptions. Then, with these assumptions,
even complex systems can be proven secure in a mathematical model. Nevertheless,
the provable cryptographic constructions are used very rarely in practice and are
almost missing in classical protocols. Therefore, the security of classical protocols is
considered low in this thesis due to the fact that it is very difficult to analyze (using
mathematical models) the underlying cryptographic primitives.
Weakness 2: No Identity Protection
All classical protocols analyzed in this thesis release user’s identity during authen-
tication. Up to here, we analyzed only classical authentication protocols where
authentication is defined as identity verification. In this model, the service provider
learns the identity of a user and then decides about authorization. However, the
services which don’t need identity disclosure are becoming more frequent with the
rising popularity of electronic devices. For such services, it is possible to check only
some attributes of the user without learning his identity. For example, some services
need only age verification and the identity can stay hidden. The disclosure of iden-
tity might be also undesirable when privacy-sensitive services are used. With the
rising amount of electronic communication, user privacy is becoming a real problem,
therefore it is desired to keep private data as secure as possible. Unfortunately, re-
leasing the user identity during every verification session is not a perfect way how to
stop the degradation of privacy. This problem of privacy degradation and missing
identity protection has been acknowledged by both European and USA governments
and respective documents calling for new authentication services have been released
[74, 72]. Due to missing protection of identity in classical protocols, the classical
protocols are considered useless for future deployment in this thesis.
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Weakness 3: No Attribute Proofs
Classical authentication protocols allow users to give proofs about their identities.
That is also the classical definition of authentication. But more flexibility is needed
to support modern electronic services. Let us consider electronic identification cards
(eID). eIDs are now being introduced in many countries in Europe, including the
Czech Republic. These cards can be used to give proofs about their owners’ citi-
zenship or to electronically sign documents. Sensitive personal information can be
stored on these cards so that their owners can give proofs about the possession of
attributes. For example, the users can give proofs about driving license ownership
or their marital status. But such proofs about attributes are currently unsupported
by classical protocols. Therefore, new authentication protocols must be designed to
provide not only proofs about user’s identity but also about user’s attributes. In
this sense, it is necessary to broaden the definition of authentication from identity
verification to attribute verification. In this definition, an attribute is any property
related to the owner. The examples are user’s age, citizenship, birthplace, birth date,
gender or authorization to use some services. Similarly to Weakness 2, where the
identity protection is required, a call for novel systems providing attribute authenti-
cation has been released by US government [74]. Classical authentication protocols
don’t support attribute authentication and the verification of user attributes is done
by lookups in service provider’s database. This approach is not only insecure (user
identity is always disclosed) but also inefficient since the attribute database must be
available to all service providers.
The three weaknesses stated above constitute great security risks to the privacy
of users of electronic systems. The proliferation of miniaturized devices such as
smart-cards or mobile phones together with an easy access to the Internet make
the authentication protocols ubiquitous. These protocols are used many times a
day not only by our computers but also by smart-cards, authentication tokens and
mobile devices. With each use of these protocols, we lose a little of our privacy. With
frequent use, the loss of privacy can be considerable and dangerous. Therefore, there
is a strengthening ambition to provide new authentication protocols with privacy
enhancing features. In this thesis, the privacy enhancing authentication systems are
the main topic.
2.2 Privacy Enhancing Technologies
During the analysis of classical authentication protocols, the missing features for
identity protection have been found to belong among three most significant weak-
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nesses. With the growing number of services provided electronically, particularly
those services which do not need identification for authorization, a solution pro-
viding user anonymity is required. It is desirable that users can choose between
full authentication where identity is proven and attribute authentication where only
the possession of some attributes is proven. Existing authentication protocols do
not provide such flexibility. Moreover, underlaying communication protocols don’t
support anonymity either. The most common protocols used on the Internet, the
TCP/IP protocol family [78], were not designed to provide any privacy. Each user
is identified by a unique address therefore all communication can be traced and
linked to real persons and companies. Although there are techniques which allow
some privacy, like Network Address Translation (NAT) or dynamic IP addresses,
these technologies don’t provide full anonymity and can be used to track users.
Fortunately, new technologies have been developed to provide anonymous commu-
nication channels in the Internet. Most of these solutions work with the TCP/IP
protocol family so they can be used directly with existing Internet infrastructure.
With these anonymous routing technologies practically available, more complex pri-
vacy preserving systems can be built. Anonymous routing protocols can be used
as communication subprotocols for more complex attribute authentication schemes
so that full anonymity of users is provided and no IP address tracking is possi-
ble. Therefore, users do not have to worry about their privacy when using Internet
authentication systems. In theory, the mentioned systems provide full anonymity
during the verification of users’ attributes.
In the beginning of this section, the existing anonymous routing protocols are
described. The criterion for selection is security and practical usability. Anonymizer
proxies [20], Crowds [83], WebMIXes [29] and Onion Routing [85] have been selected
as the most promising technologies. The analysis of these protocols is provided in
the first part of this section. In the second part, the analysis of existing attribute
authentication schemes is provided. These schemes work as an upper layer and
their security and functionality rely on anonymous routing protocols described in
the first part. Anonymous authentication schemes [88], credential systems [61, 41],
group signatures [62] and anonymous tokens [68] have been included to the analysis
of attribute authentication systems. Each of these systems provides a different level
of privacy protection and different functionality, therefore a comparison is provided.
On the basis of the analysis, existing systems for a potential future use are selected
and goals for a new system development are defined. The section is based on results
published in author’s papers [2, 15, 16, 10] where more information can be found.
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2.2.1 Anonymous Routing
Any solution to electronic privacy protection has to work with the TCP/IP protocols
because the Internet infrastructure is based on them. Unfortunately, the original
design of TCP/IP protocols did not count with anonymity. Any change to existing
protocols would be extremely difficult and costly thus it is necessary to provide a
new protocol layer which will hide sender’s and receiver’s identifiers. The goal is
the creation of an anonymous channel where the attacker, who is able to intercept
traffic of a subgroup of intermediate communicating users, is able to identify neither
sender nor receiver. Also, the receiver should be unable to identify the sender. It
is important not only to hide user addresses but also to make the traffic analysis
impossible. Solution to this problem is called anonymous routing. The basic idea
is that more entities between the sender and the receiver are added. Then traffic is
scrambled in such a way that an attacker is unable to distinguish who sent what.
Using anonymous routing, the anonymous channels can be created. They can be
used to transfer data from one entity to the other without identity revelation. That
can be further used in more complex systems for attribute authentication.
There are many solutions to anonymous routing available. Only the practical
ones are included in the following analysis.
Proxies
The anonymizer proxies are the simplest solution. The whole group can be rep-
resented by the Anonymizer Internet service (www.anonymizer.com) which works
with the mechanism of a proxy server. In a common scenario, a client wants to
communicate with a server without revealing his identity. That is why he contacts a
proxy through a private channel first. All data he sends are encrypted in such a way
that only a proxy can decrypt. All requests of the client are sent to the proxy server
which initiates a new connection to the server and resends all data with proxy’s
source address. The server receives requests but is unable to distinguish the original
initiator as the only address he can see is proxy’s address. That is why he sends the
reply to the proxy. The proxy creates a private channel with the client and resends
data from the server to the client. The whole method is depicted in Figure 2.5 for
a web page request example.
Security of the above described design depends on the proxy entity. It works
as a mediator of the communication who resends data between the sender and the
receiver to keep them separated thus anonymous. On the other hand, the proxy
must be a trusted device because it is able to link communicating entities together
and thus break anonymity. That is the reason why this approach cannot be used in
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Fig. 2.5: Anonymizer proxy design.
more advanced systems as it is unacceptable to give such strong power to a single
entity.
Crowds
A different approach is used by a service called Crowds [83]. In Crowds, anonymity is
based on the idea of “hiding in a crowd”. Traffic traverses through a probabilistic path
created by a large number of users from the sender to the receiver. The mechanism
is based on the alliance of many users of the Crowds service. The sender has a list
of participating users available. All users can be used as relays for resending others’
traffic to the receiver.
A user sends traffic directly to the receiver with probability 𝑝. With the remain-
ing probability 1−𝑝, the user sends traffic to a random user of Crowds. That is why
data sent by the sender do not go directly to the receiver but to a random Crowds
user with probability 1− 𝑝. The random user then sends data to the receiver with
probability 𝑝 and to another random Crowd user with probability 1− 𝑝. Using this
technique, a random path through the Crowd network is generated. No one who in-
tercepts traffic is able to distinguish whether the source address of a captured packet
belongs to an original sender or to just a randomly chosen relay. The mechanism
is illustrated in Figure 2.6. In the picture, the requests go as follows: User-1-6-4-
Receiver2, User-5-2-7-Receiver3 and the third request goes directly from the User 3
to the Receiver 1.
Crowds use symmetric cryptography and are resistant to attacks from subgroups
of malicious users. Like all solutions in our overview, also Crowds are not resistant
to the global adversary who is able to intercept all traffic. Security depends on the
average number of nodes between the sender and the receiver thus on the parameter
𝑝. The more relays are put between the sender and the receiver, the lower is the
probability that a malicious user intercepts a packet with sender’s original address
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Fig. 2.6: Crowds design.
inside. Of course, there is the price of communication overhead because data must
be sent 𝑘-times in the case of 𝑘 + 1 users in a path. The main advantage to the
anonymizer proxies is that users do not have to trust a single entity.
Web MIXes
Web MIXes is a system based on the mixes mechanism introduced in [29]. The
topology is different from the previous systems, although it combines them to some
extent. It is not a peer-to-peer network where all users use all other users like in the
Crowds example but it is not a centralized system like anonymizer proxies either. In
this system, the sender contacts a dedicated structure of entities called MIXes which
scrambles and reorders traffic and sends it to the receiver. The idea is that the MIX
structure consists of many MIX entities administered by different organizations.
These MIXes are not under a centralized control and the whole system works if at
least one MIX scrambles honestly. The assumption is that the attacker is able to
control 𝑛−1MIXes at most. The system works with a program installed on sender’s
computer which intercepts all (but not limited to) HTTP traffic like a proxy server.
These data are encrypted and sent in constant size chunks to the first MIX. The
MIX receives, decrypts and reorders data from all senders. After the reorder, the
MIX resends to another MIX and the process continues as long as data go through
all mixes. The last MIX sends data to the receiver. The process is depicted in Figure
2.7.
Security of the approach is based on the impossibility of linking the output of
MIXes to inputs. This is due to encryption - data come to MIXes encrypted and
are released decrypted and reordered. The system needs several layers of encryption
as data go through more Mixes. To make traffic analysis difficult, the system must
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Fig. 2.7: Web MIXes design.
generate a dummy traffic from all senders so the attacker is unable to distinguish
who is actually sending data and who is quiet. For future usability, it is also very
important that WebMIXes are already implemented and used in practice2.
Onion Routing and TOR
A mechanism similar to Web MIXes is used by Onion Routing [58, 85]. The sender
does not contact the receiver directly but through a proxy software installed on
his computer which sends data through a network of entities called Onion Routers
(Figure 2.8).
Sender Receiver
B
A C
Onion Routing Network
Fig. 2.8: Onion Routing design.
Asymmetric cryptography is used to protect data from eavesdropping by malicious
Onion Routers. All packets sent by the proxy (𝑟𝑒𝑞) are encrypted by public keys
𝑉 𝐾 of all routers on the path. The encryption must include next hop headers (ℎ𝑑𝑟)
2Available at https://anonymous-proxy-servers.net/en/.
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- the encryption for a three router situation is described by Equation 2.1.
𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑡 = 𝐸𝑉 𝐾𝐴(ℎ𝑑𝑟 + 𝐸𝑉 𝐾𝐵(ℎ𝑑𝑟 + 𝐸𝑉 𝐾𝐶 (𝑟𝑒𝑞))) (2.1)
Every router peels off a layer of encryption as the packet goes through it. It learns a
next hop IP and an encrypted payload to send. That is the reason why routers know
only their predecessors and successors because all IP addresses of remote routers
on the path are encrypted. Security of Onion Routing is based on asymmetric
cryptography and randomness of the path. Therefore, the routers must be chosen
randomly and at least one of them must be honest.
TOR Protocol
The practical implementation of Onion Routing is called TOR [51]. It uses the
above described principle to choose a random path through routers and to encrypt
data with an encryption layer for every router. The difference is in cryptography
as TOR uses symmetric cryptography for data encryption and asymmetric cryp-
tography for key establishing. Before actual data are sent through a random path,
the proxy establishes a symmetric key using a Diffie-Hellman protocol with every
router on the path. Then, the proxy encrypts data with the established keys in a
similar fashion as described in the Onion Routing section and sends them to the first
router. The peeling procedure is the same as in the original Onion Routing protocol.
The difference is in efficiency as symmetric encryption is much faster in a practical
implementation. Security depends on the same factors as in Onion routing, namely
cryptography security and at least some honest routers. The TOR design can be
used for any protocol and thanks to efficiency and low latencies it is one of the most
popular solutions. TOR is also recommended to be used as a solution for anony-
mous Internet channels in more complex constructions as attribute authentication
schemes.
Protocol Specific Solutions
In theory, all systems mentioned above can carry any protocol although they are
mostly used for the HTTP protocol. But there are also solutions designed directly
for specific protocols. The BitBlender [30] is the practical example of a protocol
designed for the BitTorrent protocol. It has specific features as it does not pro-
vide confidentiality for transferred data (data are already public information). The
BitBlender is based on an infrastructure similar to Crowds, i.e. the peer-to-peer
structure of many users. The operation is very similar as traffic is always forwarded
with a certain probability to a random user or to the receiver. The idea remains
the same as in the Crowds case. The eavesdropper cannot be sure whether the data
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sender is the original sender or just a resending user. These systems are not usable
for multi-purpose traffic and that is the reason why they are not used in structures
presented later in this thesis.
The goal of the section was to identify available solutions for anonymous routing.
Such channels can be further used in more complex structures. Based on protocol
features and on practical experience, TOR and Web MIXes are identified as the
most usable systems for further applications.
2.2.2 Attribute Authentication
The techniques for anonymous routing were described in the previous section. Us-
ing these techniques, users can anonymously communicate over the Internet without
worries about their identity disclosure. But not only computers are usable for elec-
tronic communication. In many situations, personal mobile devices are more suit-
able. For example, for citizenship verification on borders, age verification in pubs
or membership verification in libraries, it is much more convenient to use smart-
cards. These chip-enabled electronic cards can be used for verification while stored
in user’s purse and carried whenever necessary. The same advantage of mobility
can be provided by modern mobile phones supporting NFC (Near Field Commu-
nication). Altogether, there are many practical solutions which allow anonymous
communication between electronic devices. With these solutions in hand, it is neces-
sary to identify systems for attribute authentication. These systems would provide,
together with anonymous routing or smart-cards, a way how to be authorized with-
out disclosing unnecessary private information including identity. In this section,
we introduce the concept of attribute authentication and provide a short overview
of existing solutions for attribute authentication.
A practical example scenario of an electronic database (library, archive etc.) is
described here to introduce attribute authentication systems. While it is definitely
not the only application of attribute authentication systems, it demonstrates the
new approach to user authentication. Let us consider a private database accessible
only by paying users who have been issued an attribute certifying to paid annual
fees. In this case, every user must be verified as a paying customer before he can
access the database. If the user runs a protocol for attribute verification, he can
be verified as a paying customer without his real identity being released during the
communication between the user and the verifier. Therefore, the user can be sure
that the provider of the private database is unable to track what types of data
are accessed by the user. Many schemes can be used for this kind of verification,
e.g. anonymous authentication schemes, credential schemes, group signatures or
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anonymous tokens. Some of these schemes provide even higher level of user privacy:
the unlinkability of verification sessions. By using this feature, the user can be sure
that his verification sessions cannot be linked together to a single profile. Therefore,
the service provider is unable to see behavioral patterns, like what articles are read
subsequently by a single user or what groups of services are more likely to be accessed
together.
On the other hand, there are also features demanded by service providers. The
owner of the hypothetical private database must be able to revoke users who canceled
their memberships. Therefore, a practical revocation feature must be included to
allow the removal of users from the group. This can be very difficult in some schemes,
if only a smart-card is used for verification. But service providers need more than
that. If a user breaches certain rules of the system, e.g. erases some important data
in the private database, there must be a mechanism for the anonymity revocation
of that malicious internal user. But, at the same time, it is necessary to prevent
from misusing this feature. Honest users must stay anonymous and attackers must
be identifiable. For obvious reasons, the decision who is the honest user and who is
the attacker cannot rely solely on the service provider, who would then be able to
misuse its power to track users.
In our private database scenario, we considered only the access over the Internet.
But it is also very plausible that the new attribute authentication scheme will be
required to be usable in physical access systems. The anonymous access to buildings
or libraries, as well as various types of personal verifications (e.g. of age, nationality)
can be given as examples of potential applications. In these cases, the user must be
verifiable without the use of a personal computer. Usually, only an extremely slow
device is available, like a smart-card. The new scheme must be therefore efficient
enough to be implementable on a smart-card. There are few schemes which have
been implemented on smart-cards. Moreover, these implementations support only
a subset of required features.
To explicitly show the difference between classical authentication and attribute
authentication, the following two definitions are included.
Classical Authentication [67]: “Entity authentication is the process whereby one
party is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the identity of a
second party involved in a protocol, and that the second has actually participated
(i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the evidence is acquired).”
Attribute Authentication: Attribute authentication is the process whereby one
party is assured (through acquisition of corroborative evidence) of the possession of
particular attributes of a second party involved in a protocol, and that the second
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Fig. 2.9: Attribute authentication scheme.
has actually participated (i.e., is active at, or immediately prior to, the time the
evidence is acquired).
The general communication pattern of attribute authentication is depicted in Figure
2.9. It refers to Users, Issuers and Verifiers.
• Users: entities who want to get verified and use protected services which
are accessible only by users with certain attributes. They demand as much
privacy as possible so only minimal private information must be disclosed
during verification.
• Issuers: entities who issue Users’ attributes (like age, citizenship, birth place
etc.). Issuers can be either separate entities or combined with Verifiers.
• Verifiers: entities who want to check the validity of Users’ attributes and
disclose possible attackers. If required attributes are successfully proven by
users, verifiers provide (or allow to provide) required services.
The basic features of attribute authentication systems were informally described
in the practical database access scenario. More formally, following features are
demanded from attribute authentication systems [41, 74, 10].
• (Provable) Security: the attribute authentication system must be crypto-
graphically secure. Systems where security is based on a mathematical model
and a reduction to well-established assumptions can be called provably secure.
• Anonymity: anonymity during verification should be provided. In attribute
authentication systems, authentication does not mean proving identity but
proving some private attribute ownership without revealing identity. There-
fore, a user must be provided with an option to give a proof about some
attribute ownership without leaking his real identity.
• Untraceability: users of attribute authentication systems should be untrace-
able thus no entity should be able to trace and profile user’s behavior.
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• Unlinkability: more verification sessions of a single user must be mutually
unlinkable. This feature prevents user profiling. User profiling, e.g., analyzing
the types of used services and times of usage, can in some cases lead to the
identification of users. Furthermore, this feature prevents service providers
from learning users’ habits and behavioral patterns.
• Selective disclosure of attributes: users should be able to decide what
subset of private attributes is disclosed during verification. Thus, only the
minimal subset of those attributes needed for authorization are disclosed.
• Non-transferability: users’ attributes should be non-delegable to other users.
• Practical revocation3: it should be possible to revoke users who lost their
tokens, smart-cards. Also expired, stolen or blocked accounts should be easily
revocable. Furthermore, anonymity of malicious users should be revocable.
On the other hand, revocation features must be protected against a misuse.
We identified basic requirements on attribute authentication schemes. Some of these
requirements can be met by cryptographic constructions introduced in the following
section. An introduction briefly summarizing the key features of related systems is
given in the rest of this chapter. The complex analysis of the most related systems
is provided in Chapter 5 and in author’s papers on that topic [15, 6, 4].
Anonymous Authentication Systems
Schaffer and Scharter’s [88] scheme is the typical representative of anonymous au-
thentication systems. The scheme relies on Discrete Logarithm (DL) and Diffie-
Hellman assumptions and works with the group Z*𝑝 and its subgroup Z𝑞, where
𝑞|(𝑝− 1) and 𝑝, 𝑞 are primes. Therefore, appropriate parameters must be generated
and distributed. Each user additionally generates a unique 𝑖𝑑𝑖 (based on his unique
smart-card ID) and an ElGammal keypair (𝑒𝑖, 𝑑𝑖) for encryption/decryption. The
key entities are the trusted center 𝑇 , its hardware-protected part TRD (Tamper
Resistant Device) and entities used for revocation called Revocation Centers. The
trusted center 𝑇 also generates ElGammal keypair (𝑠𝑡, 𝑣𝑡) for signing/verification
(the private key is available only to TRD). Revocation centers are given decryption
key shares 𝑑𝑟𝑖 and accordant encryption key 𝑒𝑟 is provided. The scheme works in at
least three phases: user registration, establishing of authentication data, authenti-
cation and optional revocation.
3Due to privacy enhancing features, it is very difficult to provide working and efficient re-
vocation. In fact, providing computationally efficient revocation is the key problem of existing
solutions.
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User Registration
User 𝑈𝑖 personally gives his public information to 𝑇 . This comprises a commit-
ment to his identifier and a public key. 𝑇 puts user’s personal public values to its
database. User receives 𝑇 ’s public keys.
Establishing of Authentication Data
During this phase, 𝑇 creates authentication data for the user without learning the
link between them and user identity. This is thanks to TRD, which is considered
secure and trusted. Authentication data are user’s personal data randomized in
TRD in such a way that no entity except TRD can link them together. Therefore,
if TRD is trusted, no one can learn user’s identity from authentication data. TRD’s
output of randomization, the authentication data, are given to users via anonymous
bulleting board. Users then store their authentication data on their smart-cards.
These cards are later used for anonymous authentication.
Authentication
The authentication data provided in the previous phase were computed using user’s
personal data. They can be viewed as a special form of encryption to which the
user has a private key. The key represents his identity. Therefore, using a Zero-
Knowledge protocol, the user can give a proof of knowledge of authentication data
construction because he knows the secret personal information stored inside au-
thentication data. The Zero-Knowledge protocol is the key building block of the
authentication phase where the user proves that the authentication data were con-
structed using his personal data. If the user is successful, the verifier can be sure,
that a valid user was presenting the proof. On the other hand, the proof is com-
pletely Zero-Knowledge, so no additional information is released except that the user
knows the secret personal data used for the construction of authentication data.
Revocation
The revocation centers can be used to decrypt users’ authentication data. In that
case, personal data are disclosed and users can be revoked from the system. In
the Schaffer and Scharter scheme, more levels of revocation can be selected and the
power of revocation center is spread among more entities. Unfortunately, this does
not lower the need for trust in the trusted center 𝑇 .
The security of the scheme is based on the implementation of the trusted entity,
which is secured by hardware means, not by cryptography. The efficiency of the
scheme is questionable, since any single authentication is efficient, but the complex-
ity of required memory space and computations grows with the number of needed
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authentication sessions. Since users would like to use a smart-card as long as pos-
sible without requesting new pseudonyms, the smart-card memory should be used
more efficiently, e.g. by allowing to create new authentication data without the com-
munication with trusted entity. The authors do not provide any verification of the
scheme in the form of an implementation or simulation. Furthermore, anonymous
authentication schemes generally do not provide proofs about attribute ownership
but allow proving group membership only.
Group Signatures
The purpose of group signatures is to allow a group member to create a group
signature on some data. That signature can be verified using a group public key.
The output of such verification is that either the signature was made by a group
member or not. No concrete member identity is released. In case of disputes, a
trusted revocation manager can be called to reveal signer’s identity. The connection
with anonymous authentication is straightforward as we may ask users to sign a
nonce to be authenticated.
Early group signatures like [33, 34] were inefficient as the signature size and/or
computation time depended linearly on the group size. This is not acceptable for
practical use due to large groups and the need to transfer the signatures using
smart-cards.
Most of the existing schemes [46, 77, 73, 26, 64] also employ only one group man-
ager who is responsible for user registration and revocation. It is more convenient
to avoid such a design to eliminate the use of trusted third parties. Some more
complex schemes allow spreading powers over more entities using multi-party com-
putation, unfortunately this is not the case of most group signatures. Such design
was introduced without background details in [89].
While the modern group signatures solve the efficiency problem and use constant
size signatures (e.g. [64] or the very efficient [77]), revocation is still a problem. Some
schemes need to contact all group members to revoke a single member and some
need to modify already established keys. A solution called VLR (Verifier-Local
Revocation) was introduced in [26]. In that case, all operations are made on the
verifier’s side so it is not necessary to contact users.
Credential Systems
The credential systems were proposed in many variants, the original proposal is
based on [41, 42] and more recently on [44]. The systems are usually composed of the
credential issuing protocol, verification protocol and revocation protocol. Idemix of
IBM [44] is currently considered the most advanced and practical credential scheme.
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Using the scheme, users can not only provide proofs of credential possession but also
proofs of attribute possessions (like the age proofs). The scheme is provably secure
and implementable on current smart-card devices, with already provided JavaCard
implementation [28]. The scheme does not provide anonymity revocation in cases,
where users misuse their anonymity to harm provider’s system. Furthermore, plain
revocation of credentials is very problematic as revokers must wait until credentials
expire.
The verification session can run using a smart-card only, so the user does not
have to use (and trust) any further device. The protocol can run as many times
as needed, without any leakage of user identity information and without any trace-
able information released. According to the performance, the user can finish the
authentication in less than 10s, which is considered efficient, but still somewhat in-
convenient. Also, non-standard modifications of the JavaCard has to be done for the
scheme, namely the RSA interface has been changed by the authors. Since idemix
is considered the main competitor of the novel scheme provided in this thesis, a
detailed analysis of credential systems is provided in Chapter 5.2.
Anonymous Tokens
The last group of systems, represented by U-Prove technology designed by Stefan
Brands [22], uses a cryptographic construction called token to anonymously verify
users’ attributes. Users can give proofs about their attributes ownership without
releasing their identities. Users can also disclose only a selected subset of private
attributes. Unfortunately, these systems do not practically support the unlinkabil-
ity of verification sessions, thus all user’s sessions are linkable to a single profile
and the service providers can analyze users’ past behavior. Similarly to credential
systems, there is also no practical revocation because users can be revoked only by
verifiers after spending tokens. Users who own a token but haven’t spent it cannot
be revoked. Furthermore, revocation can be done only by verifiers, not by attribute
issuers. In scenarios, where the attribute issuers and the attribute verifiers are split
into different entities, the weak revocation can be a reason for refusing anonymous
tokens. Nevertheless, U-Prove is also considered a close competitor, therefore a more
detailed analysis is provided in Chapter 5.1.
All four described types of systems provide some of privacy enhancing features de-
fined in the beginning of the section. Unfortunately, no system provides a universal
solution supporting all features. The anonymous authentication systems and the
group signatures are not very usable for attribute authentication because they are
designed to allow users to provide only a single attribute proof - namely group
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membership proof. Furthermore, there are problems with revocation and the identi-
fication of malicious users. The credential systems and anonymous tokens are much
closer to desired solution. They both support full attribute authentication so users
can give various proofs about their private attributes without being limited to a
certain number or type of attributes. Unfortunately, even credential systems and
anonymous tokens have disadvantages which prevent these systems from being com-
mercially successful. A complex analysis of these two systems is given in Chapter
5. The key problems of existing solutions are identified and resolved in a newly de-
signed scheme in Chapter 6. The comparison of the existing schemes and the newly
proposed scheme is given in Chapter 8.
2.3 Motivation
The right to privacy belongs to fundamental human rights. In recent time, the
erosion of privacy in electronic systems is becoming noticeable. The more electronic
services people use, the more private information is disclosed. It is not only the
identity of users which is released, it is also their behavior. Sometimes, the behavior
can provide valuable information for creating more focused advertisement or services.
That is the reason why personal data become a valuable item on the Internet market
and international corporations try to gather as much personal information as they
can. With ubiquitous access to the Internet, mobile devices, tablets and smart-
cards, it is not very difficult to gather personal information about users and their
behavior. Many companies like Google, Facebook or Microsoft have millions of user
accounts and it is very difficult to find out how the private data of users are stored
and processed.
With the arrival of new services, the situation will not get any better. The rapid
expansion of cloud services transfers our data from our computers to centralized
servers. Again, it can be very questionable how privacy is protected and how user
profiling can be prevented. The same questions are applicable to electronic IDs.
Electronic passports are already used and electronic identity cards are currently
being enrolled all over the Europe. With citizen’s private information stored on
electronic IDs, it will be very difficult to prevent more degradation of our privacy.
The goal of this thesis, closely defined in Chapter 3, is to prevent the erosion of
user privacy by proposing a novel system which allows a better protection of users’
private information through means of modern cryptography.
Privacy can be protected if there exist mechanisms providing anonymity. The
solutions for the anonymous communication over the Internet, called anonymous
routing, were analyzed in Section 2.2.1. The Onion Routing and its implementa-
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tion TOR have been identified as practical and secure technologies for anonymous
communication. Rather than developing new anonymous routing protocols, TOR is
used in scenarios where anonymous communication over the Internet is needed. Un-
fortunately, there is no similarly simple solution to attribute authentication. Here,
a cryptographic scheme allowing users to give proofs about their attributes is miss-
ing. The required features have been stated many times in both academic papers
[60, 41, 22] and government calls [74, 72]. But, based on the results of our analysis
of attribute authentication systems, there is no scheme which supports all required
privacy enhancing features in a single practical solution. Therefore, only classi-
cal authentication protocols without any privacy enhancing features are available
for commercial systems. By designing a practical attribute authentication system,
much more privacy protection can be given to users of electronic services. More-
over, completely new systems and services can be provided in currently unsupported
scenarios where identity disclosure is a major problem.
It is not only users who can benefit from the introduction of attribute authen-
tication systems. Currently, the service providers must store private information4
of their users in databases to be able to verify their clients. This can be costly and
connected to restrictions imposed by legislation. The protection of private sensitive
information can be, in some situations (like in hospitals, courts or government),
very costly. By introducing attribute authentication, we allow users to carry their
attributes and give proofs about them to verifiers (service providers). As a result, the
service providers are not required to store personal authentication data any more.
In cryptographic protocols used in both existing schemes and the newly proposed
scheme, the verifiers are not required to store any privacy sensitive authentication
data about users. By adding anonymity, it is also possible to store data without the
link to concrete persons/companies.
Finally, it is much easier to use a single system for all privacy sensitive applica-
tions. All personal attributes can be stored on a single smart-card. This increases
the user comfort because only one device is used in all transactions, as well as user’s
privacy because a single device can be protected more easily than many. Users do
not have to trust any databases or third parties as it is only their smart-card which
carries their attributes.
4Like passwords, hashes of passwords, certificates etc.
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3 THESIS OBJECTIVES
The general objective of this thesis is to provide more privacy and identity protec-
tion in user authentication. Although it may sound contradictory to provide both
privacy and authentication, there are systems which partially allow that. With at-
tribute authentication systems, it is possible that users only prove the possession of
some personal attributes (for example age, citizenship or driving license ownership)
without disclosing their identity. More types of systems can be called attribute au-
thentication systems. Therefore, the analysis of existing systems is the first objective
of this thesis. The most promising ones, credential schemes and anonymous tokens,
are introduced in Chapter 2.2.2 and analyzed in Chapter 5. Unfortunately, these
complex cryptographic systems do not provide all required features. Therefore, the
main objective of this thesis is to design a new cryptographic scheme which will
support all privacy preserving features stated in Chapter 2.2.2. The new scheme
will support following features.
• Security: the novel scheme will be built using strong cryptographic primitives.
• Anonymity: the scheme will protect user’s identity by providing anonymity
during the verification session.
• Untraceability: no entity in the scheme will be able to trace a particular
user.
• Unlinkability: more verification sessions of a single user will not be mutually
linkable to a single profile.
• Selective disclosure of attributes: users will be able to disclose and prove
the possession of any subset of their private attributes.
• Non-transferability: user’s will be strongly discouraged by used cryptogra-
phy from lending their attributes to other entities.
• Practical, complex revocation: invalid credentials will be revocable and
malicious users will be traceable or even identifiable while honest users will
stay anonymous.
The above enlisted privacy enhancing features are partially supported by existing
systems. Nevertheless, two of these features are very difficult to provide. It is the
unlinkability of verification sessions where it is necessary to make all sessions com-
pletely different and mutually unlinkable. All authentication data must be always
regenerated and randomized to provide unlinkability. This operation can be too
complex for low-performance devices such as smart-cards. The leading scheme for
anonymous tokens, the U-Prove [68], currently does not support the unlinkability.
The other privacy enhancing feature, revocation, is even harder to obtain. For revo-
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cation, some authority or authorities must be able to reveal all sessions of a particular
user and invalidate them. This virtually contradicts anonymity, untraceability and
unlinkability. Currently, satisfactory revocation is not supported by existing prac-
tical solutions. The new scheme for attribute authentication designed in this thesis
will provide all required features, including unlinkability and revocation.
It is important to denote, that there are theoretical proposals which provide all
required features [41, 44, 43, 27]. But these systems are impractical due to their
computational inefficiency. On current smart-card technologies, these systems are
completely unimplementable. Their key disadvantages are revocation by expiration
only, the impossibility to run verification in a reasonable time (≤ 10 s) or the
necessity to update users’ credentials (tokens) frequently.
Furthermore, it is necessary to provide guarantees for service providers that
the new system cannot be abused by users who want to exploit anonymity. Such
guarantees are not provided by existing systems which leads to their rejection by
the commercial sector. Therefore, a complex revocation of malicious user anonymity
must be provided and users’ responsibility for their acts must be assured.
By providing all mentioned privacy-enhancing features, particularly the unlink-
ability of sessions and practical revocation, all key requirements on new generation
authentication scheme defined in government calls are met. Thus, it will be possi-
ble to construct new practical authentication systems which will be protecting user
privacy and digital identity much more than current solutions do.
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4 CRYPTOGRAPHY AND NOTATION
This chapter describes the cryptographic constructions and the notation used in
this thesis. The cryptographic primitives are described here because they are used
in subsequent chapters describing the related work and the proposed scheme. Most
cryptographic primitives use the concept of provable security. In this concept, math-
ematical models giving proofs about primitives’ features can be built. Thus, it is
possible to build proofs about the security of protocols. The primitives used in this
thesis are shown here together with related proofs and definitions. The notation
is also described here because it is used not only in chapters devoted to the novel
scheme design but also during the analysis of most related systems.
The first construction, cryptographic commitments, is used in cases where a user
needs to commit to a number without disclosing it. Two versions of commitments
are shown here, the computationally hiding and perfectly binding commitments and
the perfectly hiding and computationally binding commitments. The concept of
Zero-Knowledge (ZK) protocols is described in the next part. The cryptographic
background, proofs of properties and protocol examples are provided. Using the ZK
protocols, the Σ-protocols are introduced. They represent an efficient and practical
variant of ZK protocols. The Σ-protocols for proofs of knowledge, representation
and discrete logarithm equivalence are described in next sections because they are
very frequently used in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. Using above mentioned primitives,
more complex constructions can be built. The Okamoto-Uchiyama Trapdoor One-
Way Function and Bao’s Verifiable Encryption are described as they are used in the
design of the proposed scheme.
4.1 Used Cryptographic Primitives
Most cryptographic primitives described in this section exist in more variants. In this
thesis, the variants working with modular arithmetics and groups where a discrete
logarithm is hard to compute are used.
4.1.1 Commitment Schemes
A cryptographic commitment scheme can be used in scenarios where a user (U) is
required to bind to a number without disclosing it. Therefore, there are two proper-
ties which must be fulfilled. They are the hiding property and the binding property.
A practical example of using the commitment schemes is the situation where a user
generates a random number 𝑤 and computes a commitment 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑟, 𝑤) using
a randomness 𝑟. Then, the user can disclose 𝑐 to some verifier (V). Although 𝑐 is
40
disclosed, the verifier is unable to learn 𝑤 from it (hiding property) and the user is
unable to change his 𝑤 without changing 𝑐 (binding property). More formally:
• Hiding property: for V, it is difficult1 to learn 𝑤 from 𝑐.
• Binding property: for U, it is difficult to compute (𝑟′, 𝑤′) such that 𝑐 =
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑟, 𝑤) = 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑟′, 𝑤′) and 𝑤 ̸= 𝑤′.
Either of these properties can hold unconditionally while the other holds computa-
tionally. In commitment schemes, it is impossible to have both hiding and binding
properties holding unconditionally. Two examples of commitment schemes are de-
scribed here: the Discrete Logarithm (DL) commitment and the Pedersen commit-
ment [79].
Discrete Logarithm Commitment Scheme
The DL commitment scheme works with the subgroup Z*𝑞 of a multiplicative group
Z*𝑝. The subgroup Z*𝑞 is defined by a generator 𝑔 of order 𝑞 in mod𝑝, where 𝑞 and
𝑝 are large primes and 𝑞 divides 𝑝 − 1. The same settings is used in the Digital
Signature Algorithm (DSA) [71]. Numbers 𝑔, 𝑞, 𝑝 are system parameters which are
made public. To commit to a number 𝑤 < 𝑞, a user computes 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤 mod 𝑝. The
user can later decide to open the commitment by making 𝑤 public. The scheme is
computationally hiding and unconditionally binding.
• Hiding property: for V, it is difficult to learn 𝑤 from 𝑐 because it is compu-
tationally hard to compute discrete logarithms in DSA subgroup [71]. Since
the DL hardness assumption is used, the hiding property holds only compu-
tationally.
• Binding property: for U, it is impossible to compute 𝑤′ such that 𝑐 =
𝑔𝑤 mod 𝑝 = 𝑔𝑤
′
mod 𝑝 because the order of 𝑔 in mod𝑝 is 𝑞 and both 𝑤 and
𝑤′ must be smaller than 𝑞. Because no assumption is used here, the property
holds unconditionally.
Pedersen Commitment Scheme
The systems parameters 𝑔, 𝑞, 𝑝, used in the DL commitment scheme, are also used
in the Pedersen scheme [79]. Additionally, one more generator ℎ is used. It is
important, that log𝑔 ℎ mod 𝑝 is unknown to the user. The commitment to a secret
number 𝑤 is computed as 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤ℎ𝑟 mod 𝑝 where 𝑟 is a random number chosen by
the user and smaller than 𝑞. The user can later decide to open the commitment by
making (𝑤, 𝑟) public. The scheme is unconditionally hiding and computationally
binding.
1It is either impossible or computationally infeasible.
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• Hiding property: for V, it is impossible to learn 𝑤 because 𝑟 randomizes 𝑐
to any number in Z*𝑞. In other words, with fixed 𝑐, for each 𝑤 < 𝑞 there is a
unique 𝑟, such that 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤ℎ𝑟 mod 𝑝 holds. That is why the hiding property
holds unconditionally.
• Binding property: for U, it is difficult to find (𝑤′, 𝑟′) such that 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤′ℎ𝑟′ mod
𝑝 = 𝑔𝑤ℎ𝑟 mod 𝑝. Computing (𝑤′, 𝑟′) is computationally equivalent to solving
the DL problem which is assumed hard. That is why the property holds only
computationally.
4.1.2 Zero-Knowledge Protocols
Many cryptographic protocols can be denoted as Zero-Knowledge (ZK) protocols
[80]. The ZK protocol family, analyzed in [1, 9], has special features which prevent
from the leakage of private information during the protocol run. The minimization
of leaked private information can be very useful in authentication protocols. Here,
secret information must be used for authentication but cannot be disclosed to at-
tackers. In classical authentication protocols, there is no control over the amount
of disclosed private information. It is possible that some part of secret information
about, for example, passwords or secret keys, is disclosed although the attacker is
unable to get the complete information. Let us consider encrypted passwords. If
the encrypted passwords are communicated during the authentication session, then
the passwords are usually safe but their length is disclosed. In classical authenti-
cation protocols, it is very difficult to precisely define what private information is
disclosed. Furthermore, the verifier usually knows the secret information too so he
is able to verify the user. In Zero-Knowledge protocols, this is not necessary. The
goal is, therefore, to design a protocol where the user is able to give a proof about
the knowledge of his secret information without actually disclosing it. ZK proto-
cols allow exactly such a functionality. By using ZK, a user can give a proof about
some statement (e.g., that he knows some secret) without leaking any additional
information. This property of ZK protocols can be mathematically proven.
Interactive Proof Systems with ZK Property
There are more systems which can hold the ZK property. The Interactive Proof Sys-
tem (IPS) is one of them. This system is composed of two Turing machines which
are equipped with a communication tape. One of these machines, called Prover (P),
is computationally unbounded2 and the second one, called Verifier (V), is compu-
tationally bounded. P represents a user and V a verifier in authentication systems.
2Or in possession of some secret in the case of Interactive Arguments Systems.
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Prover
Interaction
Verifier
X
Accept/Reject
Fig. 4.1: Interactive proof system.
Both machines have a common input 𝑋. After receiving this input, the machines
are running and interacting until a result “Accept” or “Reject” is output by V. The
system is depicted in Figure 4.1. The result is that the pair (P,V) accepts or rejects
𝑋. The input 𝑋 can be a statement which can be True or False, leading to its
acceptance or rejection. Two properties hold for IPS.
• Completeness: if the statement is true (i.e., 𝑋 belongs to some language L),
𝑋 ∈ 𝐿, then the probability that (P, V) rejects is negligible with the length
of 𝑋.
• Soundness: if the statement is not true, 𝑋 /∈ 𝐿, then the probability that
(P*, V) accepts 𝑋 is negligible with the length of 𝑋. P* represents any client,
not only the honest one.
If IPS is used for user authentication, then the user is given a secret information
and a statement about the possession of such secret information is created. Then
the user runs the protocol as the Prover. If the user knows the secret, he is almost
always accepted by V. If the user does not know the secret, he is almost always
rejected.
The above described system can be used for user authentication but does not
specify what secret information is disclosed. Therefore, there is no protection against
disclosing users’ secrets. A system where the secret information is transmitted to
V in a plain text perfectly fulfills both completeness and soundness but is useless
in practice. That is the reason, why one more property has to be added to protect
secret information. It is the Zero-Knowledge property. By adding ZK property to
IPS systems, we get Zero-Knowledge protocols. The basic idea of ZK property is
based on a simulator MV* which is able to successfully run the protocol instead of P.
If there exist a simulator, which can simulate the protocol without knowing Prover’s
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secrets and the simulation output is indistinguishable (denoted as ∼) from the real
protocol output, then no secrets are released by the real protocol. Therefore, it is
always necessary to find a simulator which is able to simulate all values generated
by the real protocol. The concept of the ZK simulator is formalized in the following
definition of ZK property [56, 53].
Definition 1. An interactive proof system or argument (P, V) for language 𝐿 is
Zero-Knowledge if for every probabilistic polynomial time verifier V*, there is a
simulator MV* running in expected probabilistic polynomial time, such that we have
MV* ∼ (𝑃, 𝑉 *) on input 𝑋 ∈ 𝐿.
There are three variants of the ZK property, namely computational ZK, statis-
tical ZK and perfect ZK, depending on how accurate the simulation is (computa-
tionally, statistically or perfectly indistinguishable from the real protocol run). The
Definition 1 is then accordingly altered using MV* ∼𝐶 (P,V*), MV* ∼𝑆 (P,V*)
or MV* ∼𝑃 (P,V*). The definition states that for each ZK protocol it is possible
to find a polynomial time simulator which is able to generate an output indistin-
guishable from a real protocol run. The simulation runs between MV* and V, so
P is not present in the simulation, therefore his secrets are missing. Therefore, the
simulation is not depending on Prover’s secrets anyhow. This is possible due to
more levels of freedom of the simulator. MV* can generate protocol messages in
any order, unlike Prover, who must respect the order of messages. The definition
also states that the simulator must work with any Verifier (marked as V*), not only
with the honest one. Therefore, the ZK property is preserved even in cases where
the Verifier tries to cheat and make the Prover release more secrets than necessary.
It is also required that the simulator is computationally bounded and running in
polynomial time. The example of a perfect ZK protocol is given in the next section.
Zero-Knowledge Protocol Example
The protocol published in [57] uses two isomorphic graphs 𝐺0 and 𝐺1 as a common
input to P and V. P claims that 𝐺0 and 𝐺1 are isomorphic and that he knows a
permutation 𝜋 such that 𝐺1 = 𝜋(𝐺0). Such a permutation is believed to be hard to
compute if only graphs 𝐺0 and 𝐺1 are known. The protocol has three steps which
are repeated 𝑛-times where 𝑛 is the security parameter. The protocol is depicted in
Figure 4.2.
1. P chooses a random permutation 𝜔 and computes 𝐻 = 𝜔(𝐺0). P sends 𝐻 to
V.
2. V chooses a random bit 𝑏 ∈𝑅 {0, 1} and sends it back to P.
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Prover Verifier
𝐺0, 𝐺1
Secret 𝜋 : 𝐺1 = 𝜋(𝐺0)
Start of round
Random 𝜔 : 𝐻 = 𝜔(𝐺0)
𝐻−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
𝑏 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
If 𝑏 = 0, then 𝜎 = 𝜔−1
If 𝑏 = 1, then 𝜎 = 𝜋𝜔−1
𝜎−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check: 𝐺𝑏
?
= 𝜎(𝐻)
End of round
Fig. 4.2: ZK protocol based on graph isomorphism.
3. P computes a response 𝜎 on 𝑏 such that 𝐺𝑏 = 𝜎(𝐻) holds. The 𝜎 permutation
is sent back to V who either accepts the round or halts the protocol.
The goal of the protocol is to give the proof of knowledge of 𝜋 without disclosing it.
The completeness, soundness and ZK properties hold, therefore the protocol is an
IPS with the ZK property.
• Completeness: the Prover who knows 𝜋 can answer always correctly. If
𝑏 = 0, then 𝜎 = 𝜔−1. If 𝑏 = 1, then the Prover sets 𝜎 = 𝜋𝜔−1.
• Soundness: the Prover who does not know 𝜋 should be rejected. Let us
assume that the Prover does not know 𝜋 but he is accepted. If the Prover can
give an answer to one request only, he is accepted with probability 2−𝑛 after
𝑛 rounds, which is negligible. Therefore, he must be able to give a correct
answer to both 𝑏 = 0 and 𝑏 = 1. But in that case, the Prover is able to
compute 𝜋 = 𝜔 × 𝜔−1𝜋 which contradicts the assumption.
• Zero-Knowledge: it is necessary to construct a simulator of the protocol
which runs without knowing 𝜋. The simulator runs in these steps (for 1 round).
1. MV* chooses a random bit 𝑏
′ =𝑅 {0, 1}.
2. MV* chooses a random permutation 𝜎 and sends 𝐻 = 𝜎
−1(𝐺𝑏′) to V*.
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3. V* chooses a random bit 𝑏 =𝑅 {0, 1} and sends it to MV*.
4. If 𝑏 ̸= 𝑏′, the simulator goes back to step 1. If 𝑏 = 𝑏′, the simulator
outputs (𝐻, 𝑏′, 𝜎).
The simulator runs in expected polynomial time 2𝑛 because the probability of
𝑏 = 𝑏′ is 1/2. The output (𝐻, 𝑏′, 𝜎) is indistinguishable from the real proto-
col run (assuming 𝐺0 and 𝐺1 are isomorphic, then 𝐻 is just another random
permutation, 𝑏 and 𝑏′ are equal and 𝜎 is a random mapping given by the ver-
ification formula, just as in the real protocol). More details in [57].
The protocol shown above is an IPS (providing completeness and soundness) with
the Zero-Knowledge property (providing a ZK simulator). Therefore, the protocol
can be used for the authentication of users who know the secret in the form of the
permutation between 𝐺0 and 𝐺1. The protocol is perfectly ZK, therefore there is a
mathematical proof that no secrets (information about the permutation) leak during
the run of the protocol. In theory, the ZK protocols can be used to give proofs about
any statement. Unfortunately, most ZK protocols are inefficient (like the example
with graph isomorphism). In practical authentication systems, ZK protocols would
require too many rounds of communication between P and V. Therefore, more effi-
cient protocols were designed. These protocols, called Σ-protocols, provide similar
properties like the ZK protocols while being very computationally efficient.
4.1.3 Σ-protocols
The Σ-protocols [32, 50] (Sigma-protocols) provide similar properties as the full ZK
protocols while staying practical. They can be used in more complex constructions
as building blocks. In this thesis, the Σ-protocols are used in the cryptographic core
of the system proposed in Chapters 6.1 and 6.2. The Σ-protocols have following
properties.
• 3-way pattern: there are 3 messages, one goes from the Prover to the Verifier,
the second (the challenge) goes vice versa and the last one (the response)
goes again from the Prover to the Verifier. Besides these messages, system
parameters must be pre-shared before running the protocol.
• Completeness: an honest Prover who knows secret information is always
accepted by the Verifier.
• Special Soundness: Prover’s secret presence is required for the acceptance.
That is assured by the existence of a probabilistic algorithm M, called knowl-
edge extractor, which is able to extract the secret from P if it is given a
rewindable black-box access to it. This property assures that it is impossible
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to correctly answer more V’s requests without knowing the secret.
• Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK): similarly to full ZK, this prop-
erty guarantees that no secret information is released during the protocol run.
In contrast to full ZK, the HVZK provides such security guarantee only for the
communication with honest Vs. This might seem impractical but fortunately
this problem can be resolved by slight modifications of the protocol. The Σ-
protocols can be made computationally ZK using [55] and fully ZK using [35].
The HVZK simulator must have the same characteristics as the full ZK sim-
ulator, thus run in polynomial time and generate an output indistinguishable
from the real protocol run.
Similarly to ZK protocols, the Σ-protocols can be used for proving statements.
Unlike full ZK, these protocols cannot be used for proving all statements. The most
practical statement proofs are based on the DL problem or the RSA problem. By
using Σ-protocols, the prover can efficiently prove that he knows a discrete logarithm
of some public value, a representation of some public value and that the discrete
logarithm of some different public values are the same with respect to different bases.
These practical protocols are the core of many modern cryptographic constructions.
They form the basis of both the scheme presented in this thesis and its most related
systems shown in Chapter 5. The protocols are shown here to provide more detailed
information about basic building blocks used in the proposed system as well as to
provide proofs of their properties because the security of the whole system relies on
the security of these primitives.
All Σ-protocols presented in this chapter work with the DSA subgroup Z*𝑞,
namely with generators 𝑔𝑖 of order 𝑞 in modulo 𝑝, where 𝑞, 𝑝 are large primes and 𝑞
divides 𝑝− 1. Parameters 𝑔𝑖, 𝑞, 𝑝 are pre-shared to both Prover and Verifier.
Proofs of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm
The Proof of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm (PKDL) protocol can be used by the
Prover to give a proof about the knowledge of a discrete logarithm of some public
value 𝑐 with respect to generator 𝑔 and modulus 𝑝. Using PKDL, the Prover is able
to convince V that he knows 𝑤 = log𝑔 𝑐 mod 𝑝 without actually disclosing it. The
practical protocol, called Schnorr protocol [87], is depicted in Figure 4.3.
The protocol is Zero-Knowledge (ZK) against honest verifiers; it can be made
ZK against any V using [35]. It can run non-interactively using [55]. With some
restrictions, the protocol can be used in groups with hidden order by sending an-
swers in Z [52]. The protocol is considered to be a Σ-protocol because it fulfills all
requirements.
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𝑔, 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤 mod 𝑝
𝑟 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞
𝑐 = 𝑔𝑟 mod 𝑝
𝑐−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
𝑒 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
𝑧 = (𝑟 − 𝑒𝑤) mod 𝑞
𝑧−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check: 𝑐
?≡ 𝑔𝑧𝑐𝑒 (mod 𝑝)
Fig. 4.3: Schnorr’s proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm protocol.
• 3-way pattern: the Schnorr protocol is a 3-leg protocol with 3 moves.
• Completeness: an honest Prover knows 𝑤, therefore he can compute an
answer 𝑧 = (𝑟 − 𝑒𝑤) mod 𝑞, which is always accepted in the final check:
𝑐 ≡ 𝑔𝑧𝑐𝑒 ≡ 𝑔𝑟−𝑒𝑤(𝑔𝑤)𝑒 ≡ 𝑔𝑟𝑔−𝑒𝑤𝑔𝑒𝑤 ≡ 𝑔𝑟 ≡ 𝑐 (mod 𝑝). (4.1)
• Special Soundness: the knowledge extractor uses the standard rewinding
technique, thus it asks P for a response on a challenge 𝑒, then rewinds the
Prover to step 1 and asks for a response on a different challenge 𝑒′. Then, the
extractor has two answers (𝑧, 𝑧′) on different challenges (𝑒, 𝑒′) with the same
first step. Therefore, the extractor has 2 outputs which passed the check:
𝑐 ≡ 𝑔𝑧𝑐𝑒 (mod 𝑝) and 𝑐 ≡ 𝑔𝑧′𝑐𝑒′ (mod 𝑝). By dividing these equations and
from the knowledge of (𝑧, 𝑧′) and (𝑒, 𝑒′), the extractor is able to extract 𝑤.
1 ≡ 𝑔𝑧−𝑧′𝑐𝑒−𝑒′ (mod 𝑝)
1 ≡ 𝑔 𝑧−𝑧
′
𝑒−𝑒′ 𝑐 (mod 𝑝)
𝑐 ≡ 𝑔 𝑧
′−𝑧
𝑒−𝑒′ (mod 𝑝)
𝑤 ≡ 𝑧
′ − 𝑧
𝑒− 𝑒′ (mod 𝑞)
(4.2)
• Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK): the simulator of the protocol
works in these steps:
1. The simulator takes 𝑐 and 𝑒 as inputs.
48
Prover Verifier
𝑔, 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤 mod 𝑝
𝑟 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞
𝑐 = 𝑔𝑟 mod 𝑝
𝑒 = ℋ(𝑐, 𝑐, 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠)
𝑧 = (𝑟 − 𝑒𝑤) mod 𝑞
𝑐, 𝑒, 𝑧−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check: 𝑐
?≡ 𝑔𝑧𝑐𝑒 (mod 𝑝)
𝑒
?≡ ℋ(𝑐, 𝑐, 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑠)
Fig. 4.4: Non-interactive proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm protocol.
2. The simulator picks 𝑧 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞.
3. The simulator computes 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑧𝑐𝑒 mod 𝑝.
The output (𝑐, 𝑒, 𝑐, 𝑧) is indistinguishable from the real run of the protocol.
The simulator runs in expected polynomial time. More details are available,
e.g., in [49].
Non-Interactive Proofs of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm
In the above described PKDL protocol, the Verifier sends a random challenge 𝑒 to
the Prover. But the Verifier does not have to be honest in all cases and might send
malicious non-random 𝑒 with the purpose of learning Prover’s secrets. To mitigate
these attacks and to lower communication complexity, the non-interactive version
of the protocol can be used. In that version, the request is replaced by the |𝑞|-
bit-long output of a hash function ℋ of previous protocol values and public system
parameters. Such approach is known as Fiat-Shamir heuristics [55]. Assuming the
hash function is secure, its output is always random to Prover as he is unable to
predict its value due to one-wayness. The protocol security then depends on the
security of the hash function. The non-interactive version of the PKDL protocol is
depicted in Figure 4.4. All proofs of knowledge can be translated from the interactive
version to the non-interactive version using the Fiat-Shamir heuristics so we do not
have to consider only honest verifiers but all verifiers.
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𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑝, 𝑞, 𝑐 = 𝑔
𝑤1
1 𝑔
𝑤2
2 mod 𝑝
𝑟1, 𝑟2 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞
𝑐 = 𝑔𝑟11 𝑔
𝑟2
2 mod 𝑝 𝑐−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
𝑒 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
𝑧1 = (𝑟1 − 𝑒𝑤1) mod 𝑞
𝑧2 = (𝑟2 − 𝑒𝑤2) mod 𝑞 𝑧1, 𝑧2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check: 𝑐
?≡ 𝑔𝑧11 𝑔𝑧22 𝑐𝑒 (mod 𝑝)
Fig. 4.5: Proof of knowledge of representation protocol.
Proofs of Knowledge of Representation
In cryptographic constructions, it is very common to compute multi-exponentiations
in multiplicative groups. The Pedersen commitment is the typical example of multi-
exponentiation where two generators are used. Using 𝑘 generators and exponents,
the multi-exponentiation can be denoted as
𝑐 =
∏︁
1≤𝑖≤𝑘
𝑔𝑤𝑖𝑖 mod 𝑝, (4.3)
where (𝑤1, 𝑤2, ..., 𝑤𝑘) is called the representation of 𝑐 with respect to generators
(𝑔1, 𝑔2, ..., 𝑔𝑘) in mod𝑝. With (𝑔1, 𝑔2, ..., 𝑔𝑘), 𝑞, 𝑝, 𝑐 being public, the Verifier might
ask the Prover to give a proof of knowledge of (𝑤1, 𝑤2, ..., 𝑤𝑘). In our proposal, a
proof of representation for 𝑘 = 2 is used, therefore an example for 𝑘 = 2 based on
the Schnorr protocol is given in Figure 4.5.
The protocol is the parallel composition of the former PKDL protocol so it retains
its original properties. Similarly as the PKDL protocol, it can be transformed to a
full ZK protocol and can run non-interactively. All requirements on Σ-protocols are
preserved.
• 3-way pattern: the protocol is a 3-leg protocol with 3 moves.
• Completeness: an honest Prover knows (𝑤1, 𝑤2), therefore he can compute
answers 𝑧1 = 𝑟1 − 𝑒𝑤1 and 𝑧2 = 𝑟2 − 𝑒𝑤2, which are always accepted in the
final check:
𝑐 ≡ 𝑔𝑧11 𝑔𝑧22 𝑐𝑒 ≡ 𝑔𝑟1−𝑒𝑤11 𝑔𝑟2−𝑒𝑤22 (𝑔𝑤11 𝑔𝑤22 )𝑒 ≡ 𝑔𝑟11 𝑔𝑟22 𝑔−𝑒𝑤11 𝑔−𝑒𝑤22 𝑔𝑒𝑤11 𝑔𝑒𝑤22 ≡
≡ 𝑔𝑟11 𝑔𝑟22 ≡ 𝑐 (mod 𝑝).
(4.4)
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• Special Soundness: the knowledge extractor uses the same technique as in
PKDL, thus it asks P for responses on a challenge 𝑒, then rewinds the Prover
to step 1 and asks for responses on a different challenge 𝑒′. Then, the extractor
has two pairs of responses ((𝑧1, 𝑧2), (𝑧′1, 𝑧′2)) on different requests (𝑒, 𝑒′) with
a fixed first step. From ((𝑧1, 𝑧2), (𝑧′1, 𝑧′2)) and (𝑒, 𝑒′), the extractor is able to
compute the representation (𝑤1, 𝑤2).
1 ≡ 𝑔𝑧1−𝑧′11 𝑔𝑧2−𝑧
′
2
2 𝑐
𝑒−𝑒′ (mod 𝑝)
𝑐 ≡ 𝑔
𝑧′1−𝑧1
𝑒−𝑒′
1 𝑔
𝑧′2−𝑧2
𝑒−𝑒′
2 (mod 𝑝)
𝑤1 ≡ 𝑧
′
1 − 𝑧1
𝑒− 𝑒′ (mod 𝑞)
𝑤2 ≡ 𝑧
′
2 − 𝑧2
𝑒− 𝑒′ (mod 𝑞)
(4.5)
• Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK): the protocol simulator works
in these steps:
1. It takes 𝑐 and 𝑒 as inputs.
2. It picks 𝑧1, 𝑧2 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞.
3. It computes 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑧11 𝑔
𝑧2
2 𝑐
𝑒 mod 𝑝.
The output (𝑐, 𝑒, 𝑐, 𝑧1, 𝑧2) is indistinguishable from the real run of the protocol.
The simulator runs in expected polynomial time.
The proofs of properties for 𝑘 > 2 follow the same argumentation as the one provided
above.
Proofs of Discrete Logarithm Equivalence
Using Σ-protocols, it is easy to give a proof that two different DL commitments 𝑐1, 𝑐2
were constructed using the same exponent 𝑤, so that 𝑤 = log𝑔1 𝑐1 = log𝑔2 𝑐2. For this
type of proof, the Proof of Discrete Logarithm Equivalence (PDLE) protocols can be
used. In the next example, the Prover needs to prove that log𝑔1 𝑐1 = log𝑔2 𝑐2 using
the same DSA subgroup settings like in previous examples. The user not only gives
a proof of DL equivalence but also proves that he knows 𝑤. Similarly to previous
examples, the system parameters 𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑝, 𝑞 and values 𝑐1, 𝑐2 must be pre-shared to
P and V. P’s secret input is 𝑤, the DL of 𝑐1, 𝑐2. The protocol is depicted in Figure
4.6.
Similarly to both former protocols, also PDLE can run non-interactively using
[55] and obtain full ZK using [35]. The argumentation for all properties required for
Σ-protocols follows the former examples.
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𝑐1 = 𝑔
𝑤
1 mod 𝑝, 𝑐2 = 𝑔
𝑤
2 mod 𝑝, 𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑞, 𝑝
𝑟 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞
𝑐1 = 𝑔
𝑟
1 mod 𝑝
𝑐2 = 𝑔
𝑟
2 mod 𝑝
𝑐1, 𝑐2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
𝑒 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
𝑧 = (𝑟 − 𝑒𝑤) mod 𝑞
𝑧−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check:
𝑐1
?≡ 𝑔𝑧1𝑐𝑒1 (mod 𝑝)
𝑐2
?≡ 𝑔𝑧2𝑐𝑒2 (mod 𝑝)
Fig. 4.6: Proof of discrete logarithm equivalence.
• 3-way pattern: the PDLE protocol is a 3-leg protocol with 3 moves.
• Completeness: the honest Prover knows 𝑤, therefore he can always compute
an answer 𝑧 = (𝑟 − 𝑒𝑤) mod 𝑞 which is always accepted in the final checks.
𝑐1 ≡ 𝑔𝑧1𝑐𝑒1 ≡ 𝑔𝑟−𝑒𝑤1 𝑐𝑒1 ≡ 𝑔𝑟1𝑔−𝑒𝑤1 𝑔𝑒𝑤1 ≡ 𝑔𝑟1 ≡ 𝑐1 (mod 𝑝)
𝑐2 ≡ 𝑔𝑧2𝑐𝑒2 ≡ 𝑔𝑟−𝑒𝑤2 𝑐𝑒2 ≡ 𝑔𝑟2𝑔−𝑒𝑤2 𝑔𝑒𝑤2 ≡ 𝑔𝑟2 ≡ 𝑐2 (mod 𝑝)
(4.6)
• Special Soundness: the knowledge extractor uses the standard rewinding
technique, thus it asks P for a response on a challenge 𝑒, then rewinds the
Prover to step 1 and asks for a response on a different challenge 𝑒′. Then, the
extractor has two answers (𝑧, 𝑧′) on different challenges (𝑒, 𝑒′) with the first
step fixed. Therefore, the extractor has 2 equations for each of 2 commitments
which passed the check. The secret 𝑤 can be computed, e.g., from the equation
for 𝑐1, similarly to the original PKDL protocol.
1 ≡ 𝑔𝑧−𝑧′1 𝑐𝑒−𝑒
′
1 (mod 𝑝)
1 ≡ 𝑔
𝑧−𝑧′
𝑒−𝑒′
1 𝑐1 (mod 𝑝)
𝑐1 ≡ 𝑔
𝑧′−𝑧
𝑒−𝑒′
1 (mod 𝑝)
𝑤 ≡ 𝑧
′ − 𝑧
𝑒− 𝑒′ (mod 𝑞)
(4.7)
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• Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge (HVZK): the simulator works in these
steps:
1. It takes 𝑐1, 𝑐2 and 𝑒 as inputs.
2. It picks 𝑧 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞.
3. It computes 𝑐1 = 𝑔𝑧1𝑐𝑒1 mod 𝑝 and 𝑐2 = 𝑔𝑧2𝑐𝑒2 mod 𝑝.
The output (𝑐1, 𝑐2, 𝑒, 𝑐1, 𝑐2, 𝑧) is indistinguishable from the real run of the pro-
tocol. The simulator runs in expected polynomial time.
The PDLE protocol can be used not only for proving the equivalence of two log-
arithms but also for general proofs of equivalence of any exponents in different
representations. Similarly to former protocols, PDLE can be used for proofs of DL
in different groups [52].
4.1.4 Okamoto-Uchiyama Trapdoor One-Way Function
Let 𝑛 = 𝑟2𝑠 and 𝑟, 𝑠 be large primes. Pick 𝑔 ∈ Z𝑛 such that 𝑔 mod 𝑟2 is a
primitive element of Z*𝑟2 . Then 𝑐 = 𝑔
𝑥 mod 𝑛 is a trapdoor one-way function
with 𝑟 as a trapdoor [76]. Value 𝑥 can be computed using the trapdoor as 𝑥 =
((𝑐𝑟−1 mod 𝑟2)− 1)/𝑟
((𝑔𝑟−1 mod 𝑟2)− 1)/𝑟 mod 𝑟. The function is secure if the factorization of 𝑛 is
hard. Size recommendations for 𝑛 are the same as for RSA [84].
4.1.5 Bao’s Verifiable Encryption
The above mentioned primitives are used in Bao’s Verifiable Encryption (VE) scheme
[21] for discrete logarithms. Using VE, a Prover is able to convince a Verifier about
the correctness of given encryption of discrete logarithm of some public value. Al-
though the Verifier cannot decrypt, he is convinced that some other entity, which
is able to decrypt, will really get the correct discrete logarithm of the given public
value after the decryption. The idea is to put the exponent as an input to the
Okamoto-Uchiyama function and prove the discrete log equivalence between the
original public value and the output of the OU function. After seeing such a proof,
the Verifier is convinced without actually seeing the exponent. Later, a third person
who knows the OU trapdoor can invert the function and get the exponent (decrypt).
The overview of used cryptographic constructions and their placement in the scheme
proposed in Chapter 6 is in Table 4.1.
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Tab. 4.1: Overview of used cryptographic constructions.
Construction Group Where Used Notation
DL Commitments DSA R 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑤)
Proofs of Knowledge DSA, OU R 𝑃𝐾{𝑤 : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤}
Proofs of Representation DSA, OU V 𝑃𝐾{𝑤,𝑤′ : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔𝑤
′
2 }
Proofs of DL Equivalence DSA, OU R, V 𝑃𝐾{𝑤 : 𝑐1 = 𝑔𝑤1 ∧ 𝑐2 = 𝑔𝑤2 }
OU Trapdoor OWF OU R, Rev 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤 mod 𝑛
Verifiable Encryption OU V, Rev 𝑉 𝐸{𝑥 : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑥}
Glossary:
OU: Okamoto Uchiyama [76]
DSA: Digital Signature Algorithm [71]
OWF: One-Way Function
R, V, Rev: Registration, Verification and Revocation protocol of the proposed scheme
4.2 Notation
The notation common in cryptographic protocol design is used in this thesis. The
same notation is used for both the related work description and the novel scheme
design description.
A Discrete Logarithm (DL) commitment 𝑐 to a value 𝑤 is denoted as 𝑐 =
𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑤). For various proofs of knowledge or representation, the efficient no-
tation introduced by Camenisch and Stadler [48] is used. Thus, a protocol depicted
in Figure 4.3 can be denoted as 𝑃𝐾{𝑤 : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤}. The proof of knowledge of repre-
sentation depicted in Figure 4.5 is denoted as 𝑃𝐾{𝑤,𝑤′ : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔𝑤′2 }. The proof of
discrete log equivalence with respect to different generators 𝑔1, 𝑔2 depicted in Figure
4.6 is denoted as 𝑃𝐾{𝑤 : 𝑐1 = 𝑔𝑤1 ∧ 𝑐2 = 𝑔𝑤2 }. The first step of PK protocols is
denoted as 𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝1. For example, 𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝1{𝑤 : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤} = (𝑐, 𝑐) in Figure 4.3. Bao’s
Verifiable Encryption of 𝑥 inside 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑥 mod 𝑛 is denoted as 𝑉 𝐸{𝑥 : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑥}. A
signature using some PKI by a user U on some data is denoted as 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑈(𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎). The
symbol “:” means “such that”, “|” means “divides”, “𝑎||𝑏” is the concatenation of
strings 𝑎 and 𝑏, “|𝑥|” is the bitlength of 𝑥 and “𝑥 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑙” is a randomly chosen
bitstring of maximum bitlength 𝑙. “𝑥 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞” denotes a randomly chosen integer less
than 𝑞. “Z*𝑞” denotes an integer multiplicative group modulo 𝑞.
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5 ANALYSIS OF RELATED SCHEMES
The analysis of existing systems for attribute authentication is one of the objectives
of this thesis. A brief overview of related systems was done in Chapter 2. From
the systems introduced there, two most promising schemes were chosen for a deeper
analysis in this chapter. The U-Prove designed by Stefan Brands [22, 68] and idemix
designed by IBM [41, 44] are analyzed here. These schemes have the potential of
getting commercially deployed. They are built on strong cryptographic primitives
and they are both supported by large IT companies (Microsoft and IBM). Both
schemes provide attribute authentication with some of the privacy enhancing fea-
tures defined in Chapter 2.2.2. On the other hand, both schemes have weak aspects
which prevent them from being shortly commercially available. The goal of the
analysis is to identify the underlying mechanisms of these schemes and to find their
weaknesses. The outputs of this chapter are later used during the design of the new
scheme which fixes the weak aspects of analyzed schemes.
5.1 U-Prove Scheme
U-Prove is a scheme originally developed by Stefan Brands [22] and Credentica
company. Recently, it has been bought by Microsoft which replaced the CardSpace
technology with U-Prove. Currently, the U-Prove is the Microsoft’s preferred tech-
nology for future authentication systems. In addition to the official specification of
U-Prove with reference test vectors [68], there are also many academic papers which
improve the technology. In this chapter, the official specification is used as the main
information source (U-Prove Cryptographic Specification V1.1, released August 9th
2011, cited February 27th 2012, [68]). Where appropriate, the extensions presented
in research papers are referred. The analysis is structured into the description of
the communication pattern, provided features, underlying cryptographic structures
and the weaknesses of the system.
5.1.1 Entities, Communication Pattern
U-Prove allows a user (called a Prover in U-Prove’s terminology) to obtain attributes
from the Issuer. These attributes can represent anything, from user’s age to his
citizenship. Attributes are concentrated in U-Prove tokens. These tokens can be
used for proving the ownership of attributes to Verifiers. The scheme works with
three fundamental entities.
• Prover: an entity who wants to obtain attributes and give proofs about their
possession without being identifiable and traceable.
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• Issuer: an entity who issues attributes to Provers.
• Verifier: an entity who verifies the possession of attributes of Provers.
The Prover and the Issuer are involved in the process of attribute issuance.
The Issuance protocol is used to provide a Prover with desired attributes which
are aggregated in the token. Although it is always necessary to run the Issuance
protocol with the Issuer, the Issuer is unable to link the tokens with their owners.
This is due to a special feature of the Issuance protocol called blinding. The Issuance
protocol is blinded, therefore no information obtained during the Issuance protocol
can be later used by the Issuer to track or identify Provers or their tokens. During
the Issuance, two additional special attributes can be issued. They are the Token
Information (TI) attributes and Prover Information (PI) attributes. TI attributes
are known to the Issuer and must be always disclosed during verification. They
can be used, for example, to encode the validity period. PI attributes are unknown
to the Issuer and are always disclosed during verification. The disclosure of other
attributes can be decided by the Prover, he can disclose all of them or only a subset
during verification.
The Prover and the Verifier are involved in the verification phase. This phase
is realized by the Presentation protocol where the Prover gives a proof about the
possession of his attributes. TI and PI attributes are always disclosed but the dis-
closure of other attributes can be decided by the Prover. The Presentation protocol
can be completely anonymous and untraceable by the Issuer. No more information
than disclosed attributes leak during the run of this protocol. The U-Prove scheme
is designed to run in computer networks so the Prover needs a computer to run the
Presentation protocol. To enhance security, a smart-card presence can be enforced
by the Presentation protocol.
The communication pattern of the U-Prove scheme is depicted in Figure 5.1.
The protocol blinding is denoted by the blinding sign. The presence of public (𝑃𝑘)
and private (𝑆𝑘) keys is also denoted.
5.1.2 Features
The key privacy enhancing features of U-Prove are enlisted in this section. Although
U-Prove is not called an attribute authentication system by its authors, many fea-
tures defined in Chapter 2.2.2 are supported.
• Security: the scheme is based on the discrete logarithm assumption [67] in
DSA subgroup [71] and FS-heuristic [55] which relies on hash functions (SHA).
• Anonymity: the Prover’s identity is not disclosed when presenting attributes.
• Untraceability (w.r.t. Issuer): the Issuer is unable to trace the Prover.
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Fig. 5.1: U-Prove communication pattern.
• Selective disclosure: the Prover can decide the subset of attributes disclosed
during presentation.
• Non-transferability (or secrets disclosed): the Prover is prevented from
sharing his attributes with others.
• Revocation by token ID blacklisting: a token can be blacklisted so that
it cannot be used anytime in future. The blacklisting can be done by the
Verifiers only. Fresh, unused tokens cannot be blacklisted.
• Designed for computers: according to the official specification, a computer
must be used for token presentation.
There are also some unofficial extensions of the scheme. U-Prove can run only
with smart-cards using [69]. There is also an improvement of revocation features
proposed in [27]. Unfortunately, this improvement is impractical due to its compu-
tational complexity and requires token re-issuance which makes the scheme useless
on a smart-card platform1.
5.1.3 Cryptographic Design
The cryptographic design of U-Prove is outlined in this section. Only simplified
Issuance protocol and Presentation protocol are described. The Presentation proto-
col without the security enhancing device is analyzed. Only one attribute is issued
and presented there but the version with more attributes works analogically. U-
Prove works with both elliptic curves and the DSA subgroup. The DSA version is
1The number of memory write cycles is restricted on smart-cards. Furthermore, it would be
inconvenient for users to sync their smart-card with a computer every time their tokens run short.
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described here, thus all operations are done in this subgroup.
First, it is necessary to construct the U-Prove token ℎ. It is of the form
ℎ = (𝑔0𝑔
𝑥1
1 𝑔
𝑥𝑡
𝑡 )
𝛼 mod 𝑝, (5.1)
where 𝑔0, 𝑔1, 𝑔𝑡 are the DSA subgroup generators, 𝑥1 is user’s attribute and 𝑥𝑡 is
the TI attribute (Token Information, always disclosed). 𝛼 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞 is a random secret
number generated by the Prover.
Before the Issuance protocol is executed, following values must be pre-shared:
DSA subgroup environment (generators 𝑔, 𝑔1, 𝑔𝑡, order 𝑞, modulus 𝑝) and Issuer’s
public key (𝑧0, 𝑧1, 𝑧𝑡) where 𝑧𝑖 = 𝑔𝑦0𝑖 mod 𝑝, 𝑔0 = 𝑔𝑦0 mod 𝑝 and 𝑦0 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞 is a
randomly generated private key of the Issuer.
The Issuance protocol of U-Prove, depicted in Figure 5.2, significantly resembles
the PDLE protocol described in Chapter 4. In fact, it is a PDLE protocol where the
entities are switched (the Issuer acts as a Prover and the Prover acts as a Verifier)
and some modifications are employed. From the Issuer’s perspective, the protocol
can be denoted as 𝑃𝐾{𝑦0 : 𝑔0 = 𝑔𝑦0 ∧ 𝜎𝑧 = 𝛾𝑦0}. Such a protocol can be run only
by those who know 𝑦0. Therefore, the protocol can be used as a signature scheme
on message 𝜎𝑐 with 𝑦0 as a private key. Such a protocol is known as the Schnorr
signature [87]. During the Issuance protocol, the Prover asks the Issuer to provide
a signature on his message 𝜎𝑐. Later, the signature in the form of the protocol
transcript (𝜎𝑧, 𝜎𝑐, 𝜎𝑟) can be used for proofs about a correct attribute issuance. Since
the signature (𝜎𝑧, 𝜎𝑐, 𝜎𝑟) would be easily recognizable and exploitable for tracing of
Provers, it must be randomized by the Prover. Fortunately, the Schnorr signature
is easy to randomize since it is valid not only for original values but also for its
powers. Therefore, a blinding factor 𝛼 is added to the original signature to create
an untraceable blind signature (𝜎′𝑧, 𝜎′𝑐, 𝜎′𝑟). As a result, the Prover has a token ℎ
blindly signed by the Issuer in such a way that the signature (𝜎′𝑧, 𝜎′𝑐, 𝜎′𝑟) cannot be
used to trace the Prover. On the other hand, the signature can be still used to give
proofs about the origin of the token.
In the Presentation protocol, the Prover provides the Verifier with the token and
the Issuer’s blind signature. The signature can be verified by the Verifier so he is
assured that the token is valid and that the Prover ran a proper Issuance protocol.
Furthermore, the Prover must present a proof that he knows the secrets of the token,
namely the blinding factor 𝛼 and undisclosed attributes2. The Presentation protocol
is therefore a Proof of Knowledge of Representation of the token and can be denoted
as 𝑃𝐾{𝛼, 𝑥1 : ℎ = (𝑔0𝑔𝑥11 𝑔𝑥𝑡𝑡 )𝛼} for undisclosed 𝑥1 and disclosed 𝑥𝑡. No one except
2The decision which attributes are disclosed and which stay hidden is made solely by the Prover.
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𝜎′𝑟 = 𝜎𝑟 + 𝛽2 mod 𝑞
Store token (ℎ, 𝑃𝐼, 𝑇𝐼)
Store signature (𝜎′𝑧, 𝜎′𝑐, 𝜎′𝑟)
Fig. 5.2: U-Prove Issuance protocol.
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the Prover can give such a proof since at least 𝛼 stays always hidden. Thus, the
blinding factor 𝛼 can be considered a private key of the Prover.
5.1.4 Weaknesses
Using the presented analysis, the major weaknesses of U-Prove are stated here.
The first weakness is obvious from the Cryptographic Design section. The Prover
uses a token to give proofs about his attributes. The token is created using the
Issuance protocol and cannot be changed later. Therefore, the Prover must always
use the same token to be able to run the Presentation protocol. This destroys
the unlinkability of verification sessions because all sessions of a single user can be
linked together to a single profile using the unique token. To provide unlinkability,
the authors of U-Prove suggest to run a new Issuance protocol for each Presentation
protocol. This is obviously impractical and impossible in a smart-card environment.
Therefore, the unlinkability of verification sessions is not supported by U-Prove.
This brings serious privacy issues since, in some cases, revealing the user profile (e.g.
times, places and types of used services) can lead to the complete identification of
users.
Furthermore, the revocation is not fully supported by U-Prove. It is possible to
blacklist a token because each session is linked to a unique token identifier. Unfor-
tunately, unused tokens, which were never presented, cannot be revoked because no
token ID is known to Verifiers. What is even more serious, tokens cannot be revoked
by their Issuers because the Issuance protocol is completely blinded and the Issuer
has no mechanism to revoke already issued tokens.
As a result, one of the most advanced schemes for attribute authentication has
serious disadvantages. It does not provide all features required by users since it
does not provide the unlinkability of verification session. But it does not provide
all features required by service providers either because the scheme does not allow
them to effectively revoke invalid users.
5.2 Idemix Scheme
In many aspects, idemix is a scheme very similar to U-Prove. It provides similar
functionality using a similar communication pattern. Despite that, idemix is a more
complex and flexible scheme. The academic papers defining the background cryp-
tography of idemix have been published by Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [41, 42].
Since then, many improvements of the scheme have been proposed. These improve-
ments were focused mainly on implementation [59], smart-cards support [28] and
revocation [43, 40, 65, 70]. Finally, the official specification of the idemix scheme
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has been published [44]. The idemix scheme is an output of the IBM Research lab-
oratory. Therefore, also idemix has a large IT corporation supporting it. In this
analysis, the official specification is taken as the main information source (Specifi-
cation of the Identity Mixer Cryptographic Library V2.3.4, released February 10th
2012, cited February 27th 2012, [44]). Similarly to the analysis of U-Prove, the sec-
tions about communication pattern, features, cryptographic design and weaknesses
are included. The idemix scheme is even more expandable than U-Prove, thus only
the basic construction is described there, omitting deeper details.
5.2.1 Entities, Communication Pattern
The idemix scheme is called an anonymous credential scheme by its authors. In an
anonymous credential scheme, the User is issued a credential by the Issuer. The
credential gathers all User’s attributes in one cryptographic construction. The cre-
dential can be issued to Users only by designated Issuers. Then, credentials can be
used for giving proofs about the possession of attributes. Furthermore, it is possible
to give predicate proofs. Using this functionality, the User can give a proof about,
for example, his age lying in some interval (e.g., from 18 to 30). To provide revo-
cation mechanisms, a Trusted Party (TP) can be added. This trusted party can be
used for revoking invalid users or for tracking of attackers. The idemix scheme is
composed of these entities.
• User (called Recipient in the Issue protocol and Prover in the Prove protocol):
an entity who wants to be issued attributes and give anonymous proofs about
them to Verifiers.
• Issuer: an entity who issues credentials where all attributes are aggregated.
• Verifier: an entity who verifies the attribute proofs presented by Users.
• Trusted Party: an entity who can de-anonymize Users and revoke them.
The Issue protocol runs between the User (called a Recipient in this phase) and
the Issuer. Using the Issue protocol, the User is issued a credential, signed by the
Issuer, which carries all User’s attributes. The credential also carries an epoch of
validity which determines credential’s lifetime. The credential can be used only
during its epoch of validity. Unlike U-Prove, the idemix does not use any blinding
in the Issue protocol. The credential is traceable by the Issuer after its issuance.
Nevertheless, the credential is never used in its initial form, it is always randomized
by the User before it is used in the Prove protocol. That is why the Issuer is unable
to trace the credential and to de-anonymize the User.
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Fig. 5.3: Idemix communication pattern.
The Prove protocol runs between the Verifier and the User (called a Prover in
this phase). In the Prove protocol, the User can not only prove the possession of
some attributes, but also can give proofs about predicates concerning his attributes.
Similarly to U-Prove, the User can choose which attributes are revealed during the
Prove protocol. The epoch of validity is checked by the Verifier and the credential
is rejected if its lifetime is over. Each instance of the Prove protocol is randomized
(blinded) by the Prover, therefore it is impossible to trace the User or to reveal his
identity. Furthermore, since each verification session is randomized, the Verifier is
unable to link the sessions of a single user to one profile. Thus, the unlinkability
of verification sessions is provided by idemix. In this context, the blinding of the
Prove protocol used in idemix is a more effective approach compared to U-Prove,
where the Issue protocol blinding does not allow any profiling protection. The Prove
protocol runs between the User and the Verifier with the User using a smart-card
only.
In case of disputes or revocations, a Trusted Party (TP) can be used. Each
credential can carry a private information (e.g., the identity of the User or his
secrets) which is encrypted using verifiable encryption. The encryption validity
can be checked by the Verifier without decrypting. The only entity who is able
to decrypt is TP. Therefore, in case of disputes, TP can reveal the owner of the
credential and/or his secrets. Although this functionality is generally described in
the official documentation of idemix, a more detailed specification is missing.
The entities and the communication pattern of idemix is depicted in Figure 5.3.
The same notation for blinding and keys as in the case of U-Prove is used.
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5.2.2 Features
The crucial features of idemix are enlisted in this section. Again, the official specifi-
cation of idemix is taken as the information source although some more extensions
are provided in research papers. Those extensions are enlisted separately.
• Security: the scheme is based on the strong RSA (sRSA) assumption [67],
the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption [67] and FS-heuristic [55].
• Anonymity: User’s identity is not disclosed by the Prove protocol.
• Untraceability: the Issuer of attributes is unable to trace the User when he
uses his credential.
• Unlinkability: the Verifier is unable to link more sessions of a single user to
one profile.
• Selective disclosure: the User can choose which attributes are disclosed by
the Prove protocol.
• Predicates: the User can prove predicates concerning his attributes.
• Non-transferability: the Prover is prevented from sharing his attributes
with others.
• Epochs of Lifetime: a lifetime can be encoded to the credential.
• Smart-card support: the scheme supports smart-cards for attribute proving.
The unofficial extensions allow the revocation of invalid credentials [65] and
the anonymity revocation of malicious users [41]. Unfortunately, these revocation-
enabling extensions are impractical due to their high complexity or requirements on
credential updates. Furthermore, JavaCard implementation [28] is available for a
simplified version of idemix.
5.2.3 Cryptographic Design
The idemix scheme works with a different setup than previous constructions. It is
based on the RSA subgroup, using modulus 𝑛 = 𝑝𝑞 where 𝑝, 𝑞 are large safe primes
and 𝑍,𝑅𝑆, 𝑅, 𝑆 ∈𝑅 𝑄𝑅𝑛3 are bases. The credential is composed of an attribute
𝑚, User’s secret 𝑚𝑠 and the signature (𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣) such that 𝑍 ≡ 𝐴𝑒𝑅𝑚𝑠𝑆 𝑅𝑚𝑆𝑣 mod 𝑛
holds4. The factorization of 𝑛 is held secret by the Issuer because it works as his
private signing key. Without knowing (𝑝, 𝑞) : 𝑛 = 𝑝𝑞, it is impossible to com-
pute (𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣) which is the Issuer’s signature. On the other hand, without knowing
(𝑒,𝑚𝑠,𝑚, 𝑣), it is impossible to give a proof of representation of 𝑍 with respect to
𝐴,𝑅𝑆, 𝑅, 𝑆.
3𝑄𝑅𝑛 denotes quadratic residues mod𝑛
4Similarly to U-Prove, a simplified example with only one attribute is considered.
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Before running the Issue protocol, the system parameters must be pre-shared.
The modulus 𝑛, generators 𝑍,𝑅𝑆, 𝑅, 𝑆 and length parameters 𝑙1−8 are shared among
entities. The protocol is started by the Issuer who chooses a random nonce 𝑛1. The
nonce is sent to the User who replies with a randomly chosen nonce 𝑛2 and a value
𝑈 = 𝑆𝑣
′
𝑅𝑚𝑠𝑆 mod 𝑛 which can be considered the foundation of a future credential.
𝑈 is constructed using a randomly chosen number 𝑣′ and User’s randomly chosen
secret 𝑚𝑠. The proof of construction of 𝑈 is given to the Issuer together with 𝑈 and
𝑛2. The Issuer checks the proof and chooses his own random number 𝑣′′. Finally, the
Issuer issues the signature (𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣′′) on the attribute 𝑚 to the User who is able to
compute the final signature (𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣) from these values. The attribute 𝑚, the secret
𝑚𝑠 and the respective signature (𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣) is then saved by the User as the credential.
The Issue protocol is depicted in Figure 5.4.
The User obtains the signature (𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣) during the Issue protocol. The knowledge
of the signature is required by the Prove protocol. Furthermore, the knowledge of
attributes and a secret 𝑚𝑠 is required by the Prove protocol. Only the User who
knows these values can successfully run the Prove protocol. Unfortunately, it is
not possible to run the Prove protocol with the original credential disclosed. The
credential and the signature would be traceable by the Issuer. Therefore, the User
must randomize the credential and use the blinding in the Prove protocol. This
is done by choosing a random 𝑟𝑎 value and recomputing the credential and the
signature. For each Prove protocol, a different randomization number is generated.
Using the randomized credential and signature, the User runs the Prove protocol
which is a Proof of Knowledge of Representation protocol denoted as 𝑃𝐾{𝑒, 𝑣′,𝑚𝑠 :
𝑍
𝑅𝑚
= 𝐴′𝑒𝑆𝑣
′
𝑅𝑚𝑠𝑆 } where 𝑚 is the disclosed attribute and 𝐴′, 𝑣′ are the values of
the recomputed signature 5. The Proof of Knowledge of Representation can be a
Zero-Knowledge protocol thus no private information except that the user knows
a right representation leak during this protocol. The Prove protocol is depicted in
Figure 5.5.
5.2.4 Weaknesses
The major weakness of the U-Prove scheme, the missing unlinkability of verification
sessions, is resolved in idemix. Each verification session is randomized in idemix so
User’s behavior cannot be profiled. Different verification sessions cannot be linked
together to a single profile by the Verifier. From this perspective, blinding of the
Prove protocol is a better approach. Unfortunately, the second weakness of U-Prove,
the missing revocation, is not resolved in idemix. Here, a credential cannot be re-
voked after its theft, loss or expiration. Thus, users who lose their credentials or
5Value 𝑒 does not have to be randomized since it is not disclosed anywhere.
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𝑣′ ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑙3
𝑛2 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑙4
𝑈 = 𝑆𝑣
′
𝑅𝑚𝑠𝑆 mod 𝑛
𝑃𝐾𝑈 = 𝑃𝐾{𝑣′,𝑚𝑠 : 𝑈 = 𝑆𝑣′𝑅𝑚𝑠𝑆 }
𝑈,𝑃𝐾𝑈 , 𝑛2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check 𝑃𝐾𝑈
𝑒 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑙5
𝑣′′ ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑙6
𝑄 = 𝑍(𝑈𝑆𝑣
′′
𝑅𝑚)−1 mod 𝑛
𝐴 = 𝑄𝑒
−1
mod 𝑛
𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣′′←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
𝑣 = 𝑣′ + 𝑣′′
(𝐴, 𝑒, 𝑣) : 𝑍 ≡ 𝐴𝑒𝑅𝑚𝑠𝑆 𝑅𝑚𝑆𝑣 mod 𝑛
Fig. 5.4: Idemix Issue protocol.
users who wish to leave the system cannot be revoked by any entity. The only mech-
anism how to invalidate the users is to wait until their credentials expire. This is
quite problematic since in some cases (e.g., the credential theft) it is vital to revoke
credentials as soon as possible. In idemix, it is also impossible to reveal the identity
of attackers. Therefore, the anonymous Users cannot be held responsible for their
acts. This unbounded anonymity is problematic for service providers who need tools
for the identification of users who break the policy rules. The missing revocation
mechanisms are unacceptable by both Users who are unable to revoke their creden-
tials immediately and Verifiers (service providers) who are unable to identify and
revoke attackers. Except epochs, which is the official “revocation” feature of idemix,
it is also possible to use verifiable encryption of secrets. Unfortunately, this would
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User Issuer
𝑛 : 𝑛 = 𝑝𝑞
𝑍,𝑅𝑆, 𝑅, 𝑆 ∈𝑅 𝑄𝑅𝑛
Attribute 𝑚
𝑛1 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑙7
𝑛1←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
𝑟𝑎 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑙8
𝐴′ = 𝐴𝑆𝑟𝑎 mod 𝑛
𝑣′ = 𝑣 − 𝑒𝑟𝑎
𝑃𝐾𝑈 = 𝑃𝐾{𝑒, 𝑣′,𝑚𝑠 : 𝑍𝑅𝑚 = 𝐴′𝑒𝑆𝑣
′
𝑅𝑚𝑠𝑆 }
𝑃𝐾𝑈−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Check 𝑃𝐾𝑈
Fig. 5.5: Idemix Prove protocol.
bring privacy problems since one entity would be able to trace and de-anonymize all
users. Furthermore, this feature would increase the time needed for user verification.
Currently, this mechanism is not fully supported by the scheme.
5.3 Analysis of Related Solutions
In the Chapter 2, the existing privacy-enhancing systems were identified. From
these systems, the two most related schemes were chosen for a deeper analysis. The
U-Prove of Microsoft and the idemix of IBM were analyzed in this chapter. Both
schemes support many of the privacy enhancing features defined in Chapter 3. Both
U-Prove and idemix can be used as attribute authentication systems allowing users
to give anonymous proofs about their attributes. Nevertheless, neither of analyzed
systems is ready for a commercial deployment. These systems are lacking important
privacy-preserving features which might be the major reason why these systems ex-
ist more in theoretical proposals than in practical commercial systems. The most
significant problems of U-Prove and idemix are following.
• Missing unlinkability: in U-Prove, it is impossible to run more verification
sessions without the Verifier being able to link all these sessions to a single
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profile. This makes user profiling possible. User profiling can lead, in some
cases, to full identity disclosure, thus to destroying anonymity.
• Missing practical revocation of credentials: in both U-Prove and idemix,
it is impossible to efficiently revoke issued attributes if smart-cards are used
as the authentication devices.
• Missing practical revocation of anonymity: in both U-Prove and idemix,
it is impossible to efficiently identify malicious Users who made some damage
to service providers or who broke service policies.
The goal of this thesis is to design an attribute authentication scheme similar to
those analyzed above but with resolved weaknesses. Therefore, the goal is to design
a scheme with all privacy-enhancing features defined in Chapter 3. Furthermore, the
novel scheme must support all revocation mechanisms which are currently missing
in related solutions.
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6 PROPOSEDNOVEL SCHEME FORATTRIBUTE
AUTHENTICATION
The cryptographic design of a novel scheme for attribute authentication is provided
in this chapter. The proposed attribute authentication scheme supports the ba-
sic functionality of anonymously proving the possession of attributes. Additionally,
the scheme provides the privacy-enhancing features defined in the thesis objectives
chapter. Namely, following features are provided.
• Security
• Anonymity
• Untraceability
• Unlinkability
• Selective disclosure of attributes
• Non-transferability
• Practical, complex revocation
It is shown in the Chapter 5 that it is very difficult to provide some of the above
specified features. Especially, the unlinkability and revocation features are very
difficult to support. Even the most advanced schemes, like U-Prove and idemix, do
not support both these features. The goal of the new scheme proposal is to fix this
problem and provide the missing features. Moreover, the scheme design is focused
on providing more complex revocation so that service providers are more willing
to use the newly designed system in practical scenarios. That is the reason why a
scalable revocation mechanism is provided in the proposed scheme. For a practical
system, it is also very important to be computationally efficient. Thus, the proposed
scheme is designed to be as fast as possible on weak devices such as smart-cards.
The proposed scheme is built on cryptographic constructions defined in Chap-
ter 4. The cryptographic commitments, proofs of knowledge (PK) and verifiable
encryption (VE) are frequently used. All constructions are based on the discrete
logarithm (DL) assumption. Two domains (multiplicative groups) are used. They
are the DSA subgroup modulo prime 𝑝 and the Okamoto-Uchiyama subgroup mod-
ulo prime product 𝑛. Although multiple subgroups are used, the reader might still
use the description of cryptographic constructions in the Chapter 4 as a reference.
The properties and mechanisms remain the same for all used settings (distinguished
by different moduli). The cryptographic background is specified before the actual
scheme is described.
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To provide more variability for more types of systems, two specifications are
provided. The lightweight version and the full version are described in next sections.
The lightweight version is simple, based on well-established cryptographic primitives
(only the DSA subgroup) and is very computationally efficient. The disadvantage
is that it does not support all privacy-enhancing features defined above. It also
supports only one general attribute called group membership. This attribute can
be used to prove the general service authorization. The lightweight version was
developed and published in 2010 in [4]. It serves as an introduction to mechanisms
used in the full version. To fix the weaknesses of the lightweight version, the full
version was developed. The full version supports all privacy-enhancing features
defined above while staying fast enough to be implementable on weak devices like
smart-cards. The full version have been published in 2011 and 2012 in [15, 6, 8].
In following sections, both the lightweight and the full versions are described.
Both sections frequently use the Chapter 4 as the cryptographic reference because
most constructions are described using the efficient notation of Camenisch and
Stadler [48] and the notation specified in the Section 4.2. The analysis of the full
scheme is provided in Chapter 7. The analysis includes the mathematical simulation
of the designed protocol. The simulation results are provided in Chapter 7.2. Both
schemes have been also implemented on smart-cards and the implementation results
are given in Chapter 7.3.
6.1 Lightweight Scheme Design
The lightweight scheme uses the cryptographic primitives described in Chapter 4.
It is based on the DSA subgroup [71] and following GDLP and DDDH assumptions.
Generalized Discrete Logarithm Problem (GDLP) assumption
Based on [67] it is assumed that given a finite cyclic group 𝐺 of order 𝑞, a generator
𝑔 and an element 𝛽 ∈ 𝐺 it is hard to find an integer 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑞−1 such that 𝑔𝑥 ≡ 𝛽.
Derived Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDDH) Problem assumption
Based on [24, 36] it is assumed that given a finite cyclic group 𝐺 of a large prime
order 𝑞, generators 𝑔1, 𝑔2 ∈ 𝐺, modulus 𝑝 and values 𝑔𝑎1 mod 𝑝, 𝑔𝑏2 mod 𝑝 it is hard
to decide whether 𝑎 = 𝑏 or not.
The lightweight scheme works with the DSA subgroup, namely generators 𝑔1, 𝑔2 of
prime order 𝑞 in prime mod𝑝 where 𝑞|(𝑝 − 1). All parameters 𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑞, 𝑝 are pre-
shared and public. A hash function ℋ is used in non-interactive proofs based on
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Tab. 6.1: Overview of cryptographic constructions used in lightweight scheme.
Construction Group Where Used Notation
Commitments DSA I 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑤)
Proofs of Knowledge DSA I, V 𝑃𝐾{𝑤 : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝑤}
Proofs of DL Equivalence DSA I 𝑃𝐾{𝑤 : 𝑐1 = 𝑔𝑤1 ∧ 𝑐2 = 𝑔𝑤2 }
Glossary:
DSA: Digital Signature Algorithm [71]
I, V, R: Initialization, Verification and Revocation protocol of the proposed scheme
FS-heuristics [55]. Any asymmetric signature scheme with pre-shared public keys
can be used for signatures. The overview of cryptographic constructions used in the
lightweight scheme is provided in Table 6.1.
The lightweight scheme supports following features.
• Completeness: authorized user is always accepted by the verifier.
• Soundness: invalid user is always rejected by the verifier.
• Anonymity: no one can learn honest user’s identity during verification.
• Untraceability: no one is able to trace a user if he adheres to rules.
• Revocation: a coalition of precisely defined entities is able to revoke the
anonymity of malicious users.
The basic idea of the lightweight scheme comes from e-cash systems like Brand’s
scheme [23]. E-coins are used for payments there. Tokens have a similar purpose
in the lightweight scheme. The token is spent like an e-coin during verification.
Information necessary for the verification token computation is released by the Issuer
(I) and the Public Authority (PA) to the User, who can later use it to build the
token and spend it for an access to a private network or services. Altogether there
are four entities in the lightweight scheme. The scheme overview with a token flow
is depicted in Figure 6.1.
• User: a service client who wants to prove his authorization.
• Issuer: a central directory server which possesses information about valid
users and which issues token parts (e.g., domain controller).
• Verifier: border devices controlling access to private services (e.g., routers,
access points, mobile phone base stations . . . ).
• Public Authority (PA): an independent authority issuing token parts out-
side the provider organization/company, administered, e.g., by the state/country.
The lightweight scheme can be divided into four phases: registration, initializa-
tion protocol, verification protocol and revocation.
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Issuer
Verifier
Verifier
Verifier
Verifier
Verifier
PA (Public Authority)
Partial Token
Token
User
Partial Token
Service Space
Fig. 6.1: Scheme overview with token flow.
Registration Phase
The purpose of this phase is to pay for requested services, exchange cryptographic
keys (𝑆𝑘 - Private Key, 𝑃𝑘 - Public Key) and establish the environment settings (the
already defined DSA subgroup - the subgroup of group Z*𝑝, where 𝑝 is a prime, 𝑞 is a
prime divisor of 𝑝− 1 and 𝑔1, 𝑔2 are elements of order 𝑞 in Z*𝑝). This phase does not
require anonymity and can be implemented with existing tools (e.g., credit cards for
payments, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for user/service provider authentication
and communication). As a result, the Issuer learns the PKI certificate of the User,
assigns User a unique identifier 𝐼𝐷𝑈 and gets the payment for services.
Initialization Protocol1
The purpose of this phase is to create a valid verification token. Information from
both I and PA is required for the construction. The purpose of the communication
with I is to get its digital signature on a commitment. Based on the commitment
and the signature, the User is able to get PA’s signature on the token. The signature
is required later in the verification protocol. The whole initialization protocol is fully
described in Figure 6.2 and the following two paragraphs.
Communication with Issuer
The User chooses a random number 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∈ Z𝑞 and computes a commitment 𝑐2 =
𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑2 mod 𝑝 to it. The Issuer then sends a random 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒 to the User. The User
digitally signs the concatenation (marked as ||) of 𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒 and the commitment 𝑐2.
1Can be run repeatedly to get as many tokens as necessary.
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IDU, c2, SigU(nonce,  c2)
 SigI(c2)
Token, PDLE, SigI(c2)
PKDL = PK{rand: c1 = g1
rand
 mod p}
SigPA(Token || IDI)
nonce
Verify&Store SigU(nonce, c2)
PDLE:
PK{rand: c1 = g1
rand
 mod p ^ c2 = g2
rand
 mod p}
Token: 
PKstep1{rand: c1 = g1
rand
 mod p}
PDLE verification
PKDL verification&store
SigI(c2) verification
Registration phase
Public Authority 
(SkPA, PkPA)
User
(SkU, PkU)
Issuer
(SkI, PkI)
Valid token
Fig. 6.2: Initialization protocol.
The commitment, signature and User identifier 𝐼𝐷𝑈 are sent to I who verifies the
signature and replies with its own signature on 𝑐2. As a result, the User committed to
a secret value 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 and got the Issuer’s signature on the commitment. All messages
are sent over a secure channel, for example an TLS (Transport Layer Security)
channel.
Now the token must be computed. The first move of the PKDL protocol defined
in Chapter 4 with the 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 value as the secret exponent and 𝑔1 as the base, denoted
as 𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝1{𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 : 𝑐1 = 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑1 }, is used. The token therefore consist of two values -
𝑐1 = 𝑔
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑
1 mod 𝑝 and 𝑐1 = 𝑔𝑟1 mod 𝑝, where 𝑟 ∈𝑅 Z𝑞.
Communication with PA
The User has to prove the construction of the token to PA. PA must be assured
that 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 inside 𝑐2 signed by I is equal to the number used as an exponent inside
the token’s 𝑐1. That is the reason why the User sends 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 with appropriate I’s
signature together with PDLE which is the proof of equivalence of discrete logarithm
between 𝑐1 and 𝑐2. PDLE is computed using 𝑐1 = 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑1 mod 𝑝, 𝑐2 = 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑2 mod 𝑝.
Anonymous channels introduced in Chapter 2 are used for communication. Then,
PA runs the PKDL protocol using (𝑐1, 𝑐1) with the User to be sure that he knows
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑. Provided all proofs are accepted by PA, the digital signature on the token is
computed and sent to the User by PA. The User now owns a valid token and PA’s
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PKDL = PK{rand: c1=g1
rand
 mod p}
Token, SigPA(Token || IDI) SigPA(Token||IDI) verification
Verification Phase
User
(SkU, PkU)
Verifier
(PkPA)
PKDL verification&store
Fig. 6.3: Verification phase.
signature on it. All messages are sent over a secure channel. The verification phase
follows.
Verification Protocol
The verification protocol is a simple PKDL protocol where the User proves the
knowledge of 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 inside the token. The first step (𝑐1, 𝑐1) previously signed by PA
must be used. It can be denoted as 𝑃𝐾{𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 : 𝑐1 = 𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑1 }. The Verifier (V)
verifies both PKDL and PA’s signature on the token. The communication is based
on either anonymous channels or smart-cards2. The protocol is depicted in Figure
6.3. Provided all proofs are accepted by the verifier, the User is allowed to access
services.
Revocation Phase
The revocation phase can be added in the case of rule violations. In that case,
the service provider needs to revoke the user or to reveal violator’s identity. The
revocation can be done if and only if PA, V and I cooperate - none of these entities
can reveal the identity of a User alone.
All users can be uniquely identified by the 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 value. If 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 is disclosed, the
Issuer can always compute the commitment to it which can be compared to the list
of previously received commitments signed by users. The 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 value can be revealed
from the communication with PA and V by the Equation 6.1, where values with a
comma come from the PKDL communication with PA and without a comma from
2The channel must be anonymous and protected against eavesdropping.
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the PKDL communication with V3. This feature comes directly from the Special
Soundness property of Σ-protocols:
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 =
𝑧′ − 𝑧
𝑒− 𝑒′ mod 𝑞 (6.1)
Scheme analysis
The presented lightweight scheme is analyzed from both security and efficiency point
of view here.
Security Analysis
In the previous section, we demanded five requirements on the lightweight scheme.
• Completeness: valid users can always prove the knowledge of a correct 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑
value to the verifier, therefore they are always accepted, by the design of the
scheme.
• Soundness: the knowledge of a valid 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 is required for the acceptance by
the PKDL protocol. An unauthorized user might want to learn 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 from
previous verification sessions. Nevertheless, 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 is present in the commu-
nication only in the form of commitment 𝑐2 and token. In both cases, the
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 extraction means a discrete logarithm computation, which is impossible
according to the Generalized Discrete Logarithm Problem assumption.
• Anonymity: one can learn the identity of the User if he is able to either get
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑 or link the token with 𝑐2. The first is proved as impossible above and
the latter would mean solving the Derived Decisional Diffie-Hellman problem,
which is assumed to be hard in this settings.
• Untraceability: the Issuer is unable to trace the user because he is unable
to link the token with 𝑐2. PA is unable to trace the User because the User’s
identity is unknown to him and token spending is protected against eavesdrop-
ping.
• Revocation: both PA and V run a Σ-protocol with the User in the scheme.
Therefore, they can use the Special Soundness property (namely Equation 6.1)
to reveal the identity of the User who broke system rules. Is is assumed that
PA and V are driven by different domains (e.g. public and private) so V must
offer the evidence of rule breaking to PA before the identity can be revealed.
That protects the identity of honest users.
3𝑧, 𝑧′ are answers on challenges 𝑒, 𝑒′ in the PKDL protocol, see Chapter 4 for a reference.
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Efficiency Analysis
The lightweight scheme uses efficient Σ-protocols and the communication-computation
trade-off. Thus, no resource-demanding computations are made on user’s side during
the verification protocol. The user has to do one addition and one multiplication
in mod𝑞 during the verification phase, which is considered efficient enough to be
implemented on a smart-card. The amount of transported data is also reduced -
only 3 messages need to be sent. It is necessary to emphasize that the amount of
transferred data does not depend on the user group size.
Weaknesses of Lightweight Scheme
The lightweight scheme provides some of privacy-enhancing features and is extremely
computationally efficient. On the other side, it is lacking some important features. It
allows proving only one attribute, a general group membership, which is represented
by a token. It does not allow providing proofs about more attributes. This disad-
vantage lowers the granularity of proofs. Furthermore, the verification token cannot
be spent multiple times. For each verification, a unique token must be issued. It is
possible to issue a batch of tokens which is then stored in smart-card’s memory. But
after all tokens are spent, the initialization protocol must be run again. From this
perspective, the scheme is impractical for users who want to keep their smart-cards
disconnected from computers. Re-issuing tokens would also deplete smart-card’s
memory write cycles. To fix all described weaknesses, the full scheme is proposed in
the next section.
6.2 Full Scheme Design
The full scheme is built using the cryptographic constructions used in the lightweight
scheme. Additionally to these constructions, the constructions based on the Okamoto-
Uchiyama group are used. The difference is mainly in the used modulus and in the
fact that the group order is hidden in OU group. Therefore, the third message
of Σ-protocols, the answer, must be sent as a non-reduced integer instead of the
reduced answer in Z𝑞 sent in the DSA version. The OU group, used in proofs of
knowledge and verifiable encryptions, can be easily identified by used modulus 𝑛.
The full scheme is based on following assumptions.
Assumptions
The Generalized Discrete Logarithm Problem (GDLP) assumption
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Based on [67] it is assumed that given a finite cyclic group 𝐺4 of order 𝑞, a generator
𝑔 and an element 𝛽 ∈ 𝐺 it is hard to find an integer 0 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝑞−1 such that 𝑔𝑥 ≡ 𝛽.
Factorization hardness assumption
Based on [76] it is assumed that it is hard to factor 𝑛 = 𝑟2𝑠, where 𝑟, 𝑠 are large safe
primes.
The DSA subgroup, introduced in Chapter 4, is defined by public parameters ℎ
(generator), 𝑞 (prime order) and 𝑝 (prime modulus). The OU group is defined by
public bases 𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔3 and product modulus 𝑛 such that 𝑛 = 𝑟2𝑠, where primes 𝑟, 𝑠
are secret. The commitments, proofs of knowledge, proofs of DL equivalence and
verifiable encryptions are used in the full scheme. All primitives are defined in the
Chapter 4 which can be used as a cryptographic reference. The difference between
the DSA subgroup, from which all examples in Chapter 4 come, and groups with
hidden order is mainly in sending the final answer in integers. The communication
pattern remains, further information can be found in [52, 21].
6.2.1 Additional Contribution
In this chapter, an attribute authentication scheme with practical, efficient multi-
level revocation is provided. From user’s perspective, the scheme is extremely ef-
ficient, providing following features. These features are additional to the privacy-
enhancing features defined in Chapter 3 and their purpose is to further enhance
privacy and practicality of the scheme.
• Practical Revocation
– Immediate Revocation: there is no need to wait for the token lifetime
expiration, tokens can be revoked immediately.
– Issuer and Verifier Revocation: revocation is available to both at-
tribute issuers and verifiers. Any of these entities can initiate the revo-
cation process.
– Verifier Local Revocation (VLR): valid users do not have to update
their tokens or download any values after some other users are revoked.
– Practical Revocation: computational complexity of the verification
protocol does not depend on the number of revoked users.
• Scalability: computational complexity of the verification protocol does not
depend on the number of all users.
4In our case, the DSA and OU group.
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• Off-line Verification: the verification session runs between the user and
verifier only. There is no need to contact other parties.
• Computationally Efficient Verification: the verification protocol with a
revocation check needs only 6 modular exponentiations, 6 multiplications and
4 additions. The complexity of the protocol does not depend on the number
of undisclosed attributes5.
The token revocation is an extremely important feature but in some cases it is not
enough to just revoke users from the system. In cases where damage was done, the
service providers need a mechanism for learning the identity of attackers to make
them responsible. More granularity to revocation is added to the scheme by allowing
the revocation of particular privacy enhancing features. The revocation of following
features is supported.
• Token Validity Revocation: in most practical cases, like token expiration,
loss or theft, the token can be revoked without identifying the owner.
• Unlinkability Revocation: in non-critical policy breaches, the verifier can
inspect user’s past behavior by revoking unlinkability. All past sessions of a
particular user can be inspected without releasing his identity.
• Anonymity Revocation: in critical policy breaches, it is possible to revoke
the anonymity of a user to make him responsible for his acts.
It is acknowledged that these revocation features must be strongly protected
against a misuse. That is the reason why the ability to do revocation is spread over
more entities. In the system, the issuer, verifier and a third authority must cooperate
to revoke any privacy enhancing feature. By such distribution, the probability of
misusing the revocation by a single authority is limited. To provide more security
(and user trust in the system), the third party can be distributed using multi-
party computations. Moreover, the user should have the freedom to choose his own
attribute issuer among many commercial subjects, therefore, he does not have to
trust a fixed designated revocation authority but rather liberally choose an entity
he trusts most.
6.2.2 General Overview
There are 4 types of players in the scheme. They are the User (U), Issuer (I), Veri-
fier (V) and Public Authority (PA). Their roles are described in the following section.
5The protocol independence on undisclosed attributes seems obvious and easy to provide but
is currently missing in leading related schemes.
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• User: a player who wants to get verified using a smart-card with a token
issued by I and PA.
• Issuer: a player who issues attributes to users and collaborates during revoca-
tion. There are more Issuers, the Issuer can be chosen by the User depending
on his preferences and trust.
• Verifier: a player who verifies Users’ attributes and collaborates during revo-
cation.
• Public Authority: a (distributed) entity that issues tokens to Users and
collaborates during revocation.
The scheme is based on the interaction among these four entities. The User owns a
smart-card with a token construction created using information from both PA and
Issuer. The token can be used for attribute authentication, since the Verifier is able
to check token’s validity. This is done without the revelation of User’s real identity.
But when the User breaks some rules of the Verifier, e.g. destroys some data, the
Verifier can ask the Issuer and Public Authority to “open” the token and reveal the
identity of the User. The User is then held responsible for his past behavior. There
are more levels of User revocation (from token revocation to anonymity revocation)
and PA is trusted not to revoke tokens in unjustified cases.
The scheme provides security features which prevent entities from misusing their
powers. V alone, I alone or PA alone cannot track or identify a User at all. PA
cannot falsely accuse a particular User, but has to be trusted not to misuse its data
for accusing random Users during revocation. To lower such trust, distributed PA
can be introduced. Only the joint cooperation of V, I and PA can do the revocation,
by sharing their inputs.
The scheme consists of 4 protocols - setup, registration (attribute issuance),
verification and optional revocation. User’s goal of the registration is to get data
from I and PA necessary to construct the token. The token is then used during the
Verification phase to prove User’s membership, attribute ownership or any other
authorization given by I’s organization. In case of disputes, loss of a smart-card or
system policy breaches, the revocation phase can be introduced. Based on the level
of dispute, the User can be removed, traced or identified. The revocation is possible
only if I, V and PA cooperate, assuming PA cooperates only in cases where sufficient
policy violation logs are given by V’s organization. The communication pattern is
depicted in Figure 6.4.
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𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛−−−−−−−−−→ 𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛←−−−−−−−−−|
Token
(attributes)⎮⌄
Smart-card
Verifier
𝑉 𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛←−−−−−−−−→
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 6.4: Communication pattern of proposed scheme.
6.2.3 Cryptographic Design
The scheme consists of four protocols: Setup, Registration Protocol, Verification
Protocol and Revocation Protocol.
Setup
The goal of the setup phase is to generate all necessary initial parameters. It is
assumed that a public key infrastructure and valid keypairs for the User and Issuer
exist. They will be used during registration. The security parameters are 𝑘, 𝑙,𝑚 (𝑘
is the length of the challenge/hash function used, 𝑙 relates to the length of Users’
secrets, and 𝑚 is the verification error parameter). The Issuer generates the DSA
subgroup 𝐺 defined by a large prime modulus 𝑝, generator ℎ of prime order 𝑞 :
|𝑞| = 𝑙 and 𝑞|𝑝−1. The Public Authority generates groups 𝐺1, 𝐺3 for the Okamoto-
Uchiyama Trapdoor One-Way Function. 𝐺1, 𝐺3 are defined by the modulus 𝑛 = 𝑟2𝑠
with 𝑟, 𝑠 large primes (|𝑟| ≥ 350, |𝑟| > 2𝑙, |𝑛| ≥ 1024), generators 𝑔1, 𝑔3 ∈𝑅 Z𝑛 of
order 𝑜𝑟𝑑(𝑔1 mod 𝑟2) = 𝑜𝑟𝑑(𝑔3 mod 𝑟2) = 𝑟(𝑟 − 1) in Z*𝑟2 and 𝑜𝑟𝑑(𝑔1) = 𝑜𝑟𝑑(𝑔3) =
𝑟𝑟′𝑠′ in Z*𝑛. PA also randomly chooses its secrets 𝑆1, 𝑆2 : |𝑆1| = 𝑙, |𝑆−12 mod 𝜑(𝑛)| = 𝑙
and GCD(𝑆2, 𝜑(𝑛)) = 1. Finally, PA computes a token 𝐴 = 𝑔𝑆11 mod 𝑛 (public,
common for all Users) and a value 𝑔2 = 𝑔𝑆21 mod 𝑛. There might be more types of
tokens (different 𝐴𝑖’s) related to different attributes Users want to prove. In that
case, each unique 𝐴𝑖 represents one attribute, e.g. nationality, driving permission
or legal voting age.6 These attributes can be aggregated together by multiplying
6𝐴 represents a unique attribute. A public list of available attributes and their assigned values
of 𝐴 should be maintained by PA.
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mod 𝑛. In the rest of the paper, only one 𝐴 representing a general group membership
is considered for simplicity.
The values 𝑞, 𝑝, ℎ, 𝑛, 𝑔1, 𝑔2, 𝑔3, 𝐴 are made public, while 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝑆1, 𝑆2 are securely
stored at PA or secretly shared in PA’s distributed environment.
Registration Protocol
We assume a secure, authenticated (non-anonymous) channel between the User and
the Issuer during the registration phase. The User randomly chooses a secret value
𝑤 shorter than 𝑙 bits, makes a signed commitment 𝑐𝐼 to it and proves the knowledge
of logℎ 𝑐𝐼 to the Issuer. The User binds his identity to the commitment by the
signature. The Issuer might require additional actions like payments, proofs of
authorization by another entity or, for example, proofs of some (e.g. driving) license
possession. When the Issuer does all the checks and allows the User to get the
attribute, the User gets his commitment back, signed by the Issuer. After this step,
all communication of the User is anonymous if he adheres to the rules.
In the second step, the user must get information necessary to construct the
private key (𝑤,𝑤′). These values form the discrete logarithm representation of 𝐴
with respect to generators (𝑔1, 𝑔2) so that 𝐴 = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔𝑤
′
2 mod 𝑛 holds. The values
(𝑤,𝑤′) cannot be computed by the User because he does not know 𝑆1 and the
factorization of 𝑛. But it cannot be provided by PA either since these keys must
be known by the User only. Therefore, the key is computed jointly so that PA does
not learn (𝑤,𝑤′) but U does7. The User’s smart-card computes a credential seed
𝐴′ = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔
𝑤′𝑈
2 mod 𝑛 where 𝑤′𝑈 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑙 is User’s random contribution to the key.
User sends 𝐴′, 𝑐𝐼 and I’s signature to PA and proves that the key part 𝑤 is present in
both𝐴′ and 𝑐𝐼 . This can be proven in zero-knowledge using 𝑃𝐾{𝑤 : 𝑐𝐼 = ℎ𝑤 mod 𝑝∧
𝐴′ = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔
𝑤′𝑈
2 mod 𝑛}. PA verifies the proof, checks if 𝑐𝐼 is not used by any other
user and answers with his key contribution 𝑤′𝑃𝐴. The 𝑤′𝑃𝐴 is computed as 𝑤′𝑃𝐴 =
(((𝐴 * 𝐴′−1) mod 𝑛)𝑟−1 mod 𝑟2 − 1)/𝑟
(𝑔𝑟−12 mod 𝑟2 − 1)/𝑟
mod 𝑟 so that 𝐴 = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔
𝑤′𝑈
2 𝑔
𝑤′𝑃𝐴
2 mod 𝑛 holds.
The User’s smart-card sets 𝑤′ = 𝑤′𝑈 + 𝑤′𝑃𝐴 and stores the credential (𝐴, (𝑤,𝑤′)).
By using the described registration protocol, all Users share the same 𝐴 for a
particular attribute but use different keys. Users are stuck to their keys, because
without 𝑆1, 𝑆2, 𝜑(𝑛) they are unable to compute different valid keys. The registration
protocol is depicted in Figure 6.5.
7Due to security reasons, (𝑤,𝑤′) are never accessible to users directly but are stored in smart-
card’s protected memory. Keys are never extracted, all operations involving them are done on the
smart-card.
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PA User Issuer
𝑤 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑙−1
𝑐𝐼 = 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡(𝑤) = ℎ
𝑤 mod 𝑝
𝑃𝐾{𝑤 : 𝑐𝐼 = ℎ𝑤}, 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑈 (𝑐𝐼)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Store (𝑐𝐼 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑈 (𝑐𝐼))
𝑆𝑖𝑔𝐼(𝑐𝐼)←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
𝑤′𝑈 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑙
𝐴′ = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔
𝑤′𝑈
2 mod 𝑛
𝐴′, 𝑐𝐼 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝐼(𝑐𝐼), 𝑃𝐾{𝑤 : 𝐶𝐼 = ℎ𝑤 ∧𝐴′ = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔𝑤
′
𝑈
2 }←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
𝑤′𝑃𝐴 : 𝐴 = 𝑔
𝑤
1 𝑔
𝑤′𝑈
2 𝑔
𝑤′𝑃𝐴
2 mod 𝑛−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
𝑤′ = 𝑤′𝑈 + 𝑤
′
𝑃𝐴
Credential: (𝐴 = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔𝑤
′
2 mod 𝑛, (𝑤,𝑤
′))
Fig. 6.5: Registration Protocol
Verification Protocol
The verification protocol runs over an anonymous channel (using either anonymous
routing or smart-cards). The User proves the knowledge of representation of 𝐴
using (𝑤,𝑤′). By doing so, he remains completely anonymous, since the proof of
representation can be a Zero-Knowledge protocol. To get the ability to revoke invalid
Users, a subprotocol must be added. User cannot give a commitment to his 𝑤, since
this would make his sessions linkable. Therefore, he creates a verifiable encryption
of the randomness used in the first step of the proof of representation protocol
(denoted as 𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝1). Such encryption will be always different, thus unlinkable.
Nevertheless, if decrypted by PA, it can be used to trace a User or even to identify
him. The User has to prove that the randomness in VE is the same as the one
used in the proof of representation. PA is not involved during the verification at
all, therefore the verification, including the revocation check, can run off-line. The
protocol is depicted in Figure 6.6. A detailed description of the verification protocol
with all the checks needed to support revocation is given in Figure 6.7.
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PA User Verifier
Token = 𝐴 = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔𝑤
′
2 mod 𝑛
𝑃𝐾{𝑤,𝑤′ : 𝐴 = 𝑔𝑤1 𝑔𝑤
′
2 }←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
𝑉 𝐸{𝑟1 : 𝑃𝐾𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑝1 = ((𝑔𝑤1 𝑔𝑤
′
2 ), (𝑔
𝑟1
1 𝑔
𝑟′1
2 ))}←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 6.6: Simplified verification.
Revocation Protocol
The revocation protocol is the fundamental part of the system, assuming a good bal-
ance between anonymity and accountability is required. Practical credential schemes
[44, 68] do not implement scalable revocation and theoretical proposals [41] are not
efficient enough to be implementable. In the proposed scheme, there is no way of
identifying or tracing a User unless more entities cooperate. The verification proto-
col transcript must be given to (distributed) PA entity with an evidence of a breach
of a policy. PA can then decide what type of revocation will be applied: tracing,
revocation or identity revelation. The first two types can be done by PA, but in the
case of identity revelation, the real identity is readable only to the Issuer (previously
chosen by the User), so no unnecessary data about Users ever leak, even if Users
break Verifier’s policies.
Tracing (Unlinkability Revocation): the Verifier can give two transcripts of
different verification protocols to PA. PA, using its secret factorization of 𝑛, can
decrypt the randomness inside VE8, thus it can get User’s unique 𝑤9 (but not the
real identity!), so it can decide whether two verification protocols were conducted
by the same User.
Revocation (Token Revocation): based on a verification transcript, PA can get
𝑤 like in the Tracing case. To prevent identity revelation, PA can release a commit-
ment to 𝑤 in the form of 𝑟𝑒𝑣 = 𝑔𝑤3 mod 𝑛. Using 𝑟𝑒𝑣, the Verifier can always check
whether the User has been revoked or not without de-anonymizing the User. The
revocation check is described in Figure 6.7.
Identity Revelation (Anonymity Revocation): in the worst cases of rule break-
ing, PA can reveal 𝑤 to the Issuer, who can compute an adequate commitment
8With respect to Figure 6.7, randomness is obtained as 𝑟1 =
(𝑐𝑟−13 mod 𝑟
2 − 1)/𝑟
(𝑔𝑟−13 mod 𝑟2 − 1)/𝑟
mod 𝑟
9With respect to Figure 6.7, User’s secret can be obtained as 𝑤 = ((𝑟1 − 𝑧1)𝑒−11 ) mod 𝑟
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User Verifier
𝑐1 = 𝐴 = 𝑔
𝑤
1 𝑔
𝑤′
2 mod 𝑛
𝑟1 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑘+𝑙+𝑚, 𝑟′1 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑘+2𝑙+𝑚
𝑟2 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}2𝑘+𝑙+2𝑚, 𝑟′2 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}2𝑘+2𝑙+2𝑚
𝑐1 = 𝑔
𝑟1
1 𝑔
𝑟′1
2 mod 𝑛
𝑐2 = 𝑐1
𝑐3 = 𝑔
𝑟1
3 mod 𝑛
𝑐2 = 𝑔
𝑟2
1 𝑔
𝑟′2
2 mod 𝑛
𝑐3 = 𝑔
𝑟2
3 mod 𝑛
𝑐2, 𝑐3, 𝑐2, 𝑐3−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
𝑒1 ∈𝑅 {0, 1}𝑘←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
𝑧1 = 𝑟1 − 𝑒1𝑤
𝑧′1 = 𝑟
′
1 − 𝑒1𝑤′
𝑧2 = 𝑟2 − 𝑒1𝑟1
𝑧′2 = 𝑟
′
2 − 𝑒1𝑟′1
𝑧1, 𝑧
′
1, 𝑧2, 𝑧
′
2−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
𝑐3
?
̸≡ 𝑔𝑧13 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒1 mod 𝑛
(revocation check)
𝑐2
?≡ 𝑔𝑧11 𝑔𝑧
′
1
2 𝑐
𝑒1
1 mod 𝑛
𝑐2
?≡ 𝑔𝑧21 𝑔𝑧
′
2
2 𝑐
𝑒1
2 mod 𝑛
𝑐3
?≡ 𝑔𝑧23 𝑐𝑒13 mod 𝑛
Fig. 6.7: Verification protocol (optimized).
𝑐𝐼 = ℎ
𝑤 mod 𝑝 and charge the User who signed that commitment during the regis-
tration.
The above described Revocation Protocol provides full anonymity to honest
users. Malicious users, whose communication is submitted to one of three types
of revocation, can be revealaed, because their secret keys can be disclosed by PA. In
our design, PA is trusted not to disclose User’s secrets if insufficient policy violation
proofs are submitted. It is the next goal of following research to desing a scheme
were such a trust in PA is removed. In the time of writing this thesis, a solution
based on disclosing commitments of keys is being developed.
83
6.2.4 Proving Ownership of More Attributes
For simplicity, only one token construction 𝐴 was used in the description. It repre-
sented one attribute, a general group membership. On the other hand, User might
want to have more attributes, representing e.g. his citizenship, age, sex or driving
permission. In that case, the User runs more registration protocols to get all tokens
𝐴𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑤
1 𝑔
𝑤′𝑖
2 representing all attributes he wants to own. He learns all openings for
these tokens in the form (𝑤,𝑤′𝑖)10. Then he can choose any subset of these tokens
and prove to the Verifier the ownership of only selected attributes. This can be
done just by repeating the proof of a single token, which is very inefficient. The
more efficient approach is to modularly multiply selected tokens together to get a
new token 𝐴 = 𝐴1𝐴2...𝐴𝑖. Then the User can prove the representation of 𝐴 since
𝐴 = 𝐴1𝐴2...𝐴𝑖 = 𝑔
𝑤
1 𝑔
𝑤′1
2 𝑔
𝑤
1 𝑔
𝑤′2
2 ...𝑔
𝑤
1 𝑔
𝑤′𝑖
2 = 𝑔
𝑖𝑤
1 𝑔
𝑤′1+𝑤
′
2+...+𝑤
′
𝑖
2 . The User just sets 𝑤 = 𝑖𝑤
and 𝑤′ = 𝑤′1+𝑤′2+ ...+𝑤′𝑖 and runs the protocol for a single token proof. Therefore,
with a careful choice of system parameters, the proof of more attributes adds only
minimal overhead. Obviously, those attributes which the User does not want to get
disclosed stay perfectly hidden, since they are not communicated in any form.
In this chapter, the novel scheme for anonymous attribute authentication was pre-
sented. Using the scheme, a User can anonymously convince a Verifier about the
possession of an attribute, typically about the authorization to use services. By stay-
ing anonymous and having the control over all released data, the users can protect
their privacy during the verification process. The full scheme supports all required
features, so far supported only individually, in one practical solution, which is even
easily implementable on smart-cards. Additionally to being computationally effi-
cient, the scheme can be proven secure11, since it is based on strong cryptographic
primitives, mostly proofs of knowledge or representation, Okamoto-Uchiyama OWF
and DL commitments.
Additionally, features unavailable before are included, mainly scalable and im-
plementable revocation with malicious user identity revelation. These new features
make the scheme acceptable by service providers, without whose support any scheme
is without a chance for being widely accepted.
10Again, each User in the system has a unique opening (𝑤,𝑤′𝑖) for a shared, system-wide public
token 𝐴𝑖.
11Security depends also on underlying tools, like the anonymous routing protocol (TOR) and
the smart-card.
84
7 VERIFICATION OF THEORETICAL DESIGN
The cryptographic scheme for attribute authentication specified in the previous
Chapter 6 is analyzed in this chapter. First, an informal analysis of supported
features is provided. The list of features, which were identified in the Chapter 3
dealing with thesis objectives, is given together with the description of how these
features are supported by the proposed scheme. Additionally, three sections repre-
senting both theoretical and practical verification follow.
The first section deals with the theoretical verification of the scheme design.
The most important properties, namely completeness, soundness and anonymity
of users, are analyzed and formally proved. The completeness feature assures the
functionality of the scheme so that honest users are always accepted. The soundness
feature assures the security of the scheme so that unauthorized users are rejected.
Finally, the anonymity of users assures the protection of users’ privacy.
The second section provides results from the practical simulation of the verifica-
tion protocol. The scheme proposed in this thesis has been tested in Mathematica
software. The system parameters and all values necessary for the verification proto-
col were computed in Mathematica so that the verification protocol could be simu-
lated. The simulation results prove the functionality of the scheme, namely that the
scheme is working in practical settings on real computing devices. Furthermore, a
script running repeatedly the verification protocol was created to simulate a batch
of hundreds of thousands verification sessions.
Finally, the third section provides results from the smart-card implementation of
the scheme. A smart-card represents an extremely mobile, low-performance device
which is supposed to be used in practical scenarios. An off-the-shelve smart-card
without any modification was used. First implementation results show that the
proposed scheme is faster than related implementations. The implementation of the
verification protocol of the proposed scheme shows that the scheme is practical and
implementable on current hardware.
The requirements demanded in government calls [74, 72] and related work are
accomplished by the proposed scheme by following mechanisms.
• Security: the scheme is built on strong cryptographic constructions. It is
based on cryptographic commitment schemes, proofs of knowledge, proofs of
DL equivalence and verifiable encryptions. The security of these constructions
is based on well-established assumptions, namely the DL assumption and fac-
torization hardness assumption defined in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2.
• Anonymity: the identity of an honest user is not released by the verification
protocol since it is a Zero-Knowledge protocol. No more information than the
proof of statement is released.
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• Untraceability: all users share the same token during their verification so it
is impossible to distinguish and trace a particular user. Similarly as for the
anonymity feature, the verification protocol does not release any additional
private information since it is a Zero-Knowledge protocol.
• Unlinkability: it is impossible to link particular user’s verification sessions
since all users share the same token and the verification protocol is randomized
thus always different and unlinkable.
• Selective disclosure of attributes: users have the ability to selectively
choose only some attributes to give proofs about. They use only the tokens
linked with those attributes.
• Non-transferability: each token has a unique user secret number 𝑤 embed-
ded inside. Although it is not disclosed during verification, it can be disclosed
during revocation phase. Therefore, the user can be punished for his past be-
havior or for someone else’s behavior if he lends his token and secrets. Thus,
token sharing is cryptographically discouraged.
• Practical, complex revocation: the scheme allows token revocation, un-
linkability revocation and anonymity revocation. These features are described
in Section 6.2.1. The verification protocol supporting all these revocation fea-
tures was implemented on a smart-card thus it is practical.
A more formal analysis of the key aspects of the scheme follows. The theoretical
analysis relies on the cryptographic Chapter 4 since the properties of the scheme
heavily rely on the properties of the underlying cryptographic primitives.
7.1 Theoretical Verification
The verification protocol assures that honest users are accepted (completeness),
dishonest users are rejected (soundness) and that honest users stay anonymous.
Completeness
The honest users know a valid representation of 𝐴 in the form of (𝑤,𝑤′), so they
are almost always accepted in the proof of representation protocol. The protocol
is described in the Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3. There is a small verification error
probability. Since a user does not know 𝜑(𝑛), he must send answers in proofs
of knowledge/representation in Z. Based on [21], to retain the Zero-Knowledge
property, answers must fit within a certain interval, which happens with probability
𝑃 = 1− 2−𝑚. Details in [21].
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Soundness
The verification protocol depicted in Figure 6.6 and its optimized version in Figure
6.7 are the parallel compositions of a subprotocol denoted as 𝑃𝐾{𝛼 : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝛼}
described in Section 4.1.3. Its soundness is proven by following the proof of the RSA
variant of this protocol [47]. The proof is adapted to the Okamoto-Uchiyama group
which is used. The environment, already specified in sections devoted to setup and
registration, is following: 𝑛 = 𝑟2𝑠, 𝑟 = 2𝑟′ + 1, 𝑠 = 2𝑠′ + 1, 𝑔 ∈𝑅 Z*𝑛 : 𝑜𝑟𝑑(𝑔 mod 𝑟2)
in Z*𝑟2 is 𝑟(𝑟 − 1), 𝑜𝑟𝑑(𝑔) in Z*𝑛 is 𝑟𝑟′𝑠′ and 𝑟′, 𝑠′ are random large primes such that
𝑟, 𝑠 are also primes.
Theorem 1. Under the assumptions that factoring of 𝑛 is hard and log𝑔 𝑐 is un-
known, given a modulus 𝑛, along with elements 𝑔, 𝑐, it is hard to compute integers
𝑎, 𝑏 such that
1 ≡ 𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑏 mod 𝑛 and (𝑎 ̸= 0 or 𝑏 ̸= 0). (7.1)
Proof. Suppose there is an algorithm 𝒜 that inputs 𝑛, 𝑔, 𝑐 and outputs 𝑎, 𝑏 valid
in (7.1). Then one can use 𝒜 to either factor 𝑛 or compute log𝑔 𝑐, both violating
assumptions. The output (𝑎, 𝑏) satisfies 1 ≡ 𝑔𝑎𝑐𝑏 ≡ 𝑔𝑎𝑔𝛼𝑏 ≡ 𝑔𝑎+𝛼𝑏 mod 𝑛, therefore
𝑎+ 𝛼𝑏 ≡ 0 mod 𝑜𝑟𝑑(𝑔). There are two cases:
Case 1. Let us consider 𝑎 + 𝛼𝑏 = 0. Then, the discrete logarithm log𝑔 𝑐 can be
efficiently computed as log𝑔 𝑐 = 𝛼 = −
𝑎
𝑏
. Case 1 violates the discrete logarithm
assumption.
Case 2. Let us consider 𝑎 + 𝛼𝑏 ̸= 0. 𝒜 can be used to factor 𝑛 by choosing 𝛼 in
random, inputting (𝑛, 𝑔, 𝑔𝛼) and getting the output (𝑎, 𝑏). Using (𝑎 + 𝛼𝑏), which
is a non-zero multiple of 𝜑(𝑛), the adversary can factor 𝑛. To efficiently compute
a proper factor of 𝑛 using a multiple of 𝜑(𝑛), the adversary can use the technique
originally developed for RSA [25]. Case 2 violates the factorization assumption.
Using the Theorem 1, the soundness can be proven like in [47], thus by constructing
the knowledge extractor and assuming that the factorization of 𝑛 is hard. The
extractor uses the standard rewinding technique, thus inputs two different valid
answers 𝑧, 𝑧 on two different challenges 𝑒, 𝑒 with the fixed first step 𝑐. The verification
equation must hold for both answers: 𝑐 ≡ 𝑔𝑧𝑐𝑒 mod 𝑛 and 𝑐 ≡ 𝑔𝑧𝑐𝑒 mod 𝑛. From
these two equations, we get 1 ≡ 𝑔𝑧−𝑧𝑐𝑒−𝑒 mod 𝑛. From the Theorem 1, the user
must have used log𝑔 𝑐, since the factorization of 𝑛 is unknown. Based on the Case
1 of Theorem 1, (𝑒 − 𝑒) divides (𝑧 − 𝑧), therefore the extractor can extract 𝛼 =
log𝑔 𝑐 =
𝑧−𝑧
𝑒−𝑒 .
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Anonymity
The only value which can identify the user to the Issuer is 𝑤. It must be assured that
no information about 𝑤 leaks, therefore a Zero-Knowledge simulator must be found.
The subprotocol denoted as 𝑃𝐾{𝛼 : 𝑐 = 𝑔𝛼}, as well as the whole protocol, can
be simulated in the standard way [50], by choosing random answers and computing
the first steps of the protocol from the verification equations. For simplicity, the
challenge 𝑒1 from the Verifier is used in Figure 6.7, which makes the protocol secure
only against honest Verifiers. Nevertheless, the protocol can be easily modified to
become computationally secure against any Verifiers using [55] or fully secure using
[35]. In the implementation, the Fiar-Shamir heuristic [55] is used to make the
protocol non-interactive and computationally secure.
7.2 Mathematical Model
The simulation of the proposed scheme protocols is presented here to verify the
functionality of the scheme. The goal is to simulate the verification protocol and
test the design with real numbers and system parameters. The scheme is based on
modular arithmetics and computations with large numbers. Furthermore, specific
functions, such as primality tests and modular inversions, are used. That is the
reason why an advanced mathematical software was chosen to simulate the scheme.
The Mathematica 7 software allows an easy implementation of all required functions.
For the purpose of the verification protocol simulation and for the verification of the
functional design, it is a very suitable tool.
To test the concept of the scheme, all values of the verification protocol must be
correctly computed and the final checks done by the verifier must hold. Further-
more, the revocation must hold so it is possible to reveal the secret of a user from
the verification protocol transcript. To simulate the verification protocol, system
parameters must be computed. Thus, most of the scheme is simulated in the script
provided in Appendix A.
The script starts with loading of pre-defined parameters. The modulus of the
OU group and its factors are pre-defined due to efficiency reasons. The generation of
these values takes minutes on an average computer and this operation is done only
once when the scheme is deployed. Values used in the script were pre-computed
using Mathematica. Then, the OU group parameters are computed. This is done
by PA in the scheme. The script follows the specification in Section 6.2. After the
parameters are computed, the token and its opening (representation) are computed.
This operation is done by PA and the user in the real scheme. Finally, all values
of the verification protocol, as defined in section 6.2.3, are computed. These values
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Tab. 7.1: Cryptographic parameters length recommendation.
Parameter NIST 2010 NIST 2011 - 2030
k 160 224
l 160 224
m 80 80
|r| 350 b 700 b
|n| 1024 b 2048 b
represent the 3 step protocol depicted in Figure 6.7. All check equations of the
Verifier are evaluated in the simulation. If any check fails, the simulation is aborted.
If all checks pass, the verification protocol runs again with different randomization
until the intended number of iterations is met. The scheme has been tested for 1
million verification sessions without any failure. The average speed was 35 ms / 1
session.
The scheme was tested with system parameters specified in Table 7.1. The pa-
rameters in the first column follow the recommendation of National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) for cryptographic key length [63]. The same
keylength is used in the implementation presented in the next chapter. For the
commercial implementation, a more strict recommendation is required. The crypto-
graphic key length recommendation for the period of 2011 to 2030 should be used.
The stronger system parameters are specified in the second column of Table 7.1.
7.3 Implementation
The verification protocol of the full scheme described in this thesis was implemented
on a standard off-the-shelve smart-card [18, 4]. No tweaks of a standard environ-
ment, not even of the RSA implementation, which were necessary in [28], were used
during the implementation. The implementation uses the .NET V2+ smart-card
specified in Table 7.2. It can be seen in Figure 6.7 that the efficiency of the ver-
ification protocol depends on the ability to do fast modular exponentiation and
multiplication. That is why the demands of most popular multiplication methods -
schoolbook method, Comba multiplication [31], Montgomery multiplication [66] and
a method based on tunneling through the RSA crypto-coprocessor used in [28] were
measured. Based on the results (see Figure 7.2), the RSA tunneling method was
chosen for implementation. This method is indispensable for low transaction times.
Although performance results from an early implementation phase are available,
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Tab. 7.2: Specifications of the Gemalto v2+ .NET smart-cards.
Software Specification
OS type .NET
Transfer protocol T=0
Asymmetric algorithms RSA up to 2048 bit
Symmetric algorithms 3DES (EBC, CBC), AES
Hash SHA1, SHA2, MD5
Hardware Specification
Chip Infineon SLE 88CFX4000P
CMOS 0.13 micron
CPU RISC 32 bit
Internal/External clock 66 MHz/up to 10 MHz
Baud rate up to 223 Kbps
RAM memory 16 kBytes
ROM/EEPROM memory 80/400 kBytes
Memory for assemblies approx. 62 kBytes
Voltage range 1.62 V - 5.5 V
Temperature range -25 C to +85 C
Security measures TRNG, Crypto processor (1408 bit)
around 30% faster times of verification1 than related implementations on locked
smart-cards [28] were obatined. The implementation works only as a proof of con-
cept, so a major performance improvement is expected if accordingly implemented.
Furthermore, the implementation was developed only to test the functionality of the
verification protocol and its performance, therefore only parts necessary to measure
the performance of the verification protocol were included. Thus, the implementa-
tion lacks the functionality of other entities and the user interface is very simple,
displaying only protocol parameters and verification time (see Figure 7.1). The
source code for the smart-card is included in Appendix B.
1Proposed scheme requires around 7 s for the verification using a locked off-the-shelve smart-
card. This relates to cca. 10 s of idemix time. Using unlocked smart-card, e.g., MULTOS, the
time would be well below 1 s.
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Fig. 7.1: Smart-card implementation interface.
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Fig. 7.2: Comparison of modular multiplication methods performance.
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8 COMPARISON OF PROPOSED SCHEMEWITH
EXISTING WORK
The scheme proposed in this thesis allows users to anonymously prove their posses-
sion of attributes. The attributes can represent any personal characteristics, e.g.,
age, citizenship or driving license. Systems which provide such functionality can be
called attribute authentication systems. These systems are usually designed to pro-
vide as much privacy for users as possible. The required privacy-enhancing features
have been specified in Chapter 3. These privacy-enhancing features are required
not only by cryptographers and system security engineers, but also by official gov-
ernmental calls [74, 72]. Thus, it is necessary to provide as many of these features
as possible in future authentication systems. Some of these features are already
supported by current systems. On the other hand, there are features which are
very difficult to provide. During the analysis of related solutions, the missing un-
linkability of verification sessions and revocation have been identified as the most
significant problems preventing existing attribute authentication systems from being
commercially successful. Therefore, the goal of this thesis, defined in Chapter 3, is
to develop a new cryptographic scheme which is supporting all privacy-enhancing
features, including unlinkability and revocation. Furthermore, the scheme must be
efficient enough to be implementable on a smart-card.
In this chapter, the proposed scheme is compared to related techniques and
related systems. Since the revocation feature is the key innovative aspect of the
proposed scheme, the proposed revocation approach is compared to existing revoca-
tion techniques. In the first part of this chapter, the existing revocation techniques
are analyzed and their weaknesses are described. To author’s best knowledge, there
is currently no scheme providing practical, multi-level revocation which is imple-
mentable on smart-cards.
In the second part of the chapter, the comparison of the proposed scheme to
existing attribute authentication systems is provided. Currently, there are only two
schemes which provide attribute authentication capabilities and have the potential
to become widespread. They are the U-Prove and idemix, both analyzed in Chapter
5. These systems, both supported by large IT companies, are compared with the
proposal. The weaknesses and missing features, which make them less practical, are
identified.
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8.1 Existing Techniques for Revocation
Revocation, a feature crucial for both attribute issuers and service providers, allows a
token to be revoked after its misuse, expiration, theft or loss. By omitting revocation,
there is no mechanism for revoking malicious users, stolen verification tokens or lost
verification smart-cards. Missing revocation is the reason why the service providers
do not accept existing systems. It is too dangerous for them to provide their assets
without being able to revoke invalid users, charge attackers for potential damage
or identify clients who use stolen identities. The problem of missing revocation
has been unsuccessfully addressed by many authors in papers dealing with privacy
enhancing cryptography. A short overview of revocation techniques used in existing
systems is provided there together with reasons why they were found impractical.
Blacklisting of Token IDs
Some systems, for example U-Prove [68], use a token identifier embedded to each
transaction. The identifier is a public, unique and unchangeable number linked to
the token. This number can be used to revoke the token by putting it on a blacklist.
Nevertheless, this approach destroys unlinkability (the unique token identifier creates
a link among all user’s verification sessions). Furthermore, a token can be revoked
only by verifiers who already saw the token before and there is no mechanism for
revoking tokens by their issuers. That is why the issuers have no power to revoke
invalid, stolen or expired tokens.
Blacklisting of Secrets
The technique for blacklisting of secrets, used, for example, in [28], allows an invalid
token to be revoked by using the knowledge of secret keys used for its construction.
This technique can be used in cases where secret keys of users are revealed and
for example made public on the Internet. In that case, a revocation authority can
create a blacklist of these keys to prevent verifiers from accepting tokens based on
leaked keys. Nevertheless, this technique works only if the user secrets are revealed.
But in most cases, the secret keys never leave a protected device (like a smart-card),
therefore they cannot be revoked. Moreover, lost, stolen or expired tokens (e.g.,
stored on a smart-card) cannot be revoked because their secret keys never become
public.
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Epochs of Lifetime
Epochs of lifetime are the official revocation technique of idemix [44]. Here, a cre-
dential carries an epoch of validity as a special attribute. In this case, the verifier
can check whether the credential is fresh. The user is required to renew his creden-
tial for every new epoch. The disadvantage of this mechanism is that the revocation
of credentials is never immediate, the revoker must wait until their expiration and
the issuer must stop issuing new credentials to revoked users. The second major
disadvantage is that the user must periodically run the issuance protocol with the
issuer (or designated entity) to update his credential.
Accumulator Proofs
The most recent technique, analyzed in [65], allows both issuers and verifiers to
revoke tokens immediately by publishing so called whitelists. In this technique,
a user must provide a proof that his token is included on a list of valid tokens.
This can be done anonymously and efficiently using so called accumulators which
accumulate all non-revoked users. Most efficient techniques are based on bilinear
maps [39, 70, 73, 39]. The disadvantage of these solutions is that the user must
update his secrets every time any other user is revoked from the system. This is
not a big problem when the user uses an on-line computer for his verification. On
the other hand, if the user uses only an off-line device, like a smart-card, then he
is unable to update his secrets. Therefore, the user is unable to use his token after
some other users are revoked from the system. The objective of this thesis is to
provide a system which can be used for everyday verification in libraries, pubs or
hotels, therefore the smart-card implementation is crucial. That is the reason why
the accumulator based techniques are considered impractical.
Verifiable Encryption of Secrets
The user identity or personal secrets can be encrypted inside a token in such a
manner that only a trusted authority can do the revocation or identity disclosure
by decryption. In this case, the system might be considered insecure from the per-
spective of a user who does not fully trust the authority. In fact, this is a likely
problem since users would not welcome a scheme where a fixed third party can learn
all information about their verification sessions, including their identities. In prac-
tical scenarios, the user would have no choice from more trusted authorities. This
even more degrades his trust in such a dictated authority. Furthermore, there is a
problem with unlinkability because the verifiable encryption must be randomized
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for each session, which might be inefficient. Even though mentioned in some pa-
pers, this technique has not been used for revocation in any well-known system for
anonymous attribute authentication.
8.2 Existing Systems
There are two privacy preserving authentication systems which have the potential
of getting largely widespread. They are the idemix of IBM [44] and the U-Prove of
Microsoft [68].
Let us start with Microsoft’s U-Prove scheme developed by Stefan Brands [22].
Using U-Prove, a user can run the issuing protocol with an issuer to get a token with
requested attributes. Then, the token can be presented to a service provider, who
is able to verify the attributes and their ownership. The user might decide to reveal
only a subset of attributes. A hardware device might be enforced to participate
during the presentation protocol. The scheme provides user anonymity, since the
verifier is unable to identify a user who is presenting an attribute (if the user wishes
so). Similarly, the issuer is unable to trace issued tokens. Nevertheless, the scheme
does not provide the unlinkability of verification sessions, since one token cannot be
spent more than once without spendings being linkable. Unfortunately, this makes
the scheme vulnerable to attacks on users’ privacy. In many cases, just seeing what
services are used together (at particular times) might be enough to de-anonymize
the user. The recommendation of U-Prove authors is to use a different token for
every verification session. This solution certainly works if the user has a computer
connected to a network always available. In that case, he has enough resources to
recompute tokens for every verification session. But this is not the case if we are using
smart-cards only. In that case, the user cannot update tokens for each verification
session because of the limited number of card’s memory write cycles. Besides write
cycles, the system should be autonomous and working with smart-cards only. That
allows usage in places where user’s computer is unavailable (libraries, pubs, country
borders etc.). U-Prove also does not provide efficient revocation. It is possible to
revoke tokens using their IDs, nevertheless this destroys unlinkability and is not
available for Issuers. Unofficial mechanisms [27] need on-line token updates, thus
require users’ devices connected to the Internet and are computationally inefficient.
The solution is also impractical for computationally slow devices. U-Prove does not
seem to aim to the verification based solely on smart-cards. Unfortunately, many
systems (e.g. [88, 91]) have this limitation too, because they are unable to provide a
user with a long-term token which can be spent many times without being linkable.
The attacks using linking of verification sessions are not applicable to credential
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Tab. 8.1: Comparison to existing privacy preserving schemes.
U-Prove Idemix Proposed
Security DL sRSA DL
Anonymity ∙ ∙ ∙
Attributes ∙ ∙ ∙
Untraceability ∙ ∙ ∙
Unlinkability O ∙ ∙
Selective disclosure ∙ ∙ ∙
Smart-cards O ∙ ∙
Practical revocation O O ∙
Anonymity revocation O O ∙
Speed (1+u) exp. (9+u) exp. 6 exp.
Glossary: O = Unsupported, ∙ = Supported.
systems. These systems were introduced by Chaum [61], improved by Camenisch
and Lysyanskaya [41, 42] and since then they have been redefined or improved many
times to become idemix of IBM [44]. Similarly to U-Prove, these systems allow a
user to be verified as a member of an organization, more generally as a holder of
an attribute. This can be done efficiently, anonymously, untraceably a provably
securely. There is also no need for token re-registration, computation delegation or
communication with third party entities. The system has already been implemented
in both computer and smart-card environment [59, 28]. Unlike U-Prove, idemix can
run solely on smart-cards (JavaCards) without losing unlinkability. That is the rea-
son why idemix can be implemented as an eID, where the verification sessions cannot
be linked together. Nevertheless, also idemix lacks some important features. The
basic revocation of users is still not fully resolved, since the initial proposal [41] is too
computationally inefficient for a smart-card implementation, more recent solutions
require credential updates [65, 43, 44], are not supported by current smart-card plat-
forms [70, 73] or both [39]. Furthermore, the idemix does not provide mechanisms
for the identification of malicious users. This feature has been proposed, but is not
implementable on smart-cards due to high complexity [41], or is focused rather on
accountability and the fulfillment of a predefined contract [38]. Full identification of
internal malicious users is considered very important in this thesis, since it protects
service providers’ assets. It is supposed that any system lacking the ability to iden-
tify and charge malicious users cannot be widely accepted by commercial service
providers. Moreover, the verification time of idemix implementation [28] is around
10 s for the basic version1. Although it is a dramatical improvement in comparison
1JCOP v2.2/41, restricted attribute security model, no revocation, no malicious user identifi-
cation.
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to previous schemes, it can be still considered quite a long time for verification in a
real life.
An overview of features supported by the proposed scheme and its main com-
petitors, U-Prove and idemix, is provided in Table 8.1. In Speed row, the letter
“u” represents the number of undisclosed attributes. Speed is measured by the
number of exponentiations (exp) needed for attribute ownership verification. The
comparison is based on information from the official U-Prove [68] and idemix [44, 28]
specification.
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9 CONCLUSION
The main objective of this thesis is to bring more privacy and digital identity pro-
tection to user authentication. This intention is motivated by the increasing number
of new types of services and technologies which bring new threats to our privacy
and digital identity. Technologies like electronic IDs, cloud services or ubiquitous
smart-cards intensively work with our personal data although we cannot be sure if
the protection is adequately high. Thus, a novel cryptographic scheme assuring per-
sonal data protection is proposed in this thesis. The scheme directly reacts on official
U.S. and EU requests [74, 72] for new authentication services with the support of
user-centric, attribute-based approach to authentication. Besides privacy-enhancing
features, the proposed scheme provides also higher security because it is built on
strong cryptographic constructions with provable features.
The proposed scheme is based on a new concept called attribute authentication.
In this concept, a user can give proofs not only about his identity but also about
the possession of attributes. The attributes represent any personal data, e.g. age,
citizenship or nationality. With the increasing number of services, where identity
disclosure is not necessary but the verification of some attribute is required, the
user can anonymously prove that he is a justified holder of that attribute. By using
attribute authentication, honest users can give proofs about their age, nationality or
any authorization while staying completely anonymous. To protect assets of verifiers,
the scheme allows the de-anonymization of malicious users so that they can be held
responsible for their behavior. By allowing attribute authentication, the users can
precisely manage what personal data are being released and are assured that the
verifier is unable to identify, trace and profile their behavior.
An extensive analysis of current state in the field of cryptographic privacy pro-
tection is provided in this thesis. Due to missing support of privacy protection in
classical protocols like RADIUS, EAP or Diameter, more advanced cryptosystems
have been analyzed. The most promising technologies, U-Prove and idemix, were
examined. Major weaknesses were found in these systems, namely missing unlinka-
bility of verification sessions and weak revocation.
Due to the absence of these important features, a new scheme supporting all
privacy-enhancing features including unlinkability and advanced revocation was de-
signed. Particularly, it is the revocation feature, which virtually prevented existing
systems from being commercially enrolled. Revocation was the main topic of many
research papers from the last decade but it has been still unresolved, especially on
low-performance, off-line devices. Without revocation, it is impossible to revoke
invalid, expired, lost or stolen authentication tokens. The scheme presented in this
thesis is the first solution which is both providing practical revocation and highly
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practical on devices like smart-cards. With the proposed scheme, it is now possible
to significantly enhance the privacy of users of electronic services. The solution is
the first one which provides strong authentication with privacy protection together
with the protection of service providers. Moreover, the scheme is practical on devices
like off-line smart-cards which allows the application to electronic IDs.
An extensive verification of the proposed scheme is presented in this thesis. Both
theoretical and practical verification is included. Three key properties, soundness,
completeness and anonymity of verification phase, are formally proven. The scheme
is verified on a mathematical model using Mathematica software. An experimental
smart-card implementation of the verification phase is provided. The time of veri-
fication is around 30% faster than in related existing implementations. The results
have been published at international conferences, awarded prizes (Keymaker 2011,
Brno Ph.D. Talent, Fulbright Stipend) and presented at key institutions (Univer-
sity of Minnesota, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), USA,
Goethe-University Frankfurt (ABC4Trust Project Leader), DE).
Although the proposed scheme is fully functional and ready for deployment, there
is a potential for future development. The full implementation has been currently
started as a TACR project with a commercial partner. Also, there are several
aspects of the scheme which can be cryptographically improved. These aspects are
being investigated by the author and foreign partners. The goal is improving the
verification and revocation procedure so that user keys are not fully learnt by PA,
more attributes are proven more quickly and the trust in key entities like PA is
even more lowered. All these three improvements are the core subjects of follow-up
research.
99
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Author’s selected publications
[1] Hajný, J. Úvod do zero- knowledge protokolů. Crypto-World. 2008, vol. 10,
pp. 7–13. ISSN 1801-2140.
[2] Hajný, J. Anonymita v globální síti. Crypto-World. 2009, vol. 11, pp. 7–11.
ISSN 1801-2140.
[3] Hajný, J. Flexible authentication framework. In Proceedings of the 15th
conference Student EEICT 2009 EEICT, 2009. pp. 468–472. ISBN 978-80-214-
3870-5.
[4] Hajný, J. Anonymous authentication for smartcards. Radioengineering. 2010,
vol. 19, pp. 363–368. ISSN 1210-2512.
[5] Hajný, J.; Malina, L. Implementation results of anonymous authentications
scheme. Elektrorevue. 2010, vol. 2010, pp. 1–8. ISSN 1213-1539.
[6] Hajný, J.; Martinásek, Z. Kryptografický systém pro ochranu identity. In
Proceedings of the MKB 2011 2011. pp. 67–68. ISBN 978-80-904257-3- 6.
[7] Hajný, J.; Malina, L. Secure authentication for smart-cards. In Proceedings
of the 17th conference Student EEICT 2011 EEICT, 2011. pp. 1–5. ISBN 978-
80-214-4273- 3.
[8] Hajný, J.; Malina, L. Practical revocable anonymous credentials. In CMS
2012, LNCS 7394 proceedings Springer, 2012. pp. 211–213. ISBN InPrint.
[9] Hajný, J.; Malina, L.; Pelka, T. Zero- knowledge for anonymous authen-
tication. In Proceedings of the 33rd International Conference on Telecommuni-
cation and Signal Processing TSP, 2010. pp. 1–6. ISBN 978-963-88981-0-4.
[10] Hajný, J.; Malina, L.; Zeman, V. Practical anonymous authentication: De-
signing anonymous authentication for everyday use. In Proceedings of the Inter-
national Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2011) ICETE,
2011. pp. 405–408. ISBN 978-989-8425-18- 8.
[11] Hajný, J.; Pelka, T. Univerzální autentizační rámec. Sdělovací technika.
2009, vol. 2009, pp. 3–6. ISSN 0036-9942.
[12] Hajný, J.; Pelka, T. Univerzální autentizační rámec. Elektrorevue. 2009,
vol. 2009, pp. 1–6. ISSN 1213-1539.
100
[13] Hajný, J.; Pelka, T.; Lambertová, P. Flexible authentication framework.
In Proceedings of the IEEE Xplore. Network and Service Security IEEE Xplore,
2009. pp. 1–5. ISBN 978-2-9532-4431-1.
[14] Hajný, J.; Pelka, T.; Lambertová, P. Universal authentication frame-
work: Requirements and phase design. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2009) ICETE, 2009. pp.
57–60. ISBN 978-989-674-005-4.
[15] Hajný, J.; Pelka, T.; Zeman, V. Privacy protection for user authentication.
In Proceedings of the International Conference on Security and Cryptography
(SECRYPT 2010) ICETE, 2010. pp. 90–93. ISBN 978-989-8425-18-8.
[16] Hajný, J.; Zeman, V. Anonymous authentication with spread revelation.
Cryptologia. June 2011, vol. 35, pp. 235–246. ISSN 0161-1194.
[17] Malina, L.; Hajný, J. Secure authentication in privacy protection systems.
In Proceedings of the 16th conference Student EEICT 2010 EEICT, 2010. pp.
1–3. ISBN 978-80-214-4079-1.
[18] Malina, L.; Hajný, J. Accelerated modular arithmetic for low- performance
devices. In Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Telecommuni-
cation and Signal Processing TSP, 2011. pp. 1–5. ISBN 978-1-4577-1409-2.
101
Other’s publications
[19] Aboba, B. et al. Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP). 2004. http:
//www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3748.txt.
[20] Anonymizer, [http://www.anonymizer.com/]. 20.2.2010 2010.
[21] Bao, F. An efficient verifiable encryption scheme for encryption of discrete
logarithms. In Proceedings of the The International Conference on Smart Card
Research and Applications. London, UK, UK: Springer-Verlag, 2000. CARDIS
’98, pp. 213–220. ISBN 3-540-67923-5.
[22] Brands, S. A. Rethinking Public Key Infrastructures and Digital Cer-
tificates: Building in Privacy. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2000.
ISBN 0262024918.
[23] Brands, S. Untraceable off-line cash in wallets with observers (extended ab-
stract). In Proceedings of the 13th Annual International Cryptology Conference
on Advances in Cryptology. London, UK: Springer-Verlag, 1994. CRYPTO ’93,
pp. 302–318. ISBN 3-540-57766-1.
[24] Boneh, D. The decision diffie-hellman problem. In Lecture Notes in Computer
Science Springer-Verlag, 1998. pp. 48–63. ISSN 3-540-64657-4.
[25] Boneh, D. Twenty years of attacks on the rsa cryptosystem. NOTICES OF
THE AMS. 1999, vol. 46, pp. 203–213. ISSN 0002-9920.
[26] Boneh, D.; Boyen, X.; Shacham, H. Short group signatures. In Advances
in Cryptology - CRYPTO’04 2004. ISBN 3-540-22668-0.
[27] Brands, S.; Demuynck, L.; De Decker, B. A practical system for glob-
ally revoking the unlinkable pseudonyms of unknown users. In Proceedings of
the 12th Australasian conference on Information security and privacy. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2007. ACISP’07, pp. 400–415. ISBN 978-3-540-
73457-4.
[28] Bichsel, P. et al. Anonymous credentials on a standard java card. In
Proceedings of the 16th ACM conference on Computer and communications
security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2009. CCS ’09, pp. 600–610. ISBN 978-
1-60558-894-0.
102
[29] Berthold, O.; Federrath, H.; Köpsell, S. Web mixes: a system for
anonymous and unobservable internet access. In International workshop on De-
signing privacy enhancing technologies. New York, NY, USA: Springer-Verlag
New York, Inc., 2001. pp. 115–129. ISBN 3-540-41724-9.
[30] Bauer, K. et al. Bitblender: light-weight anonymity for bittorrent. In
AIPACa ’08: Proceedings of the workshop on Applications of private and anony-
mous communications. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2008. pp. 1–8. ISBN 978-
1-60558-241-2.
[31] Comba, P. G. Exponentiation cryptosystems on the ibm pc. IBM Syst. J.
October 1990, vol. 29, pp. 526–538. ISSN 0018-8670.
[32] Cramer, R. Modular Design of Secure, yet Practical Cryptographic Protocols,
PhD thesis University of Amsterdam, 1996.
[33] Camenisch, J. Efficient and generalized group signatures. In Proceedings of
the 16th annual international conference on Theory and application of cryp-
tographic techniques. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1997. EURO-
CRYPT’97, pp. 465–479. ISBN 3-540-62975-0.
[34] Camenisch, J.; rd, I. D. Verifiable Encryption and Applications to Group
Signatures and Signature Sharing BRICS, 1999. Technical report.
[35] Cramer, R.; Damgård, I.; MacKenzie, P. D. Efficient zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge without intractability assumptions. In Proceedings of the
Third International Workshop on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptogra-
phy: Public Key Cryptography. London, UK, UK: Springer-Verlag, 2000. PKC
’00, pp. 354–372. ISBN 3-540-66967-1.
[36] Canard, S.; Gouget, A. Divisible e-cash systems can be truly anonymous.
In In EUROCRYPT 2007 2007. pp. 482–497. ISBN 978-3-540-72539-8.
[37] Carrell, D.; Grant, L. The TACACS+ Protocol Version 1.78. 1997. http:
//tools.ietf.org/id/draft-grant-tacacs-02.txt.
[38] Camenisch, J.; Groß, T.; Heydt-Benjamin, T. S. Rethinking account-
able privacy supporting services: extended abstract. In Proceedings of the 4th
ACM workshop on Digital identity management. New York, NY, USA: ACM,
2008. DIM ’08, pp. 1–8. ISBN 978-1-60558-294-8.
[39] Camenisch, J.; Kohlweiss, M.; Soriente, C. An accumulator based on
bilinear maps and efficient revocation for anonymous credentials. In Proceedings
103
of the 12th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key
Cryptography: PKC ’09. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2009. Irvine, pp.
481–500. ISBN 978-3-642-00467-4.
[40] Camenisch, J.; Kohlweiss, M.; Soriente, C. Solving revocation with
efficient update of anonymous credentials. In Proceedings of the 7th interna-
tional conference on Security and cryptography for networks. Berlin, Heidelberg:
Springer-Verlag, 2010. SCN’10, pp. 454–471. ISBN 3-642-15316-X, 978-3-642-
15316-7.
[41] Camenisch, J.; Lysyanskaya, A. An efficient system for non-transferable
anonymous credentials with optional anonymity revocation. In Proceedings of
the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic
Techniques: Advances in Cryptology. London, UK: Springer-Verlag, 2001. EU-
ROCRYPT ’01, pp. 93–118. ISBN 3-540-42070-3.
[42] Camenisch, J.; Lysyanskaya, A. A signature scheme with efficient proto-
cols. In Proceedings of the 3rd international conference on Security in com-
munication networks. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2003. SCN’02, pp.
268–289. ISBN 3-540-00420-3.
[43] Camenisch, J.; Lysyanskaya, A. Dynamic accumulators and application to
efficient revocation of anonymous credentials. In Proceedings of the 22nd Annual
International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology. London, UK,
UK: Springer-Verlag, 2002. CRYPTO ’02, pp. 61–76. ISBN 3-540-44050-X.
[44] Camenisch, J.; et Al. Specification of the Identity Mixer Cryptographic
Library IBM Research - Zurich, 2012. Technical report.
[45] Calhoun, P. et al. Diameter Base Protocol. 2003. http://www.
rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3588.txt.
[46] Camenisch, J.; Michels, M. A group signature scheme based on an RSA
variant BRICS, 1998. Technical report.
[47] Camenisch, J.; Shoup, V. Practical verifiable encryption and decryption of
discrete logarithms. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2003. Editor Dan
Boneh Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2003. Lecture Notes in Computer Science;
vol. 2729, pp. 126–144. ISBN 978-3-540-40674-7.
[48] Camenisch, J.; Stadler, M. Proof Systems for General Statements about
Discrete Logarithms IBM, 1997. Technical report.
104
[49] Damgård, I. Efficient concurrent zero-knowledge in the auxiliary string model.
In Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application
of cryptographic techniques. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2000. EURO-
CRYPT’00, pp. 418–430. ISBN 3-540-67517-5.
[50] Damgård, I. On Σ-protocols, [lecture notes]. 2011.
[51] Dingledine, R. Tor: anonymity online, [world wide web electronic publica-
tion]. 2012.
[52] Damgård, I.; Fujisaki, E. A statistically-hiding integer commitment scheme
based on groups with hidden order. In Proceedings of the 8th International Con-
ference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security:
Advances in Cryptology. London, UK: Springer-Verlag, 2002. ASIACRYPT ’02,
pp. 125–142. ISBN 3-540-00171-9.
[53] Damgård, I.; Nielsen, J. B. Commitment Schemes and Zero-Knowledge
Protocols, [lecture notes]. 2011.
[54] Dierks, T.; Rescorla, E. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
Version 1.2. 2008. http://tools.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5246.txt.
[55] Fiat, A.; Shamir, A. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identi-
fication and signature problems. In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 86.
Editor Andrew Odlyzko Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1987. Lecture Notes in
Computer Science; vol. 263, pp. 186–194. ISBN 0-387-18047-8.
[56] Goldwasser, S.; Micali, S.; Rackoff, C. The knowledge complexity of
interactive proof systems. SIAM J. Comput. February 1989, vol. 18, pp. 186–
208. ISSN 0097-5397.
[57] Goldreich, O.; Micali, S.; Wigderson, A. Proofs that yield nothing but
their validity and a methodology of cryptographic protocol design. In Pro-
ceedings of the 27th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science.
Washington, DC, USA: IEEE Computer Society, 1986. SFCS ’86, pp. 174–187.
ISBN 0-8186-0740-8.
[58] Goldschlag, D. M.; Reed, M. G.; Syverson, P. F. Hiding routing in-
formation. In Proceedings of the First International Workshop on Information
Hiding. London, UK, UK: Springer-Verlag, 1996. pp. 137–150. ISBN 3-540-
61996-8.
105
[59] Camenisch, J.; Van Herreweghen, E. Design and implementation of the
idemix anonymous credential system. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference
on Computer and communications security. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 2002.
CCS ’02, pp. 21–30. ISBN 1-58113-612-9.
[60] Chaum, D. L. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital
pseudonyms. Commun. ACM. 1981, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 84–90. ISSN 0001-
0782.
[61] Chaum, D. Security without identification: transaction systems to make big
brother obsolete. Commun. ACM. October 1985, vol. 28, pp. 1030–1044.
ISSN 0001-0782.
[62] Chaum, D.; Van Heyst, E. Group signatures. In Proceedings of the 10th an-
nual international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic tech-
niques. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1991. EUROCRYPT’91, pp. 257–
265. ISBN 3-540-54620-0.
[63] Giry, D.; Quisquater, J.-J. Cryptographic Key Length Recommendation.
2011.
[64] Kiayias, A.; Yung, M. Group signatures: Provable security, efficient con-
structions and anonymity from trapdoor-holders. Cryptology eprint Archive.
2004.
[65] Lapon, J. et al. Performance analysis of accumulator-based revocation mech-
anisms. In Security and Privacy – Silver Linings in the Cloud. Editors Kai
Rannenberg, Vijay Varadharajan a Christian Weber Springer Boston, 2010.
IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology; vol. 330, pp.
289–301. ISBN 978-3-642-15256-6.
[66] Montgomery, P. L. Modular multiplication without trial division. Mathe-
matics of Computation. April 1985, vol. 44, pp. 519–521. ISSN 1080-6842.
[67] Menezes, A. J. et al. Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC Press, 1997.
ISBN 978-0849385230.
[68] Paquin, C. U-Prove Cryptographic Specification V1.1 Microsoft Corporation,
2011. Technical report.
[69] Mostowski, W.; Vullers, P. Efficient u-prove implementation for anony-
mous credentials on smart cards. In Proceedings of the 7th International ICST
Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. Berlin, Hei-
delberg: Springer-Verlag, 2011. SecureComm’11.
106
[70] Nguyen, L. Accumulators from bilinear pairings and applications. In Topics in
Cryptology CT-RSA 2005. Editor Alfred Menezes Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,
2005. Lecture Notes in Computer Science; vol. 3376, pp. 275–292. ISBN 978-
3-540-24399-1.
[71] National Institute of Standards and Technology (U.S.) . Digital
Signature Standard (DSS) [electronic resource]. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD :, 2009. pp. 1
online resource (ix, 119 p.) :.
[72] Naumann, I.; Hogben, G. Privacy features of eid cards. Network Security
Newsletter. 2008, vol. 2008, pp. 9–13. ISSN 1353-4858.
[73] Nguyen, L.; Safavi-Naini, R. Efficient and provably secure trapdoor-free
group signature schemes from bilinear pairings. In ASIACRYPT’04, LNCS
3329 Springer-Verlag, 2004. pp. 372–386. ISBN 3-540-23975-8.
[74] The White House. National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cy-
berspace. 2011. http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_
viewer/NSTICstrategy_041511.pdf.
[75] Neuman, C. et al. The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5). 2005.
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4120.txt.
[76] Okamoto, T.; Uchiyama, S. A new public-key cryptosystem as secure as
factoring. In Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 98. Editor Kaisa Nyberg
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 1998. Lecture Notes in Computer Science; vol.
1403, pp. 308–318. ISBN 3-540-64518-7.
[77] Popescu, C. An efficient id-based group signature scheme. Babes-Bolyai,
Informatica. 2002, vol. 2, pp. 29–38. ISBN 978-1-4244-9347-0.
[78] Postel, J. Transmission Control Protocol. 1981. http://www.ietf.org/
rfc/rfc793.txt.
[79] Pedersen, T. P. Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable
secret sharing. In Proceedings of the 11th Annual International Cryptology
Conference on Advances in Cryptology. London, UK, UK: Springer-Verlag,
1992. CRYPTO ’91, pp. 129–140. ISBN 3-540-55188-3.
[80] Quisquater, J.-J. et al. How to explain zero-knowledge protocols to your
children. In Proceedings on Advances in cryptology. New York, NY, USA:
Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 1989. CRYPTO ’89, pp. 628–631. ISBN 0-387-
97317-6.
107
[81] Rivest, R. The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm. 1992. http://www.ietf.
org/rfc/rfc1320.txt.
[82] Rivest, R. The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm. 1992. http://www.ietf.
org/rfc/rfc1321.txt.
[83] Reiter, M. K.; Rubin, A. D. Crowds: anonymity for web transactions. ACM
Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 1998, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 66–92. ISSN 1094-9224.
[84] Rivest, R. L.; Shamir, A.; Adleman, L. A method for obtaining digital
signatures and public-key cryptosystems. Commun. ACM. February 1978,
vol. 21, pp. 120–126. ISSN 0001-0782.
[85] Reed, M. G.; Syverson, P. F.; Goldschlag, D. M. Anonymous connec-
tions and onion routing. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications.
1998, vol. 16, pp. 482–494. ISSN 0733-8716.
[86] Rigney, C. et al. Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS).
2000. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2865.txt.
[87] Schnorr, C. P. Efficient signature generation by smart cards. Journal of
Cryptology. 1991, vol. 4, pp. 161–174. ISSN 0933-2790.
[88] Schaffer, M.; Schartner, P. Anonymous authentication with optional
shared anonymity revocation and linkability. In Proceedings of the 7th IFIP
WG 8.8/11.2 international conference on Smart Card Research and Advanced
Applications. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2006. CARDIS’06, pp. 206–
221. ISBN 3-540-33311-8, 978-3-540-33311-1.
[89] Sako, K.; Yonezawa, S.; Teranishi, I. Anonymous authentication: For
privacy and security. Nec Journal Of Advanced Technology: Special Issue on
Security for Network Security. 2005. ISBN 1348-8341.
[90] Todorov, D. Mechanics of User Identification and Authentication: Fun-
damentals of Identity Management. 1 edition. AUERBACH, June 2007.
ISBN 1420052195.
[91] Teranishi, I.; Furukawa, J.; Sako, K. k-times anonymous authentication
(extended abstract). In ASIACRYPT, VOLUME 3329 OF LNCS Springer,
2004. pp. 308–322. ISBN 3-540-23975-8.
108
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AVP Attribute-Value Pairs
DDDH Derived Decisional Diffie Hellman Assumption
DDH Decisional Diffie Hellman Assumption
DH Diffie Hellman
DL Discrete Logarithm
DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
eID Electronic ID
FS Fiat Shamir
H Secure Hash Function
HTTP Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HVZK Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge
I Issuer
ID Identity, Identity Document
IP Internet Protocol
IPS Interactive Proof Systém
Ipsec IP Security
KDC Kerberos Distribution Center
LAN Local Area Network
LTK Long Term Key
MD5 Message Digest Algorithm
NAT Network Address Translation
NFC Near Field Communication
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
109
nonce Number used ONCE (fresh randomness)
NSTIC National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace
OU Okamoto Uchiyama
OWF One Way Function
P Prover
PA Public Auhtority
PDLE Proof of Discrete Logarithm Equivalence
PEAP Protected Extensible Authentication Protocol
Pk Public Key
PK Proof of Knowledge
PKDL Proof of Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PPP Point-To-point Protocol
RADIUS Remote Authentication Dial-In Protocol
RSA Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithm
SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
Sk Private Key
sRSA Strong RSA Assumption
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TGT Ticket Granting Ticket
TLS Transport Layer Security Protocol
TOR The Onion Routing Protocol
TP Trusted Party
TRD Tamper Resistant Device
U User
110
UDP User Datagram Protocol
V Verifier
VE Verifiable Encryption
VLR Verifier Local Revocation
VPN Virtual Private Network
WWW World Wide Web
ZK Zero-Knowledge
111
LIST OF APPENDICES
A Appendix: Mathematica 7.0 Script 113
B Appendix: Smart-card Source Code 115
112
A APPENDIX: MATHEMATICA 7.0 SCRIPT
(*Pre-defined system parameters: length of modulus, number of verification sessions,
OU group modulus and safe primes r, s*)
modulus=1024;
iterace=1000000;
Test=True;
ri=75600297147579351057756514812931727100002265785597272548504900517849388985069477
6490601926739494070872643;
r=151200594295158702115513029625863454200004531571194545097009801035698777970138955
2981203853478988141745287;
si=85754769631754086140332178744139919921280996680811633584960569395420586327100211
61673644011999083;
s=171509539263508172280664357488279839842561993361623267169921138790841172654200423
23347288023998167;
n=r^2*s;
phi=n*(1-1/r)(1-1/s);
(*The iterations simulate not only the verification protocol but also parameter generation*)
i=0;
While[i<iterace&&Test==True,{
(*Generation of OU parameters, by PA*)
S1=RandomInteger[{2^159,2^160-1}];
g1=2;
g3=3;
While[PowerMod[g1,phi/r,n]==1||PowerMod[g1,phi/(ri),n]==1||PowerMod[g1,phi/(si),n]==1||
PowerMod[g1,r-1,r^2]==1||PowerMod[g1,2r,r^2]==1||PowerMod[g1,r*ri,r^2]==1,g1++];
While[PowerMod[g3,phi/r,n]==1||PowerMod[g3,phi/(ri),n]==1||PowerMod[g3,phi/(si),n]==1||
PowerMod[g3,r-1,r^2]==1||PowerMod[g3,2r,r^2]==1||PowerMod[g3,r*ri,r^2]==1||g1==g3,g3++];
S2inv=RandomInteger[{2^159,2^160-1}];
While[GCD[S2inv,phi]!=1,S2inv=RandomInteger[{2^159,2^160-1}]];
S2=PowerMod[S2inv,-1,phi];
g2=PowerMod[g1,S2,n];
A=PowerMod[g1,S1,n];
(*Generation of token parameters, by PA and User*)
w=RandomInteger[{2^158,2^159-1}];
wiU=RandomInteger[{2^159,2^160-1}];
Ai=Mod[PowerMod[g1,w,n]*PowerMod[g2,wiU,n],n];
wiPA=Mod[(PowerMod[Mod[A*PowerMod[Ai,-1,n],n],(r-1),r^2]-1)/r*PowerMod[
(PowerMod[g2,(r-1),r^2]-1)/r,-1,r],r ];
wi=wiU+wiPA;
Atest=Mod[PowerMod[g1,w,n]*PowerMod[g2,wi,n],n];
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Test0=A==Atest;
(*Verification protocol simulation, by User*)
(*Step1*)
r1=RandomInteger[{2^0,2^400-1}];
r1i=RandomInteger[{2^0,2^560-1}];
r2=RandomInteger[{2^0,2^640-1}];
r2i=RandomInteger[{2^0,2^800-1}];
c1=A;
c11=Mod[PowerMod[g1,r1,n]*PowerMod[g2,r1i,n],n];
c2=c11;
c3=PowerMod[g3,r1,n];
c22=Mod[PowerMod[g1,r2,n]*PowerMod[g2,r2i,n],n];
c33=PowerMod[g3,r2,n];
(*Step2*)
e1=RandomInteger[{0,2^160-1}];
(*Step3*)
z1=r1-e1*w;
z1i=r1i-e1*wi;
z2=r2-e1*r1;
z2i=r2i-e1*r1i;
(*Verifier’s check*)
Test1=c11==Mod[PowerMod[g1,z1,n]*PowerMod[g2,z1i,n]*PowerMod[c1,e1,n],n];
Test2=c22==Mod[PowerMod[g1,z2,n]*PowerMod[g2,z2i,n]*PowerMod[c2,e1,n],n];
Test3=c33==Mod[PowerMod[g3,z2,n]*PowerMod[c3,e1,n],n];
revr1=Mod[(PowerMod[c3,(r-1),r^2]-1)/r*PowerMod[(PowerMod[g3,
(r-1),r^2]-1)/r,-1,r],r ];
revw=Mod[PowerMod[e1,-1,r]*Mod[revr1-z1,r],r];
rev=PowerMod[g3,revw,n];
Test4=c3==Mod[PowerMod[g3,z1,n]*PowerMod[rev,e1,n],n];
Test5 = w == revw;
i++;
Test= Test0&&Test1&&Test2&&Test3&&Test4&&Test5;
If[Mod[i,1000]==0,Print[DateString["Time"]," Iterace ", i, ": ",Test],];
If[Test,,iterace=0];
}]
01:26:50 Iterace 1000000: True
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B APPENDIX: SMART-CARD SOURCE CODE
using System;
using System.Text;
using System.IO;
using System.Security.Cryptography;
namespace MyCompany.Server
{
public class Service : MarshalByRefObject
{
/// <summary>
/// optimalized nonVARversion
/// </summary>
/// This version is optimized only for 1024b tokens
static int RSAsize =1024;
static int k = RSAsize/8;
#region ProtocolParameters
private static byte[] w,wi;
static byte[] two = new byte[1];
static byte[] aMULTb = new byte[k];
private static byte[] r1 = new byte[k];
private static byte[] r1i = new byte[k];
private static byte[] r2 = new byte[k];
private static byte[] r2i = new byte[k];
static byte[] c11,c3,c22,c33;
static byte[] e1 = new byte[k];
static byte[] z1,z2,z1i,z2i;
#endregion
//Cryptoprimitives
static private RSACryptoServiceProvider RSAd = new
RSACryptoServiceProvider(RSAsize);
private static RNGCryptoServiceProvider generator = new
RNGCryptoServiceProvider();
public static RSAParameters RSAparam = new RSAParameters();
static SHA1 sha = SHA1.Create();
//Modulus size setter
public void SetRSAsize(int size)
{
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RSAsize = size;
}
#region Power a Multiply
//Power
public static byte[] Power(byte[] baze, byte[] exponent, byte[] modulus)
{
RSAparam.Exponent = exponent;
RSAparam.Modulus = modulus;
RSAd.ImportParameters(RSAparam);
return RSAd.EncryptValue(baze);
}
//Multiply
public static byte[] Multiply(byte[] a_byte, byte[] b_byte, byte[] mod_byte)
{
aMULTb = ArrSubSimple(ArrSubSimple(Power(ArrAddSimple(a_byte, b_byte,
mod_byte),
two, mod_byte), Power(a_byte, two, mod_byte), mod_byte),
Power(b_byte, two, mod_byte), mod_byte);
return ArrHalfSimple(aMULTb, mod_byte);
}
#endregion
#region Verification protocol
//Stores parameters to memory
public void SetParametersTxt(string variable, string name, bool first, bool last)
{
//Appends new parameter line
FileStream file = new FileStream("C:/Data/TokenList.txt", FileMode.Append,
FileAccess.Write);
StreamWriter sw = new StreamWriter(file);
string parameters = "";
//Parameters
parameters += variable;
//Write to file
sw.WriteLine(parameters);
sw.Close();
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file.Close();
}
//Erase card
public void EraseParametersTxt()
{
//Creates streamwriter
FileStream file = new FileStream("C:/Data/TokenList.txt", FileMode.Create,
FileAccess.Write);
StreamWriter sw = new StreamWriter(file);
string parameters = "";
//Writes empty string
sw.Write(parameters);
sw.Close();
file.Close();
}
//Computes verification proof
public void RunVerification()
{
two[0] = 2;
//system parameters hardcoded for 1024b, for speed
byte[] g1 = Convert.FromBase64String("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAI=");
byte[] g3 = Convert.FromBase64String("AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAM=");
byte[] g2 = Convert.FromBase64String("Dkatf0hDyRLsCQeqaFPt81CoUYqbbrVF
ykoGfcwEVK1HVhxQ/DXJJ4cY9Uye9SmyfZ2UQ/HKbvVN7eeWJ4YZdkU/YH6xVof9foei8e
gYnl93mz6CWfQ3NQZg35H+KmqCHhqHrxSSVC7pWiCjmRs6qPKy/VsBhcP9GzsDPd49bwk=");
byte[] n = Convert.FromBase64String("k4UD8MWbWzeUcCull8TIPK7ZZzc6bVZLB
2vJ/cWlIzyW32ngZfUzDXkiNu/UA3YkHOmVaU8TilMSXvtUD3gHXhZgVJgfp8gCu/YYlW3/
L+34wEsqHXn9bHu4r1N6ojFoUoPA7yk8+2OfdXlZqj4z+YT8j6YUEaV5PBS5RWJa4Dk=");
//Loads secret keys w, wi from persistent memory
StreamReader sReader = new StreamReader("C:/Data/TokenList.txt");
w = Convert.FromBase64String(sReader.ReadLine());
wi = Convert.FromBase64String(sReader.ReadLine());
//Generates randomness for the proof
generator.GetBytes(r1, k - 48, 48);
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generator.GetBytes(r1i, k - 68, 68);
generator.GetBytes(r2, k - 75, 75);
generator.GetBytes(r2i, k - 95, 95);
//Computes the output
c11 = Multiply(Power(g1, r1, n), Power(g2, r1i, n), n);
c3 = Power(g3, r1, n);
c22 = Multiply(Power(g1, r2, n), Power(g2, r2i, n), n);
c33 = Power(g3, r2, n);
Array.Copy(sha.ComputeHash(c11), 0, e1, k-20, 20);
z1 = ArrSubSimple(r1, Multiply(e1, w, n), n);
z1i = ArrSubSimple(r1i, Multiply(e1, wi, n), n);
z2 = ArrSubSimple(r2, Multiply(e1, r1, n), n);
z2i = ArrSubSimple(r2i, Multiply(e1, r1i, n), n);
}
#endregion
#region Getters
public byte[] Getc11()
{
return c11;
}
public byte[] Gete1()
{
return e1;
}
public byte[] Getc22()
{
return c22;
}
public byte[] Getc33()
{
return c33;
}
public byte[] Getz1i()
{
return z1i;
}
public byte[] Getz2()
118
{
return z2;
}
public byte[] Getz2i()
{
return z2i;
}
public byte[] Getc3()
{
return c3;
}
public byte[] Getz1()
{
return z1;
}
public byte[] Getw()
{
return w;
}
public byte[] Getwi()
{
return wi;
}
#endregion
#region arithmetics
//Addition
public static byte[] ArrAddSimple(byte[] a, byte[] b, byte[] modulus)
{
byte[] res = new byte[k];
int[] carry = new int[2];
for (int i = k - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
carry[(i + 1) % 2] = ((a[i] + b[i] + carry[i % 2]) > 255) ?
0x1 : 0x0;
res[i] = (byte)((a[i] + b[i] + carry[i % 2]) % 256);
}
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if (carry[1] == 1)
{
a = ArrSubSimple(a, modulus, modulus);
res = ArrAddSimple(b, a, modulus);
}
return res;
}
//Subtraction
public static byte[] ArrSubSimple(byte[] a, byte[] b, byte[] modulus)
{
byte[] res = new byte[k];
int[] carry = new int[2];
for (int j = 0; j < k; j++)
{
if (a[j] > b[j])
{
for (int i = k - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
carry[(i + 1) % 2] = ((a[i] - b[i] - carry[i % 2]) < 0) ? 0x1 : 0x0;
res[i] = (byte)((a[i] - b[i] - carry[i % 2] + 256 *
carry[(i + 1) % 2]) % 256);
}
return res;
}
if (a[j] < b[j])
{
for (int i = k - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
carry[(i + 1) % 2] = ((modulus[i] + a[i] +
carry[i % 2]) > 255) ? 0x1 : 0x0;
res[i] = (byte)((modulus[i] + a[i] + carry[i % 2]) % 256);
}
for (int i = k - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
carry[(i + 1) % 2] = ((res[i] - b[i] -
carry[i % 2]) < 0) ? 0x1 : 0x0;
res[i] = (byte)((res[i] - b[i] - carry[i % 2] +
256 * carry[(i + 1) % 2]) % 256);
}
return res;
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}}
for (int i = k - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
carry[(i + 1) % 2] = ((a[i] - b[i] - carry[i % 2]) < 0) ? 0x1 : 0x0;
res[i] = (byte)((a[i] - b[i] - carry[i % 2] + 256 * carry[(i + 1) % 2])
% 256);
}
return res;
}
//Division by 2
public static byte[] ArrHalfSimple(byte[] input, byte[] modulus)
{
if (input[k - 1] % 2 == 1)
{
byte[] res = new byte[k + 1];
int[] carry = new int[2];
for (int i = k - 1; i >= 0; i--)
{
carry[(i + 1) % 2] = ((input[i] + modulus[i] +
carry[i % 2]) > 255) ? 0x1 : 0x0;
res[i + 1] = (byte)((input[i] + modulus[i] +
carry[i % 2]) % 256);
}
res[0] = (byte)carry[1];
int[] carry2 = new int[2];
for (int j = 0; j < k + 1; j++)
{
carry2[(j + 1) % 2] = (res[j] % 2) * 128;
res[j] = (byte)((res[j] >> 1) + carry2[j % 2]);
};
for (int j = 0; j < k; j++)
{
input[j] = res[j + 1];
};
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return input;
}
int[] carry3 = new int[2];
for (int j = 0; j < k; j++)
{
carry3[(j + 1) % 2] = (input[j] % 2) * 128;
input[j] = (byte)((input[j] >> 1) + carry3[j % 2]);
};
return input;
}
#endregion
}
}
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